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Rural life in developing and transition countries is prone to risks. Unanticipated shocks such as 
droughts, fluctuating prices or diseases pose a heavy burden on rural welfare and frequently push 
rural households into poverty. Households, however, do not just undergo shocks. In the absence 
of functioning formal insurance and credit markets, they have developed a remarkable set of 
strategies to manage risks ex-ante and cope with shocks ex-post. This dissertation takes a welfare 
perspective to analyze how rural households adapt their livelihoods to the multitude of risks and 
shocks. 
The first part looks at risk-coping strategies and analyzes the socio-economic consequences of 
AIDS-related mortality in rural sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 2 shows that households in rural 
Zambia are able to stabilize their per-capita incomes after the death of a prime-age member. 
Adjustments of income-generating activities as well as household size and composition are likely 
to explain this finding. Yet, risk-sharing arrangements appear to spread the burden beyond 
directly afflicted households. Households that have not lost a member but support afflicted 
households by fostering orphans incur considerable reductions in per-capita incomes. Overall, 
however, the impact of AIDS-related mortality on monetary welfare appears to be rather limited. 
Nevertheless, the death of an adult member could still affect other dimensions of household 
welfare. Chapter 3 demonstrates for North-Western Tanzania that the age at parental 
bereavement has important consequences for children’s long-term capital accumulation in terms 
of both health and education. These effects, however, depend on the gender of the deceased 
parent. Preferences of the surviving parent partly protect same-sex children from the detrimental 
effects of orphanhood, suggesting that risks are not shared equally within households. 
The second part of the dissertation explores risk-management strategies and investigates the 
income diversification patterns of farm households in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 4 analyzes the 
dichotomy of the non-agricultural sector in Western Kenya and the resulting poverty and 
inequality implications. The results show that only rich households are able to overcome the 
entry barriers into high-return activities. Low-return activities, however, are not concentrated 
among the poor. They are pursued by households across the entire income distribution, possibly 
reflecting the high risks associated with high-return activities. The chapter also provides evidence 
that engagement in high-return, but not low-return non-agricultural activities is associated with 
increased agricultural productivity. Apparently, high-return activities play an important role in 
triggering positive interactions between different income strategies and may hence contribute to 
sustainable livelihood success. Chapter 5 examines the determinants of diversification in Burkina 
Faso over the shock-prone period between 1994 and 2003. Diversification into non-agricultural 
activities appears to be motivated by insurance motives. During the severe drought in 1997/1998 
households earned increased incomes from migration and local non-agricultural activities. The 
poorest households were hit particularly hard, often being forced to sell livestock. Yet, the 
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patterns of diversification also reflect structural change offering better opportunities in the non-
farm sector. 
The final part of the dissertation concentrates on Eastern Europe and looks at the welfare 
implications of international migration for those who stay behind and the migrants themselves. 
Chapter 6 examines the reasons for reduced labor supply of migrant-sending households in 
Moldova. The findings do not support the common view that decreased labor market activity is 
the result of remittances-driven leisure consumption. Instead, the departure of a migrant appears 
to raise remaining members’ productivity in home production. In addition, young adults in 
migrant families are substantially more likely to pursue higher education. This effect may be due 
to remittances relieving credit constraints or migration-induced incentives for additional 
investments in human capital. Chapter 7 takes into account that migration itself is a very risky 
activity. It investigates the economic drivers of human trafficking, which refers to a situation in 
which a migrant has been recruited under false promises and is forced to work for no or little pay 
by means of coercion. Based on a household survey on human trafficking from Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Moldova, Romania and Ukraine, the analysis finds that the individual risk of falling victim to 
human trafficking increases with the size of regional migration flows. The reasons are lower 
recruitment costs for traffickers and, to a lesser extent, more negative self-selection into 
migration.  
Together, these findings illustrate that rural households in the developing world have adapted 
their livelihoods in various ways to cope with shocks and reduce their exposure to risks. While 
these strategies help households to temporarily smooth income or consumption, they are likely to 
perpetuate poverty and reduce economic growth. Coping strategies such as the depletion of 
productive assets or the withdrawal of children from school have detrimental and persistent 
effects on future welfare and vulnerability. Likewise, diversification into low-risk low-return 
activities prevents capital accumulation or savings. Consequently, measures that protect 






Rural households in developing and transition countries face many risks. Climatic shocks such as 
drought, flooding, or pestilence can substantially reduce crop and livestock income. Economic 
shocks, in particular fluctuating input and output prices, add to the vulnerability of rural 
households’ income base. Besides, rural livelihoods are subject to political and institutional 
shocks like conflict or arbitrary treatment by government authorities. In transition countries, the 
change in production systems characterized by market liberalization and the reallocation of 
productive assets has also severely impacted on rural livelihoods. Finally, there are several 
household-specific types of shocks: Illness, death, or crime can impose a heavy burden on a 
household’s income-generating activities. Both the frequency and severity of shocks have not 
been declining over the past decades. Rather, globalization and the increasing interdependencies 
of previously segmented markets, the spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS as well as global 
warming keep risks in rural areas high (Dercon, 2005). 
Unlike in developed countries, formal insurance and credit markets are often incomplete or 
missing altogether in developing countries, in particular in rural areas. Thus, households have to 
fall back on informal measures to smooth their income or consumption (Murdoch, 1995). These 
measures basically fall into two categories. First, households can manage risks ex-ante. By 
choosing income portfolios with low positive covariances between different income-generating 
activities, they are able to mitigate the adverse impacts of shocks before they actually occur. For 
instance, farmers could engage in non-agricultural activities including migration to reduce their 
exposure to agricultural risks. Second, households can cope with risks ex-post. Various coping 
strategies, such as asset depletion, changes in the allocation and supply of labor as well as 
informal borrowing within the extended family or community, help shock-hit households to 
temporarily stabilize their consumption levels. 
Overall, risks can be classified as covariate or idiosyncratic. Covariate risks such as drought or 
commodity price shocks impinge on the total population of a region or community. By contrast, 
idiosyncratic risks like sickness only affect particular individuals or households of the population 
under consideration. In general, idiosyncratic risks are insurable within a community because not 
every member would be affected at the same time and require transfers (Townsend, 1994). 
Covariate risks, however, are not compatible with community insurance schemes. The inability to 
pool risks resulting from the fact that covariate shocks hit all members simultaneously renders 
these schemes bound to fail (Murdoch, 1999). In such cases, households have to rely on transfers 
from outside of the community, e.g. remittances sent by migrants or on personal savings 
including the sale of assets to smooth their consumption. Nevertheless, in case of severe 
economy-wide shocks the effectiveness of self-insurance through asset depletion might also be 
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limited. Asset markets may poorly function as the number of asset sellers is likely to exceed the 
number of asset buyers by far, thus depressing asset prices (Dercon, 2005). 
Similarly, ex-ante strategies to manage risks have their limits. Poor farmers who want to diversify 
into profitable non-agricultural activities face considerable entry constraints (Dercon and 
Krishnan, 1996). In addition, high-return activities often exhibit high risks. As a result, 
households may have to resort to low-risk and low-return activities and forego income in order 
to reduce the overall risk exposure of their income portfolio (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993).  
On the whole, rural households in developing and transition countries have developed a 
remarkable set of strategies to deal with risks and shocks in the absence of functioning formal 
insurance and credit markets. While both risk management and risk coping reduce households’ 
vulnerability to severe hardship, however, they cannot completely shield from risks (Dercon, 
2005). 
Against this general backdrop, this dissertation takes a welfare perspective to analyze how rural 
households cope with shocks and adapt their livelihoods to the multitude of risks. The first part 
looks into the consequences of AIDS-related mortality on various dimensions of household 
welfare in rural sub-Saharan Africa. The second part analyzes income diversification patterns of 
rural households in sub-Saharan Africa. The third and final part concentrates on Eastern Europe 
and examines the welfare implications of migration for household members left behind and the 
migrants themselves. 
HIV/AIDS poses a relatively new and severe health risk. Since the arrival of the virus, HIV 
prevalence rates have increased dramatically in many developing countries. Sub-Saharan Africa is 
particularly affected and has seen AIDS become the prime cause of adult death within just two 
decades (WHO, 2008). In contrast to other common diseases, AIDS first and foremost hits 
prime-age adults. It thus kills people at the peak of their productivity and earning capacity and 
disrupts many families. 
Chapter 2 evaluates the impact of AIDS-related mortality on per-capita incomes of surviving 
household members. The loss of a prime-age adult is likely to reduce total household income. 
Yet, the effect on per-capita income is not clear a priori as the number of consuming members in 
the household is also reduced. Ceteris paribus, the direction of the effect depends on whether the 
deceased adult was a net producer or net consumer for the household. In addition, as discussed 
above, households do not just undergo shocks; they try to mitigate adverse welfare impacts. To 
stabilize per-capita incomes, afflicted households may adjust their income-generating activities or 
change the composition and size of the household. For instance, they could work longer and 
harder hours to substitute for the labor previously supplied by the late member. Otherwise, they 
could call migrants back to the household to increase the number of net producers or reduce the 
number of net consumers by sending children away to members of the extended family. 
A major problem in identifying the causal impact of AIDS-related mortality on household 
welfare is that health shocks are typically not distributed randomly across the population. With 
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HIV being primarily transmitted sexually, AIDS is a behavioral disease and may thus cause 
endogenous selection into prime-age mortality. Another problem is that risk-sharing agreements 
between households may blur the distinction between the treatment and control group. To the 
extent that non-afflicted households support afflicted households by sending adults or fostering 
children, the welfare implications of AIDS-related deaths are likely to be underestimated. These 
problems are dealt with by using difference-in-difference matching techniques and excluding 
households from the control group if members departed or joined for reasons related to AIDS. 
The analysis is based on a large nationally representative longitudinal survey from Zambia that 
tracks rural households over the period 2001-2004. 
Chapter 3 considers some non-monetary consequences of prime-age mortality. Building on the 
finding that losing a parent has detrimental effects on human capital accumulation, it aims to 
identify critical periods in child development by examining how the impact of parental loss 
differs with age at bereavement. There is ample theoretical ground to expect impact heterogeneity 
across the age at which a child loses a parent. The impacts of psychological trauma, income loss, 
and changed preferences of the (new) caregivers are all likely to vary with children’s age. 
The problem of unobserved heterogeneity is addressed by controlling for a wide range of pre-
orphanhood characteristics and demonstrating that future age at bereavement is not associated 
with baseline outcomes. An alternative identification strategy is based on family fixed effects and 
exploits the exogenous variation created by the fact that siblings experience parental death 
simultaneously, but at different ages. The analysis deals with both dimensions of human capital, 
health and education, and takes a long-run perspective. It is based on a longitudinal household 
survey from the predominantly rural Kagera region in North-Western Tanzania that spans 
thirteen years from 1991 to 2004. 
While the first part of this dissertation is concerned with risk-coping, the second part deals with 
risk-management strategies of rural households. As argued above, income diversification can help 
households to reduce their vulnerability to income shocks. In rural areas, many farmers diversify 
into non-agricultural activities. Such activities include both local self- or wage employment and 
migration. Locally employed members directly contribute non-agricultural income to their 
households’ budget, whereas migrants usually send remittances on a regular base or help out 
when a shock hits their households of origin. Under normal circumstances, agricultural incomes 
are not highly correlated with income from local non-agricultural employment. During severe 
crisis, however, agricultural and non-agricultural incomes may move together as a result of 
demand and supply linkages in spatially segmented markets (Czukas et al., 1998). Thus, the 
effectiveness of diversification might be reduced when it is needed most. By contrast, 
remittances, in particular from urban or international migrants, are unlikely to be subject to the 
same shocks and may hence provide a more reliable form of insurance in case of emergency 
(Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). 
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Chapter 4 analyzes the dichotomy of the local non-agricultural sector and the resulting poverty 
and inequality implications. Apart from insurance motives, rural households’ diversification 
patterns can be looked at as survival- or opportunity-led. Poor rural households without a 
sufficient agricultural asset base may be forced to diversify into non-agricultural activities to 
sustain a living. Such activities are characterized by low returns, often below those in agriculture. 
By contrast, richer households may use their higher asset endowments to enter profitable niches 
in the non-agricultural sector. These activities typically exhibit entry barriers which the poor are 
not able to overcome. 
The resulting dichotomy of the non-agricultural sector implies a U-shaped relationship between 
household wealth and the share of income earned from non-agricultural employment. Survival-
led diversification should increase the incomes of the poor and hence decrease inequality. The 
reverse should be true for opportunity-led diversification. These considerations are tested using a 
household survey from Kakamega district, a poor rural region in Western Kenya. 
Chapter 5 investigates the changing patterns and determinants of income diversification of farm 
households in Burkina Faso between 1994 and 2003. Burkina Faso is an exceptionally shock-
prone country. During the period under consideration, the country experienced two severe 
droughts (1997/1998 and 2001) and a political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire (2002), the main destination 
of Burkinabe migrants. Another though rather positive shock for rural households was the CFA 
Franc devaluation in 1994. The analysis relies on three nationally representative household 
surveys from 1994, 1998, and 2003. Thus, the surveys were well-timed to capture the effects of 
adverse shocks on households’ income portfolios. 
The last part of this dissertation is dedicated to international migration, with a focus on transition 
countries in Eastern Europe. The transition from a centrally planned to a market economy has 
fundamentally changed the livelihoods of rural households in the former Soviet Union. Above all, 
the privatization of agricultural assets and the liberalization of agricultural markets in 
combination with the abolition or reform of previously existing safety nets have (temporarily) 
increased insecurity and vulnerability of many farmers. These circumstances as well as the (re-
)integration with Western Europe and Russia’s economic crisis in 1998 have induced many 
households to send a migrant abroad (Mansoor and Quillin, 2007). 
Chapter 6 examines the reasons for reduced labor market activity of household members left 
behind by labor migrants. The receipt of remittances has often been argued to lower the work 
effort and labor supply of migrant-sending households. However, labor market inactivity is not 
necessarily due to remittances-driven leisure consumption. The departure of a migrant implies 
that two helping hands might be missing for household duties, child care or work on the 
household farm. Thus, individuals from migrant families might substitute for the labor of the 
migrants if they were previously engaged in home production. In addition, younger adults in 
migrant-sending households could be more likely to engage in higher education. This effect may 
be due to remittances relieving credit constraints or additional incentives for education as returns 
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to education are often higher abroad and migrants directly transmit information on jobs in their 
destinations. 
The relative importance of these explanations is assessed with a recent household survey from 
Moldova. Because of self-selection into migration, any observed differences in inactivity patterns 
between migrant and non-migrant households might have existed already before migration. This 
concern is addressed by using a novel instrumental-variable approach that exploits the substantial 
diversity of first emigrants’ destination choices. The instrument is based on the degree to which 
initial regional migrant networks in the different destination countries differentially exposed 
Moldovan regions to economic performance and job opportunities abroad, thus affecting the 
subsequent departure of new migrants. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the welfare of the migrant, taking into account that due to the enormous 
information asymmetries involved migration itself is a very risky activity. It analyses the economic 
drivers of human trafficking, which refers to a situation in which a migrant has been recruited 
under false promises and is forced to work for no or little pay by means of coercion. Arguably, 
human trafficking is the worst possible outcome of migration. Trafficked migrants experience a 
dramatic loss of material and non-material welfare and are typically unable to send remittances to 
their households. The main hypothesis is that human trafficking is closely interwoven with 
regional migration flows. The departure of many migrants from a given area is likely to cause 
adverse cumulative effects on both the demand side (criminal agents recruiting for employers 
abroad) and the supply side (vulnerable individuals willing to work abroad) of the human 
trafficking market, thus increasing the risk of being trafficked. In particular, mass migration from 
a region may lower recruitment costs for traffickers and increase the degree of negative self-
selection into migration. The analysis aims to disentangle the role of demand- and supply-side 
factors and builds on a household survey on human trafficking from Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, 




Czukas, K., M. Fafchamps and C. Udry (1998). Drought and Saving in West Africa: Are 
Livestock a Buffer Stock? Journal of Development Economics, 55(2): 237-305. 
Dercon, S. (Ed.) (2005). Insurance Against Poverty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dercon, S., and P. Krishnan (1996). Income Portfolios in Rural Ethiopia and Tanzania: Choices 
and Constraints. Journal of Development Studies, 32(6): 850-875. 
Mansoor, A., and B. Quillin (2007). Migration and Remittances: Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
Murdoch, J. (1999). Between the State and the Market: Can Informal Insurance Patch the Safety 
Net? World Bank Research Observer, 14(2): 187-207. 
Murdoch, J. (1995). Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 9(3): 103-114. 
Rapoport, H., and F. Docquier (2006). The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances. In S.C. Kolm 
and J. Mercier Ythier (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity. 
Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Rosenzweig, M., and K. Wolpin (1993). Credit Market Constraints, Consumption Smoothing, 
and the Accumulation of Durable Production Assets in Low-Income Countries: 
Investment in Bullocks in India. Journal of Political Economy, 101(2): 223-244. 
Townsend, R.M. (1994). Risk and Insurance in Village India. Econometrica, 62(3): 539-591. 




Does AIDS-Related Mortality Reduce Per-Capita Household Income? 
Evidence from Rural Zambia1 
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Abstract 
Without knowledge about the causal impact of HIV/AIDS on poverty, the benefits of 
current programs to fight the epidemic cannot be fully assessed. Yet, evidence on the 
impoverishing effect of HIV/AIDS is still scarce. This paper evaluates the impact of 
AIDS-related mortality on per-capita incomes of surviving household members, using a 
nationally representative sample of rural households from Zambia. Using difference-in-
difference matching techniques, we find that the death of a prime-age member has no 
significant effect on per-capita household income. This result continues to hold when we 
control for spillover effects by excluding households from the control group if members 
departed or joined for reasons related to AIDS. However, non-afflicted households hosting 
orphans incur considerable reductions in per-capita incomes. A likely explanation for the 
limited income effects is that surviving household members pursue a mix of income and 
demographic coping strategies that stabilize income in the short to medium run. 
Keywords: HIV/AIDS, prime-age mortality, per-adult equivalent income, spillovers, 
difference-in-difference, propensity score matching, Zambia 
JEL classification: I31, J19, C14, C23 
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Within two decades, AIDS has become the leading cause of death on the African continent and 
the sixth highest cause of mortality worldwide (WHO, 2008; UNAIDS, 2007). In 2007 alone 
about 1.5 million Africans died due to AIDS and almost 2 million got infected with HIV. With 
22 million, or two thirds, of the global total of 33 million people infected with HIV, sub-Saharan 
Africa is the epicenter of the AIDS epidemic (UNAIDS, 2008a). The consequences of AIDS-
related deaths are not comparable to those from most other diseases because AIDS hits adults at 
the peak of their productivity and earning capacity. It disables and kills the people on whom 
families rely for their livelihood. Consequently, it has been widely conjectured that AIDS may 
constitute a severe impediment to Africa’s socio-economic development. In turn, development 
agencies, international organizations and national governments are spending billions of dollars 
each year to respond to the epidemic. The arrival and scaling-up of antiretroviral treatment has 
dramatically increased health expenditures in highly affected countries. From 2005 to 2008 alone, 
global spending on HIV/AIDS programs increased from US$ 7.9 billion to US$ 13.8 billion 
(UNAIDS, 2009). 
Yet, the impact of AIDS-related mortality on household welfare as measured by per-capita 
income or expenditure is not clear a priori. While AIDS-related mortality may lower total 
household income through the loss of productive family members, the size of the household is 
also reduced by the death of a member. Ceteris paribus, the direction of the effect depends on 
whether the deceased member was a net consumer or a net producer for the household. The 
death of a net producer would reduce per-capita household income of surviving members, 
whereas the death of a net consumer would actually raise per-capita income. In addition, AIDS-
afflicted households may cushion adverse welfare effects through adjusting the income-
generating activities of remaining members (income coping) or the composition and size of the 
household (demographic coping). 
Income-coping strategies include changes in the supply and allocation of household labor. In 
rural areas, non-farm employment may be given up to fill labor shortages on the farm. Case 
studies for Rwanda (Donovan et al., 2003) and Kenya (Yamano and Jayne, 2004) show for 
example that off-farm income of vulnerable and asset-poor households is at particular risk if an 
adult member dies. By contrast, for the Kagera region in Tanzania, Beegle (2005) finds no 
significant changes in labor supply of individuals in households having experienced a prime-age 
death. Another income-coping strategy is the sale of assets. Yamano and Jayne (2004) as well as 
Chapoto and Jayne (2008) find that prime-age mortality has only a minor impact on livestock, but 
greatly reduces the value of small animals such as goats and sheep in rural Kenya and Zambia, 
respectively. 
Demographic coping may involve attempts to attract additional net producers, e.g. by letting 
migrants return to support the household, or to reduce the number of net consumers, e.g. by 
sending children away to members of the extended family. Demographic coping has been shown 
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to exist in the African context, with a strong variation across countries as well as the position and 
sex of the deceased (Mather et al., 2004). At one extreme, afflicted households in Kagera, 
Tanzania were able to maintain their household size (Ainsworth et al., 1995). In Uganda, by 
contrast, household size declined by about one person after a prime-age death, indicating that no 
new members could be attracted (Menon et al., 1998). Based on Demographic and Health 
Surveys from 21 countries across Africa, Beegle et al. (2009) also show that many single orphans 
do not stay with the remaining parent, but are rather sent away to live with other relatives. 
Despite the theoretical ambiguity and the policy relevance of the topic, surprisingly little empirical 
knowledge exists about the effects of AIDS deaths on per-capita welfare of African households 
(Beegle and de Weerdt, 2008).3 It is important to look at the per-capita implications of prime-age 
mortality, as the impact on total household welfare is not ambiguous. Examining the causal 
relationship between HIV/AIDS and poverty is essential for a meaningful cost-benefit analysis of 
current efforts to tackle the epidemic and prioritization of public health interventions. This paper 
aims to make a contribution to filling this gap by evaluating the changes in per-capita household 
incomes associated with AIDS-related mortality in rural Zambia, distinguishing between the 
deaths of household heads and spouses, who are likely to be net producers, as well as other adult 
household members, who might rather tend to be net consumers. Our methodological focus is 
on causal interpretation and we use a large nationally representative longitudinal survey that 
tracks about 5420 Zambian households over the period 2001-2004. 
To minimize the selection bias that potentially arises because AIDS-related mortality is likely to 
be the endogenous outcome of individual behavior, we employ a difference-in-difference 
propensity score matching (DID-PSM) estimator. While PSM removes the selection bias due to 
observed differences between afflicted and non-afflicted households, the DID estimator 
differences out the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between the two groups.  
To the extent that demographic coping plays a significant role, spillover effects may cause a 
further bias in the estimated impact of prime-age mortality. For instance, households without a 
deceased member may experience welfare losses when taking care of children sent away by 
AIDS-afflicted households. These effects have been neglected in the previous literature. We 
assess their relevance by testing whether non-afflicted households with AIDS-related 
demographic changes fare worse in per-capita income terms than their counterparts without such 
changes. In estimating the welfare effects of prime-age mortality, we also exclude households 
from the control group if members departed or joined for reasons related to AIDS.  
Our paper is related to two previous empirical studies by Beegle et al. (2008) and Chapoto and 
Jayne (2008). Beegle et al. (2008) share our objective of evaluating the impact of prime-age 
mortality on the per-capita welfare of surviving household members. Yet they do so for one 
specific region characterized by high HIV prevalence, Kagera district in Tanzania, which makes it 
                                                 




difficult to extrapolate their results to the national level. We use the same dataset as Chapoto and 
Jayne (2008), but their analytical focus is different from our study. Most notably, they look at 
how AIDS-related deaths affect various (farm and non-farm) income sources rather than 
household income per capita. Furthermore, Beegle et al. (2008) as well as Chapoto and Jayne 
(2008) rely on parametric approaches as compared to the non-parametric PSM applied here.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes some key characteristics 
of the dataset, while Section III explains the method used to perform the estimations. The results 
of the empirical analysis are presented in Section IV. The paper closes with some concluding 
remarks. 
2.2 Data and Setting 
We use a nationally representative longitudinal dataset of 5420 rural farm households from 
Zambia surveyed in 2001 and 2004. As a very poor country with high HIV prevalence rates, 
Zambia makes an interesting case to study the effects of AIDS. Three in four rural Zambians live 
below the national poverty line (World Bank, 2007) and about 15 percent of adults aged between 
15 and 49 are HIV-positive (UNAIDS, 2008b). As a result, life expectancy at birth has fallen to 
less than 41 years, making it the second lowest in the world (UNDP, 2007). This naturally raises 
the question to what extent AIDS has contributed to the low levels of socio-economic outcomes 
in Zambia. 
The household survey was conducted by the Central Statistical Office in conjunction with the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and Michigan State University. In addition to standard 
socio-economic information of the household and its members, the survey paid particular 
attention to capturing a household’s income generation process and its demographic 
development including the death of members. It not only recorded all deaths of household 
members after 2001, but also asked whether households had experienced the loss of a member 
between 1996 and 2001. To the best of our knowledge, the survey design makes it one of the 
most representative and comprehensive longitudinal household surveys available from Africa to 
examine the socio-economic effects of prime-age mortality. In particular, the combination of 
both the large sample size and relatively high HIV prevalence rates in Zambia provides a 
sufficiently large subsample of households afflicted by adult mortality. It allows examining the 
impact of a low-frequency event such as prime-age death with meaningful statistical power. 
With a re-interview rate of 78 percent (6922 households were interviewed in 2001), the rate of 
attrition in the sample turns out to be fairly high.4 To the extent that it reflects household 
dissolution caused by the death of an adult member, attrition may lead to underreporting of 
prime-age mortality and bias estimations of the socio-economic consequences: households that 
dissolve are likely to be hit harder by adult mortality than those that remain intact. Using the 
                                                 
4 It should be noted, however, that the re-interview rate rises to 89 percent if one excludes attrition caused by 
enumerators not returning to several enumeration areas (Chapoto and Jayne, 2008). 
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same dataset, Chapoto and Jayne (2008) apply inverse probability weights to control for potential 
attrition bias. They find that this correction has little effect on the magnitude of the estimated 
impact of mortality, which suggests that attrition bias is not a major problem. 
Although the surveys collected detailed information on mortality, epidemiological information on 
the cause of death is not available. For this reason, we follow the standard approach and use 
disease-related prime-age (15-59 years) mortality as a proxy for AIDS mortality. Comparing 
provincial HIV prevalence rates from antenatal clinics with adult mortality rates from the survey 
also used in this study, Chapoto and Jayne (2008) illustrate that the large majority of prime-age 
deaths are indeed likely to be AIDS-related. 
Around ten percent of the households re-interviewed in 2004 experienced at least one prime-age 
adult death between the two survey years. We reduce this sample in various ways to arrive at 
treatment and control groups best suitable to identify the effects of adult mortality. First, 
households are only included if no member had died before the baseline survey was conducted, 
and if no chronically ill members were present in the household in 2001, because AIDS-related 
death is typically preceded by prolonged illness.5 This correction is made to ensure that 2001 
incomes are not contaminated in the sense of already being lowered by AIDS-related 
adjustments. Second, we only consider the death of individuals who were recorded as household 
members in the baseline survey, eliminating from the sample the group of more than 150 
households that experienced the death of a member who returned to the household to seek 
terminal care after the baseline survey. The main reason for doing so is that in households 
suffering the death of a long-term resident the deceased member contributed to initial income in 
2001, whereas this was not the case for households incurring the death of a member who had not 
been a resident at the time of the baseline survey. As a consequence, the impact of prime-age 
mortality on welfare may be more severe for the former than for the latter (Chapoto and Jayne, 
2008). We end up with a treatment group of 221 households, which are fairly equally distributed 
across income quartiles (Table 2.1). Among these households, 210 reported one dead member, 
nine reported two dead members, and two reported three dead members. Another 465 
households incurred the death of a prime-age adult between 1996 and 2001. Again, afflicted 
households are fairly evenly spread over the income distribution. 
When it comes to evaluating the impact of prime-age mortality on household welfare, either 
consumption or income can be employed as an indicator. While consumption is usually measured 
with a higher degree of precision, income changes may give a better indication of the household’s 
future prospects and the sustainability of a household’s adopted strategies to cope with the loss 
of an adult member. For instance, households may be able to temporarily smooth consumption 
by selling assets, but lower their income-generating capacity through such measures. In our case, 
consumption data are not available, but the survey offers very detailed information on the 
                                                 
5 Overall, 548 households reported a prime-age death in the period 1996-2001. The total number of households with 
a chronically ill member was 580 in 2001. 
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income sources of a household. Total yearly income is computed as the sum of the value of 
agricultural production (including production for home consumption), livestock income, and off-
farm income including remittances.6 Per-adult equivalent incomes are computed using total 
household income and the adult equivalent conversion factors provided by the Ministry of 
Finance and National Planning. In principle, welfare could also be measured in per-capita terms. 
However, we prefer the use of per-adult equivalent units in order to capture age and sex-specific 
differences in need and economies of scale in consumption. On average, yearly per-adult 
equivalent incomes in AIDS-afflicted households slightly fell over the period 2001-2004 (Table 
2.1). 
TABLE 2.1: NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS REPORTING PRIME-AGE MORTALITY 
Mean SD
Period 2001-2004
  any prime-age death 221 57 60 44 60 -26379 1059819
  death of head/spouse 124 28 35 28 33 -7852 1195724
  death of other members 105 30 26 18 31 -58859 833998
  death of male members 101 18 32 22 29 27930 866045
  death of female members 130 40 31 24 35 -75022 1157807
Period 1996-2001
  any prime-age death 465 138 101 109 117 -36684 770837
  death of head/spouse 96 27 23 20 26 -140071 775322
  death of other members 375 112 82 89 92 -9133 764037
  death of male members 218 66 51 46 55 -90790 828569
  death of female members 277 77 61 69 70 1887 692275
Quartile 4
Income change          
2001-2004 (in ZMK)Total Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3
 
All monetary values are given in 2004 Zambian Kwacha (ZMK). Mean 2001 per adult equivalent incomes of the four 
income quartiles are ZMK 91,669; ZMK 217,212; ZMK 422,337; and ZMK 1,347,059. 
As argued above, the income effect of a death also depends on whether the deceased was a net 
consumer or a net producer for the household. However, the dataset does not allow identifying 
individual income and consumption levels. Instead, we try to account for the previous position of 
the deceased in the household by distinguishing between the deaths of a household head or 
his/her spouse and other adult members as well as between the deaths of male and female 
adults.7 
2.3 Methodology 
In estimating the causal impact of prime-age mortality on household welfare two problems have 
to be taken into account. First, with sexual transmissions accounting for the vast bulk of HIV 
                                                 
6 All monetary values are given in 2004 Zambian Kwacha (ZMK). 
7 To keep the number of observations for each kind of prime-age death large enough, we abstain from further 
disaggregation. Note that the ratio of head’s/spouse’s and other members’ death is different for the two periods 
because for the period 2001-2004 the reference was made to the head at the time of the death, while for the period 
1996-2001 the reference was made to the head at the time of the interview in 2001. No deaths of heads should 
therefore be reported for the period 1996-2001, but some households nevertheless did so, probably confounding 
current with former (deceased) heads. 
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infections in Africa (Walker et al., 2003), AIDS is a behavioral disease. This may give rise to 
endogenous selection into treatment (prime-age mortality being the treatment). Second, to the 
extent that demographic coping leads to negative spillover effects on the control group of 
households without a deceased member, the causal effect of AIDS-related deaths will be 
underestimated.  
2.3.1 Estimation Method 
As a solution to the problem of endogenous selection, we employ the DID-PSM estimator. 
While PSM removes the selection bias due to observed differences between afflicted and non-
afflicted households, the DID estimator controls for time-invariant unobserved characteristics 
such as risk attitudes and sexual behavior. A number of different issues have previously been 
studied using the DID-PSM approach. Recent examples include the impact of subsidies on 
exporting activity (Görg et al., 2008) and the schooling effects of conditional cash transfers 
(Behrman et al., 2009).  
The general idea of matching is to find a comparison group that shares the same characteristics as 
the treatment group, but did not receive treatment. However, there is a trade-off between the 
potentially wide range of characteristics one might want to match on and the chances of finding 
matches which would be identical across all characteristics. In addition, it is not clear how each 
characteristic should be weighted. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the use of PSM to solve 
this dimensionality problem. Performing PSM involves matching treated to non-treated 
households based on similarity of their predicted probability of receiving the treatment (their 
‘propensity scores’): 
P(Xi)=Pr(Di=1|Xi)         (2.1) 
where Di=1 refers to households i receiving a treatment, Xi is a vector of pre-exposure 
characteristics, and 0<P(Xi)<1. PSM matches pairs on the basis of how close the propensity 
scores P(Xi) are across the two samples of treated and non-treated observations. Through the use 
of the propensity scores, PSM balances the observable covariates X between the treatment and 
the control group and thus selects similar non-treated observations for each of the treated 
observations. 
The assumption needed for the treatment effect to be identified is that selection into treatment is 
random conditional on the observable covariates X (conditional independence assumption). In 
other words, all factors which simultaneously determine treatment and outcomes of interest 
should be observed. If data quality is not sufficient to capture important components of X, then 
the presence of these unobserved characteristics implies that PSM will be biased. 
To more convincingly argue that the assumption of conditional independence is satisfied, we 
combine PSM with the DID approach. Hence, we compare changes in the levels of the outcome 
variable rather than the levels themselves. This allows us to purge all time-invariant 
unobservables from the analysis. Yet, unobservable effects may still bias our results if they are 
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time-varying and apply differently to treated and non-treated observations. This cannot be ruled 
out completely, but we are confident that our dataset is rich enough to control for important 
time-varying factors.  
The resulting DID-PSM estimator for the average treatment effect on the treated households 
(ATT) can be expressed as 
ATT=∑i λi [(yi1 – yi0) – ∑jєc(pi) μij (yj1 – yj0)]      (2.2) 
where the λis are sample weights used to construct the mean impact PSM estimator for the 
afflicted households i, (yi1 – yi0) is the difference in these households’ income per adult equivalent 
before and after the death of a member, and (yj1 – yj0) is the difference in income per adult 
equivalent for households j of the control group over the same period. The μijs are the weights 
applied in calculating the average outcome of the matched non-afflicted households. In our case, 
these weights are based on Kernel matching, which is a non-parametric approach that uses 
weighted averages of all households in the control group to construct the counterfactual 
outcome.8 The average treatment effect is only defined in the region of common support c(pi), 
which implies that all observations whose propensity score is lower than the minimum and larger 
than the maximum of the opposite groups are excluded. 
Since our longitudinal dataset consists of just two waves, we can only evaluate absolute changes 
in per-adult equivalent income between 2001 and 2004. Even in a very poor context like rural 
Zambia it is likely that these absolute changes depend on initial income levels. In absolute terms, 
richer households may incur higher fluctuations in income than their poorer counterparts. To 
avoid matching households with very different income levels, we enforce exact matches within 
income quartiles. 
The propensity score for each observation in the treatment and control group is estimated by 
using the predicted values from a logit model. Only variables which have an effect on both 
treatment and outcome and are not affected by the treatment should be included. Building on the 
existing literature on the determinants of HIV infection, we identify a set of variables 
simultaneously affecting a household’s probability to experience the death of a prime-age 
member and its income-generation capacity. These variables are constructed using pre-treatment 
data from the baseline survey. At the household level, we include variables capturing the 
demographic composition of the household, also accounting for the sex and educational levels of 
prime-age adults and the household’s head (compare Hargreaves and Glynn, 2002; Chapoto and 
Jayne, 2006). We also control for the importance of different income sources, as involvement in 
local non-farm activities or migration not only has an effect on income levels, but also increases 
the risk of infection with HIV (Ainsworth and Semali, 1998; Lurie et al., 2003). As a proxy for 
social capital we add a dummy indicating whether a household has a relation to the village head 
(compare Pronyk et al., 2008). The effect of household wealth is captured through land 
                                                 
8 Note, however, that our results do not seem to be sensitive to the choice of the matching algorithm. Our findings 
are robust to using caliper matching. See Smith and Todd (2005) for a discussion of different matching methods. 
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endowments and a broader asset index9 (compare Gillespie et al., 2007). We also include a 
dummy for radio ownership to proxy access to information. At the community level, we control 
for the distance of the village to the district town and nearest tarred main road (compare Buvé et 
al., 2002; Tanser et al., 2000). Besides, we add population density and rainfall levels and 
variability.10 The latter variable is thought to account for the general exposure of communities to 
weather risks and related agricultural income shocks. Finally, by introducing provincial dummies, 
we also control for the observed regional variety in HIV prevalence. Table A2.1 presents a 
complete list of the explanatory variables included in the logit model to estimate the propensity 
score. 
A formal requirement for a reliable estimation with PSM is that, under the conditional 
independence assumption, the relevant covariates are balanced between the treatment group and 
the comparison group. Lack of balance points to a possible misspecification of the propensity 
score model. Hence, it is important to verify that the balancing condition is satisfied by the data. 
We perform three different balancing tests suggested in the literature.  
The first balancing test (Sianesi, 2004) re-estimates the propensity score on the matched sample, 
i.e. only on afflicted households and matched non-afflicted households, and compares the 
pseudo-R2 before and after matching. The pseudo-R2 indicates how well the regressors explain 
the probability of being affected by prime-age mortality. After matching there should be no 
systematic differences in the distribution of covariates between both groups and hence the 
pseudo-R2 should be fairly low. As shown in the upper part of Table A2.3, the pseudo-R2 indeed 
approaches zero after matching. 
The second balancing test (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) calculates the standardized bias before 
and after matching. For each covariate it is defined as the difference in the means of the treated 
and (matched) control group as a percentage of the square root of the mean of variances in both 
groups. In the matched sample the standardized bias should be reduced considerably and be 
close to zero percent. In our case, PSM reduces the mean bias by about 70 percent, bringing the 
remaining mean bias down to about five percent (lower part of Table A2.3). 
The third balancing test (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) first divides the observations into strata 
based on the estimated propensity scores. These strata are chosen so that no statistically 
significant difference in the mean of the estimated propensity scores remains between the 
treatment and comparison group observations within each stratum. Then, t-tests are used to test 
within each stratum for mean differences in the regressors between the observations in the 
                                                 
9 The asset index is based on a principal component analysis of the following variables: Dummy for iron roof, 
dummy for brick walls, dummy for modern door, dummy for cement floor, and the value of agricultural productive 
assets.  
10 Community variables are taken from supplementary datasets: Distance and rainfall data for the period 1990-2004 




treatment and comparison group. In our propensity score model, mean differences turn out to be 
insignificant across the board, suggesting that the balancing conditions are satisfied.11 
As a final point, it is illustrative to briefly compare PSM to other non-experimental methods of 
impact evaluation. Like PSM, OLS and IV estimations also rely on the conditional independence 
assumption. In the case of OLS, this is the assumption of exogeneity of treatment. The IV 
estimator in turn allows for the possibility of endogenous treatment, but rests on the challenging 
exclusion restriction. In contrast to these approaches, however, PSM is non-parametric. Hence, it 
does not impose assumptions of functional forms and error distributions. In addition, PSM also 
uses a different sample by confining matching to the region of common support thus dropping 
unmatched observations from the control group (Ravallion, 2008). 
2.3.2 Spillover Effects 
A unique characteristic of the Zambian dataset is that it allows us to link demographic changes in 
the composition of households to AIDS-related mortality. The survey included specific questions 
on why a member (12 years or older) joined or left a household between the two waves, and on 
whether a household hosted orphans (11 years or younger). We then define the following three 
groups of individuals who may give rise to an AIDS-related demographic burden for households 
without a deceased member, thus reducing their per-adult equivalent income: 
1. New members (12 years and older), who were not in the household in the first wave, but 
were so in the second wave; they joined the household for the following reasons: having 
lost parents/being fostered, having been widowed, returning to the household because of 
sickness12, needing help without being sick, and marrying a household member13. Not 
included as AIDS-related cases are individuals who joined the household to help with 
activities, to work for the household, because of old age, and because of divorce or 
separation.  
2. Departed members (12 years and older), who were a household member in the first wave, 
but no longer so in the second wave; they departed from the household to live with other 
relatives. Individuals who departed to find a job, to establish a new home, to enter 
marriage, and because of divorce or separation are not counted as AIDS-related cases. 
3. Orphans (11 years and younger), who lost at least one parent and did not live with the 
remaining parent. Information for orphans is only available for the 2004 wave, i.e., we do 
not know whether they were already members of the household in the first (2001) wave. 
                                                 
11 Also compare Table A2.4, which shows simple t-tests for the matched sample within different income quartiles. 
12 Death due to AIDS is normally preceded by prolonged and severe illness. Given the transmission nature of HIV, 
it is likely that the partner of a deceased is also infected. Using the same dataset, Chapoto and Jayne (2006) provide 
evidence that this is the case in Zambia. 
13 Beegle and Krutikova (2008) show for Tanzania that adult death affects the timing of marriage in affected 
households. In particular girls who lose their father marry at significantly younger ages. In addition, Ueyama and 
Yamauchi (2009) demonstrate for the case of Malawi that women’s marriage age is lowered in general if the local 
marriage market is characterized by excess adult mortality. 
 
19 
Employing this demographic information, we check in various ways whether spillover effects can 
be observed in the data. First, based on Dzekedzeke and Fylkesnes (2006), who use DHS and 
antenatal care clinic data to estimate the HIV prevalence in 2001, we compare households 
without a deceased member in low-prevalence and high-prevalence provinces.14 Using the same 
estimation method described above, we test whether the number of members who joined or left 
a household due to AIDS-related reasons is higher in regions with high HIV prevalence. 
Obtaining a significant difference across regions would not only point to spillovers but also 
suggest that the above definitions indeed provide a reliable proxy for AIDS-related demographic 
changes. Second, we examine whether households that are indirectly affected by AIDS through 
demographic changes fare worse in terms of income per capita than their unaffected 
counterparts. Finally, we control for spillover effects in the estimation of the impact of AIDS-
related mortality on per-adult equivalent incomes by excluding households from the control 
group if members departed or joined for AIDS-related reasons. 
Of course, per-adult equivalent incomes of households in the control group are not only subject 
to demographic spillovers. Income levels are also affected through economic spillovers. High 
adult mortality rates may alter communities’ economic structure, e.g. through general equilibrium 
effects on local labor markets or the availability of land for cultivation. AIDS may also lower the 
resilience of communities’ social networks to other shocks (de Waal and Whiteside, 2003). 
However, the indirect nature of these effects renders them not only difficult to identify but also 
likely to be small. Using the same dataset, Jayne et al. (2006) find only minor effects of prime-age 
mortality on Zambian communities’ crop output, mean income, and income per capita. We are 
thus confident that economic spillovers do not seriously impinge on the validity of our control 
group. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Base Estimates 
Before turning to the role of spillover effects, we first present PSM-DID estimates based on the 
unrefined control group (Table 2.2). This facilitates comparison with previous studies where 
spillovers were not taken into account. Note that the number of observations in Table 2.2 is 
lower than in Table 2.1 because a few cases are off the region of common support. Standard 
errors are computed using bootstrapping with 400 replications.15 At the aggregate level, we find a 
                                                 
14 Provinces with relatively low HIV prevalence are Northern and Northwestern (8.3 and 9.0 percent, respectively), 
while the three provinces with the highest prevalence are Copperbelt, Lusaka, and Southern (19.9, 22.0 and 17.6 
percent, respectively). 
15 Standard errors are bootstrapped for two reasons. First, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004), block bootstrap, 
which is also used here, can be used to correct for inconsistent standard errors in difference-in-difference 
estimations. Second, conventional standard errors tend to be biased because the estimated variance of the treatment 
effect should also include the variance due to the estimated propensity score and the imputation of the common 
support (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The validity of bootstrapped standard errors in matching estimators has 
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positive but insignificant effect of prime-age mortality on household per-adult equivalent income. 
Disaggregating impacts according to the gender and position of the deceased person leads to 
even higher standard errors of the estimated treatment effects, rendering it impossible to identify 
any pattern that would point to differences between net producers and net consumers.16 
TABLE 2.2: SHORT-RUN INCOME EFFECTS OF RECENT PRIME-AGE MORTALITY (2001-2004) 
Treatment Observations ATT (in ZMK) Standard error p-value
Any prime-age death 217 90676 73840 0.22
Death of head/spouse 120 47278 112550 0.67
Death of other members 96 -32900 115592 0.78
Death of male members 98 64596 102804 0.53
Death of female members 125 -11234 107407 0.92
 
Chapoto and Jayne (2008) provide detailed evidence on the coping mechanisms that may lie 
behind this ‘non-finding’. As concerns income coping, they show that the death of a male prime-
age household head is associated with a modest fall in the value of cattle, while the death of other 
adult household members has no significant effect on cattle assets. After the death of male and 
female adults, the value of small animals declines by 36 percent and 18 percent, respectively. 
Selling small animals thus appears to be a quantitatively important coping strategy used by AIDS-
afflicted households. In addition, demographic coping plays a role. While households 
experiencing the death of the head are partially able to replenish their household size by attracting 
additional members, the death of other members is associated with a more than one-person 
decline in household size due to a significant reduction in the numbers of boys and girls. 
According to Chapoto and Jayne (2008, p. 344), the latter suggests that “in many cases, the 
deceased adult’s family lived with him or her while the sick person received terminal care at a 
relative’s home (possibly the older parents) and then left after the person passed away.” When re-
estimating the relationship for the present sample that excludes sick persons seeking terminal 
care, we find a less than one-person decline in household size both for aggregate deaths (Table 
2.3) and for all subgroups including other members. In combination, the attraction of new 
household members and the selling of productive assets may have prevented incomes from 
falling over the period 2001-2004.  
Our core result is corroborated by Mather and Donovan (2008) for Mozambique, a neighboring 
country that provides a comparable setting of predominantly poor rural households. Mather and 
Donovan (2008) also find insignificant effects of prime-age mortality on rural households’ per-
adult equivalent income irrespective of whether household heads or other members died, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
been questioned by Abadie and Imbens (2008), but their critique does not apply to kernel-based matching employed 
here. 
16 The relevance of unobserved and time-varying heterogeneity could in theory be assessed with Rosenbaum bounds 
(Rosenbaum, 2002). Rosenbaum bounds calculate the size of hidden bias required to alter significance levels and 
hence inference about treatment effects. However, this sensitivity analysis is not meaningful in our case, as we do not 
find significant treatment effects to start with. 
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identify a loss of assets and changes in household composition as major factors contributing to 
this outcome.  
Two further studies investigating the welfare impact of prime-age mortality come to different 
conclusions. For the case of Indonesia, Grimm (2010) shows that indirect coping effects more 
than offset the direct losses caused by the death of an adult household member, leading to overall 
gains in consumption per adult equivalent. Notably, surviving members of Indonesian 
households experiencing prime-age adult deaths are found to rely on increases in labor supply as 
one coping strategy, a scenario that is unlikely to happen in the rural African context as a result of 
limited employment opportunities. By contrast, Beegle et al. (2008) estimate for the Kagera 
region in Tanzania that within the first five years after the death of an adult per-adult equivalent 
consumption of the surviving household members grew by about seven percent less than 
consumption levels of non-afflicted households. Nonetheless, average consumption growth 
continued to be positive for AIDS-afflicted households for the period under consideration (2000-
2004). Positive economic conditions may thus have enabled AIDS-afflicted households to uphold 
or even increase their consumption levels over time without resorting to desperation-led selling 
of assets. 
2.4.2 Controlling for Spillover Effects 
The demographic coping of AIDS-afflicted households may translate into significant spillover 
effects and thereby affect the welfare estimates reported above. We find that on average 
individuals (12 years and older) more frequently join and leave households without a deceased 
member for AIDS-related reasons when the households reside in regions with high HIV 
prevalence, but that these changes in the composition of households do not lead to significant 
welfare changes (Table 2.3).17 Having to care for orphans, by contrast, is estimated to lower yearly 
household income per adult equivalent by roughly US$ 20 on average. Given the low income 
levels characterizing rural Zambia, this is a quantitatively important income drop of almost 20 
percent. Overall, we thus obtain evidence pointing to the existence of considerable spillover 
effects. 
In a subsequent step, we re-run the DID-PSM regressions using only households without AIDS-
related demographic changes as a control group. The results are shown in Table 2.4. For 
aggregate deaths, the estimated impact of AIDS-related mortality on household incomes turns 
negative when controlling for spillovers, but continues to be insignificant. Disaggregating 
households by the position or sex of the member who died again produces absolutely 
insignificant results. We also check for impact heterogeneity across the initial poverty status of a 
household. Examining the income effects for each income quartile separately, however, yields no 
significant effects (available upon request). 
                                                 




TABLE 2.3: SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF RECENT PRIME-AGE MORTALITY 
Treatment Observations ATT Standard error p-value
Any prime-age death 220 -0.43** 0.18 0.02
Treatment Observations ATT Standard error p-value
High-prevalence region 500 0.08** 0.04 0.05
Treatment Observations ATT Standard error p-value
High-prevalence region 499 0.10* 0.05 0.06
Treatment Observations ATT (in ZMK) Standard error p-value
New members (12 and older) 435 -43397 40850.84 0.29
Orphans (11 and younger) 248 -95182* 55014.26 0.08
Departed members (12 and older) 398 18210 50318.79 0.72
a) Does the adult equivalent size of  households with a deceased member change dif f erently?
b) Do more persons (12 years and older) join households without a deceased member for AIDS-related reasons 
in high-prevalence regions?
d) Do households without a deceased member but with AIDS-related demographic changes fare worse in terms 
of  income?
c) Do more persons (12 years and older) leave households without a deceased member for AIDS-related reasons 
in high-prevalence regions?
 
**/* denote significance at the 5/10 percent level respectively. 
 
TABLE 2.4: SHORT-RUN INCOME EFFECTS OF RECENT PRIME-AGE MORTALITY (2001-2004) 
CONTROLLING FOR SPILLOVERS18 
Treatment Observations ATT (in ZMK) Standard error p-value
Any prime-age death 207 -67771 74522 0.36
Death of head/spouse 119 8376 115020 0.94
Death of other members 87 -80803 131160 0.54
Death of male members 93 -30852 100593 0.76
Death of female members 120 -52689 113779 0.64
 
Since we do not find evidence for significant short-run income effects, even after controlling for 
spillovers, we can also examine the medium-run income effects for the period 2001-2004 
resulting from prime-age deaths that occurred before 2001. As noted above, the household 
survey also recorded the death of a member between 1996 and 2001. Our identifying assumption 
is that 2001 incomes are not contaminated by short-run AIDS-induced welfare losses. The results 
shown in Table 2.5 point to the absence of such effects, which is in line with what Beegle et al. 
(2008) found for the Kagera region in Tanzania. Beegle et al. (2008) suspect that over the 
medium run factors not related to AIDS increasingly blur any existing difference between 
afflicted and non-afflicted households. 
                                                 
18 The respective number of observations in Table 2.4 is slightly different from the one in Table 2.2 because 
matching is confined to the region of common support. 
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TABLE 2.5: MEDIUM-RUN INCOME EFFECTS OF LESS RECENT PRIME-AGE MORTALITY (1996-2001) 
CONTROLLING FOR SPILLOVERS 
Treatment Observations ATT (in ZMK) Standard error p-value
Any prime-age death 449 -29288 45954 0.52
Death of head/spouse 85 -122950 121992 0.31
Death of other members 359 5068 46239 0.91
Death of male members 203 -49586 61844 0.42
Death of female members 265 48548 52908 0.36  
2.5 Conclusion 
Finding no negative impact of prime-age mortality on the per-capita incomes of surviving 
household members may appear counterintuitive, in particular if it was the household head or the 
spouse who died. For the Zambian case, one might argue that by employing income as a welfare 
indicator the true impact is not easily identifiable due to possible measurement error, even 
though income generation was carefully captured in the household survey. Yet, through income 
and demographic coping, which has been shown to exist on a significant scale, AIDS-afflicted 
households may well be able to preserve their per-capita income levels over the short to medium 
term as our analysis and a similar study for rural Mozambique suggest. This is not to deny the 
potentially negative impact of prime-age mortality on human capital formation and its 
transmission across generations (Beegle et al., 2010; Bell et al., 2006). Besides, our analysis 
focuses on AIDS-related mortality, not morbidity. Yamano and Jayne (2005) and Linnemayr 
(2010) present evidence that AIDS may already lower household welfare well before the infected 
household member dies. On a more speculative note, our finding could also reflect the specific 
context of a very poor rural economy with high subsistence shares, where in a Lewis-type fashion 
surplus labor on farms implies that no welfare losses occur when the household loses a member. 
In a similar vein, the distinction between net producers and net consumers may get blurred in 
such a setting because all household members tend to be involved in the same set of low-return 
activities.  
As concerns policymaking, the finding that surviving household members are able to avoid a 
drop in per-capita incomes after a prime-age death does not render public support unnecessary if 
coping involves actions with severe long-run consequences, such as depleting the only assets a 
household owns or taking children out of school. Our analysis of spillover effects suggests that 
the targeting of AIDS-related interventions should extend to households not experiencing a 
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TABLE A2.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Mean SD Mean SD
income change, 2001-2004 (in ZMK) -26,379 71,291 -23,500 12,004 0.06
no 0-14 years 3.11 2.36 2.96 2.02 1.07
no 15-59 male skilled 0.50 0.85 0.39 0.68 2.38
no 15-59 male unskilled 1.18 1.31 0.94 0.93 3.61
no 15-59 female skilled 0.38 0.79 0.21 0.58 4.06
no 15-59 female unskilled 1.51 1.23 1.17 0.84 5.60
no 60 years and older 0.40 0.68 0.24 0.52 4.41
no migrants 0.39 0.83 0.37 0.80 0.39
male head 0.81 0.40 0.82 0.39 0.45
skilled head 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.31
relationship with village head 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.18
crop income (%) 69.12 33.87 71.77 31.88 1.19
self-employment income (%) 13.15 25.25 12.89 24.79 0.15
remittances income (%) 3.74 11.08 3.15 9.72 0.86
wage income (%) 10.58 24.75 9.14 23.56 0.88
land per adult equivalent 0.72 0.89 0.83 1.46 1.15
radio 0.38 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.07
asset index -0.13 1.45 -0.20 1.33 0.78
distance to main road 26.83 39.80 24.89 35.30 0.78
distance to district town 32.74 22.23 34.37 22.41 1.05
population density 22.46 37.92 24.92 44.58 0.80
mean rainfall 963.02 178.49 998.84 181.99 2.84
rainfall variability 155.06 41.88 158.27 38.44 1.19
Central 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.30 2.47
Copperbelt 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.25 1.86
Eastern 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.42 0.31
Luapula 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.21
Lusaka 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.15 2.51
Northern 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37 1.56
Northwestern 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.26 2.34
Southern 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.29
Western 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.30 1.50
Treated (n=221) Control (n=3,289) t-statistics
 
Treatment is any prime-age death between 2001 and 2004. 
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TABLE A2.2: LOGIT ESTIMATION OF THE PROPENSITY SCORE (TREATMENT IS ANY PRIME-AGE 
DEATH BETWEEN 2001 AND 2004) 
coef se
no 0-14 years -0.070** 0.028
no 15-59 male skilled 0.189** 0.095
no 15-59 male unskilled 0.201*** 0.053
no 15-59 female skilled 0.389** 0.164
no 15-59 female unskilled 0.351*** 0.038
no 60 years and older 0.497*** 0.179
no migrants -0.139 0.109
male head -0.085 0.176
skilled head 0.075 0.194
relationship with village head -0.024 0.110
crop income -0.302 0.544
self-employment income -0.106 0.668
remittances income 0.178 0.556
wage income 0.143 0.671
land per adult equivalent -0.023 0.041
radio -0.066 0.098
asset index -0.084 0.068
distance to main road 0.002 0.002
distance to district town -0.005 0.005
population density 0.001 0.001
mean rainfall 0.000 0.001








Western 0.455 0.320  
***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively. 
TABLE A2.3: PSEUDO R2 AND MEAN BIAS REDUCTION 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Pseudo R2 before matching 0.136 0.145 0.133 0.118
Pseudo R2 after matching 0.016 0.019 0.02 0.022
Mean bias reduction (%) 78.93 68.57 67.76 63.61
Mean bias after matching (%) 3.19 4.07 5.24 4.49  
Treatment is any prime-age death between 2001 and 2004. 
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Abstract 
Losing a parent is a trauma that has consequences for human capital formation. Does it 
matter at what age this trauma occurs? Using longitudinal data from the Kagera region in 
Tanzania that span thirteen years from 1991-2004, we find considerable impact 
heterogeneity across age at bereavement, but less so for the death of opposite-sex parents. 
In terms of long-term health status as measured by body height, children who lose their 
same-sex parent before teenage years are hit hardest. Regarding years of formal education 
attained in young adulthood, boys whose fathers die before adolescence suffer the most. 
Maternal bereavement does not fit into this pattern as it affects educational attainment of 
younger and older children in a similar way. The generally strong interaction between age at 
parental death and sex of the late parent suggests that the preferences of the surviving 
parent partly protect same-sex children from orphanhood’s detrimental effects on human 
capital accumulation. 
Keywords: orphans, health, education, timing of parental death, child development, 
Tanzania 
JEL classification: I10, I21, J19, C23 
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About 150 million boys and girls, eight percent of the child population in developing countries, 
have lost at least one of their parents (UNICEF, 2009). While HIV/AIDS has dramatically 
increased prime-age mortality in various parts of the world, above all in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
high rates of orphanhood can be largely attributed to other diseases, accidents, wars and natural 
disasters.21 Undoubtedly, parental bereavement is a trauma that has long-term consequences for 
child development. In this paper, we examine at what ages the loss of a parent is most critical for 
a child’s human capital formation. 
There is growing evidence that parental death, in particular the death of the mother, is 
detrimental to children’s human capital formation, especially so in terms of educational 
attainment and health status in the short to medium run. So far, the literature has evaluated the 
effects of parental loss by comparing orphans and non-orphans, implicitly treating orphanhood 
as a binary event. We propose that the severity of impacts depends on the timing of parental 
death and investigate whether the long-term effects of parental death on orphans’ human capital 
accumulation depend on the age at which a child is orphaned. For this purpose, we use 
longitudinal data from the Kagera region in North-Western Tanzania that follows children in 
several survey rounds from 1991-2004. Specifically, we estimate reduced-form equations to 
analyze the impact of age at bereavement on height and educational attainment in early 
adulthood. 
Apart from evaluating the heterogeneous impact of orphanhood, this analysis contributes to the 
burgeoning literature on critical periods in child development. Is has been widely shown that 
conditions before age five are crucial for human capital development and have persistent impacts 
on later life (Almond and Currie, forthcoming). Yet, relatively little is known about the relevance 
of conditions after early childhood, especially when it comes to developing countries. By 
distinguishing between the timing of paternal and maternal bereavement, this paper also adds to 
the understanding of the importance of different parental preferences for children’s human 
capital formation. 
We tackle the problem of unobserved heterogeneity by using a wide range of pre-orphanhood 
characteristics, including community fixed effects and showing that future age at bereavement is 
not significantly related to baseline outcomes. We also employ family fixed effects and exploit the 
plausibly exogenous variation created by the fact that siblings experience parental death 
simultaneously, but at different stages in their human capital formation. As we are interested in 
identifying the differential impact of parental death at different ages, we do not compare orphans 
and non-orphans. Accordingly, our sample is confined to children who lost at least one parent. 
                                                 




We find considerable evidence that the effect of orphanhood on long-term human capital 
outcomes depends on the timing of parental death. Impact heterogeneity, however, appears to be 
conditional on the gender of the deceased parent. Children’s growth is particularly stifled when 
they lose a parent of the same sex before teenage years. Similarly, the death of a father prior to 
age twelve brings about the largest reductions in years of attained schooling for boys. Only when 
considering educational attainment in the case of maternal bereavement do we not find 
heterogeneous impact across age at bereavement for both boys and girls. The generally strong 
interaction between age at parental death and sex of the late parent suggests that to a degree the 
preferences of the surviving parent can protect same-sex children from the detrimental effects of 
orphanhood. 
In the following section, we present several mechanisms through which the death of a father or a 
mother could differentially affect child development. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the 
literature on the mean impact of parental loss. Methodological issues are discussed in section 4, 
which also describes the dataset and our estimation samples. Section 5 presents our results and 
conducts some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
3.2 Channels of  Transmission 
As health and education are complementary investments in human capital accumulation, we 
discuss them jointly at this point. Our focus is on children in developing countries, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa where the AIDS epidemic has led to exceptionally high rates of parental 
mortality. We discuss in how far each channel might cause heterogeneous impacts across 
different ages at bereavement. 
3.2.1 Psychological Trauma 
Parents are, without doubt, the most important caregivers and attachment figures providing 
emotional support and consistent nurture. In his works on early child development, Bowlby 
(1982) stresses the role of the relationship between caregivers, in particular mothers, and their 
children in shaping subsequent development and personality. Losing a parent during childhood is 
a traumatic event that shapes child development beyond purely economic consequences. Above 
all, parental death can have a lasting effect on children’s emotional status which, in turn, can keep 
them from studying or attending school altogether (Gertler et al., 2004). Dozier et al. (2008) 
review, inter alia, evidence on the relation between the loss of an attachment figure and 
psychological disorders in adulthood and find a strong correlation between depression and 
anxiety and early maternal loss. Depressive episodes, in turn, can have a profound effect on both 
educational performance and physical health (Needham, 2009; Katon, 2003). A report from the 
National Scientific Council on the Developing Child (2010) concludes that early experience of 
traumatic events which produce lasting fear and anxiety can have lifelong consequences by 
disrupting the developing architecture of the brain, particularly in areas involved in emotions and 
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learning. In the absence of the buffering protection of adult support, such chronic stress in early 
childhood may even be toxic to the developing brain. Makame et al. (2002) find that orphans in 
Tanzania’s capital Dar Es Salaam have more internalizing problems which put their long-term 
mental health at risk. For the case of Zimbabwe, Nyamukapa et al. (2008) show that orphanhood 
is associated with high levels of psychosocial distress. Children who have been orphaned by 
AIDS are likely to suffer from the direct trauma of parental illness and loss, as well as from 
stigma and discrimination. Such aggravating effects may result in even worse school performance 
and attendance/graduation rates (Sharma, 2006).  
The nature of impact heterogeneity across age at bereavement is not obvious. In general, 
attachment during the first two years of life is crucial for later peer relations, effective emotional 
regulation and behavioral self-control (Deklyen and Greenberg, 2008). Infants and toddlers may, 
however, not yet fully realize the full significance of parental loss and might therefore be better 
able to relate to a new set of caregivers. In contrast, school-age children may be capable of 
grasping the significance of their parent’s death but not be emotionally equipped to cope with 
such a loss. Evidence suggests that the death of a parent before the age of eleven has more severe 
psychological consequences than parental loss later in childhood or adolescence (Brown and 
Harris, 1978; Agid et al., 1999). Older adolescents, having lived through puberty, might be more 
capable of coping with the associated psychological burden. This is in line with Liu et al. (2009) 
who study the impact of parental absence on children’s mental health in Chinese migrant 
households. They find that children approaching adulthood develop fewer symptoms of anxiety 
and depression than their younger counterparts. Overall, it is likely that the trauma of parental 
loss is particularly harmful for children in their early stages of human capital formation. 
3.2.2 Lost Income 
The loss of an income-generating household member is probably the single most important 
economic impact of parental death. This is particularly true for deaths due to AIDS which 
typically kills people in their most productive years of life. With low levels of wealth and the 
absence of well-functioning credit and insurance markets, households may be seriously 
compromised to respond to income shocks and smooth consumption after the death of an adult 
member. Beegle et al. (2008) show that households in Tanzania see their per-capita consumption 
drop by seven percent within the first five years after the death of a prime-age adult. Severe 
financial constraints may force households to save on food expenditures and reduce nutritional 
intake which, in turn, is an important determinant of children’s health and cognitive development 
(Alderman et al., 2009; Currie, 2009). Moreover, reduced household resources can impact 
orphans’ schooling directly by making it impossible to pay for tuition fees and school materials. 
The severity of these effects is likely to depend on the gender of the deceased parent. The loss of 
a father may be more critical as the death of a male household head typically brings about the 
largest reduction in material household welfare (Case and Paxson, 2004). 
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Insufficient or inferior nutrition in early childhood is particularly detrimental for subsequent 
health outcomes. This phenomenon has received ample attention in the literature on critical 
periods in child development (Alderman et al., 2006; Glewwe and King, 2001). Younger children 
suffer more from malnutrition than older children. The impact on educational attainment is less 
clear. To reduce schooling expenditures, young children’s first enrolment could be deferred or 
even cancelled. However, older siblings might also be pulled out of school. 
3.2.3 Increased Opportunity Costs of  Children’s Time 
Due to insufficient or non-existent public safety nets, credit and insurance markets in many parts 
of the developing world, children who lose a parent often play an important role in households’ 
strategies to cope with the death of an adult (Subbarao and Coury, 2004; Sharma, 2006). For 
instance, child labor could be a substitute for the deceased parent’s labor supply which would 
increase the opportunity costs of children’s time. Hence, school attendance could not only 
become less affordable due to the new budget constraint of the household, but also in terms of 
orphans’ forgone earnings and domestic labor (Ainsworth et al., 2005). 
It is probable that the degree of substitutability depends on the age of the child at the time of the 
parental loss (Evans and Miguel, 2007). The sex of the child and the late parent may also play an 
important role, even more so in societies with strong gender roles. Older sons are clearly a better 
substitute for their deceased fathers than younger ones, particularly in the context of physically 
demanding farm work or informal employment. The same logic applies to girls and their 
mothers: Older girls would have a comparative advantage in household production over their 
younger sisters. This observation has also been made in the literature on the economics of child 
labor (Edmonds, 2006). Hence, older children are more likely than their younger siblings to 
spend time in activities that mitigate the negative impacts of the death of an adult and reduce 
time in formal education. 
3.2.4 Parental Preferences, Child Fostering and Lost Parental Inputs 
Following parental death, orphans are typically subject to changed preferences of their (new) 
caregivers. Children who lose only one parent most often stay with the surviving parent (Beegle 
et al., 2009). Given that mothers tend to invest more in their children than fathers (Case and 
Paxson, 2001), the gender of the late parent is likely to affect orphans’ human capital outcomes. 
Ceteris paribus, paternal death increases the importance of maternal preferences and may change 
a household’s resource allocation in favor of children. Conversely, the death of a mother may 
reinforce paternal preferences and hence reduce child investments. Another dimension of 
differential treatment is the sex of the child. Parental preferences in developing countries are 
normally believed to be in favor of sons (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). This effect, however, is due 
to the fact that fathers most often exert more bargaining power on the intra-household allocation 
of resources. Considering parental preferences separately, mothers favor their daughters over 
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their sons, while the reverse is true for fathers (Thomas, 1990 and 1994; Lamb, 2010).22 Thus, the 
loss of a mother would have even more adverse effects on girls than the loss of a father. 
Given the importance of conditions in early childhood, young children’s health status appears to 
be most sensitive to changes in parental preferences. Educational outcomes are likely to be 
affected, too, though it is less apparent whether younger or older children would be hit harder. 
Double orphans are usually cared for within the extended family network, mostly by their 
grandparents or other close relatives (Beegle et al., 2009; UNAIDS et al., 2004). It has been 
argued that the ever rising numbers of orphans due to the AIDS crisis may overstrain the 
capacity of traditional coping systems in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and shift the burden of child 
fostering to households that are not willing or able to invest in orphans’ development (Beegle et 
al., 2009). 
As discussed above, the presence of parents is of crucial importance for a child’s development. It 
is well-known from developmental psychology that children learn a lot from their parents both 
through encouragement and through direct teaching and emulation (WHO, 2004). Leibowitz 
(1974) argues that quality and quantity of time invested by parents are important for healthy child 
development and can partly explain the variation in children’s cognitive abilities prior to the start 
of formal education. Foster parents can take over these roles, but they are unlikely to be perfect 
substitutes for biological parents. They may have reduced incentives to invest time and money in 
orphans’ human capital formation if they expect smaller pay-offs because of the informal, non-
binding structure of intergenerational contracts as compared to more binding expectations from 
the biological children (Sharma, 2006; Ainsworth et al., 2005). Subbarao and Coury (2004) discuss 
the quality of various fostering arrangements and conclude that the arrangement is the more 
desirable the closer foster parents’ kinship or relationship to the orphan is. In general, however, 
they find that the lack of nurture and guidance, due to parental loss and inadequate compensatory 
care, may stifle orphans’ socialization. Similarly, the World Health Organization (2004) concludes 
that the effects of inadequate and disrupted care-giving can persist into adolescence in the form 
of behavioral disorders, anxiety, and depression. 
The fact that socialization is a non-uniform process over the child’s age reveals the scope for the 
effects of this channel to depend on the age at bereavement. One the one hand, older children 
are increasingly shaped by their parents’ attitudes, values and willingness to invest time and 
resources in their upbringing and education. Thus, they may be less reliant on parental non-
material inputs than younger children. On the other hand, being adopted at an earlier age means a 
higher chance of developing a close relationship with the caregiver (Odenstad et al., 2008; 
UNAIDS et al., 2004). Teenagers might thus be affected harder than others, if foster parents 
                                                 
22 Similarly, Duflo (2003) documents for the case of South Africa that old-age pensions received by women 
improved the health status of girls living in the same household, but had no significant effects for boys. Pension paid 
to men, however, had no such impacts. 
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anticipate more pay-off to education of younger adopted children as a longer care-giving period 
results in stronger ties with the orphan. 
3.2.5 Overall Impact on Human Capital Formation 
The theoretical transmission channels discussed above strongly suggest that the impact of 
parental death on children’s human capital formation depends on the age at which a child loses a 
parent. In addition, this differential impact is most likely to vary with the gender of the late parent 
and the child. The relative strength of the presented transmission channels, however, is not 
known a priori and likely to vary according to the context. As a result, the pattern of the overall 
effect remains theoretically ambiguous and is potentially non-linear in age at bereavement. 
Moreover, the importance of the various pathways is likely to differ for the two outcomes of 
interest, health and educational attainment. Losing non-material parental inputs, for instance, 
could be more relevant to orphans’ adult health outcomes; increased opportunity costs should be 
primarily decisive for schooling outcomes; and changing parental preferences as well as lost 
household income are likely to affect both. Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether the 
aforementioned mechanisms are indeed at work and how they interact with each other. 
Ideally, one would like to explicitly model health and educational outcomes by two separate 
production functions that contain, among other things, measures of parental time and care, 
monetary resources, measures of children’s idiosyncratic endowments and abilities as inputs. 
However, given that the decisions regarding demand for children’s health and education are 
jointly determined with other important factors influencing these outcomes, estimating such 
production functions is not feasible. Besides, the channels identified above are partly related and 
overlap to some extent in their predictions regarding the impacts. In the absence of experimental 
data, however, it is intrinsically difficult to distinguish between these transmission channels. We 
hence follow the empirical literature on the effects of orphanhood and employ reduced-form 
estimates. Accordingly, our analysis effectively examines the overall impact of parental loss on 
human capital accumulation across age at bereavement, irrespective of the channel through which 
it may operate. 
It is important to bear in mind that all effects measured are net effects, i.e. they already take into 
account the mitigating impact of coping strategies at the household and community level. The 
availability of access to formal or informal credit and insurance or support from government, 
NGOs and the like is context-specific and should also affect the human capital formation of 
orphans. 
3.3 Evidence on Mean Impacts 
There is growing evidence that parental death stifles children’s development. The empirical 
literature has primarily focused on orphans’ educational attainment. Using data from Indonesia’s 
National Socioeconomic Survey from 1994-1996, Gertler et al. (2004) find that recently orphaned 
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children are substantially more likely to drop out of school than non-orphans. This effect is most 
pronounced for children at the transition between primary and lower secondary school and 
between lower secondary and higher secondary school. Regarding heterogeneity across age, they 
present some evidence that older children’s enrolment is decreased more by the loss of a parent. 
In South Africa, mother’s death reduces children’s likelihood to be enrolled by about two 
percentage points and depresses school-related expenditures by more than ten percentage points. 
Based on a longitudinal data from 2001 to 2004, Case and Ardington (2006) also show that given 
their age maternal orphans have completed about a quarter of a year less schooling. Paternal 
death, however, does not appear to be a significant determinant of orphan’s educational 
outcomes. Older children (aged 11-16 at the last survey round in 2003-2004) experience larger 
reductions in completed years of schooling than younger children (aged 6-10), although the 
difference is not statistically significant. This finding, however, refers to children’s age at the time 
of the interview, not to their age at bereavement. 
Using Kenyan longitudinal data from 1998 to 2002, Evans and Miguel (2007) find that parental 
loss decreases school participation rates of children by seven percentage points. Their estimates 
suggest no sign of recovery of orphans’ school attendance for at least three years after the death, 
which they interpret as indication of possible long-run effects. In line with other studies, the 
impact is primarily driven by maternal deaths. Younger children (below age 12 in the year of their 
parent’s death) are somewhat more likely to drop out of school than older children. The authors 
suggest that this result may be due to the high drop-out rates in primary schools in rural Kenya. 
If students in higher grades are selected on academic ability, potentially higher returns to 
schooling might keep them at school. 
Despite this evidence for reduced school enrolment or attendance in the short and medium run, 
it is not obvious whether such effects persist into adulthood. While impacts could be cumulative 
over the duration of orphanhood, they might as well vanish after a period of mourning and 
household adjustments (Beegle and de Weerdt, 2008). Yet, long-run evidence is still scarce as very 
few datasets follow orphans and non-orphans over a sufficient period of time. 
An important exception is Beegle et al. (2010) who investigate the long-term impacts of parental 
loss on educational and body height attainment using the same dataset from North-Western 
Tanzania as we do. Their sample consists of 718 non-orphaned children aged 6-15 years and 
surveyed in 1991-1994 who are at least 19 years old by the final survey round in 2004. About 20 
percent of the children lost at least one parent prior to age 15 after the baseline. Beegle et al. 
(2010) find that maternal loss permanently reduces educational attainment by about one year and 
final body height attained by almost two centimeters. In a related study, Beegle et al. (2006) split 
the same sample into two groups based on children’s age at bereavement to separate younger and 
older orphans. In general, the impact on schooling and health does not seem to differ for 
orphans above and below twelve years at parental death. However, maternal death is associated 
with a larger impact on final height attainment for younger orphans. 
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Taken together, there is considerable evidence that parental loss, in particular the loss of the 
mother, has detrimental effects on children’s human capital formation. This paper contributes to 
the presented set of studies on the mean impact of orphanhood by analyzing at what ages 
parental death is most critical to children’s human capital formation in the long run. 
3.4 Empirical Strategy 
3.4.1 Data and Setting 
With a per-capita income of about US$1100 adjusted for purchasing power parity and ranking 
152 out of 179 countries on the Human Development Index, Tanzania is one of the world’s 
poorest countries. While the national prevalence rate of HIV among individuals aged 15-49 has 
shown a slight downward trend from well over seven percent in the mid-1990s to just over six 
percent in 2007, the absolute number of AIDS orphans continued to rise from an estimated 
610,000 in 2001 to around 970,000 in 2007 (UNAIDS, 2008). The total number of orphans 
irrespective of the cause of parental death is significantly higher at around 2.6 million in 2007. 
Our analysis draws upon data from the Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS). The 
Kagera region is located in North-Western Tanzania and was one of the first areas in Africa to be 
hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It thus provides a well-suited setting for the analysis of the long-
run impact of parental death. The original dataset (KHDS-I) was collected between 1991 and 
1994 and includes information on 915 households who were interviewed up to four times at 6-7 
months intervals. In 2004, a large effort was undertaken to track and re-contact as many surveyed 
individuals as possible for a repetition of the survey referred to as KHDS-II. Individuals were 
followed even if their original households had dissolved, if they had left the household, or if they 
had migrated to neighboring regions or countries. Thanks to the rigorous tracking effort, the re-
contact rate is as high as 93 percent and 82 percent on the household and individual level, 
respectively. The longitudinal dataset thus covers up to 13 years and contains up to five 
observations per individual.23 
As explained below, we use slightly different samples to analyze the long-run effects of 
orphanhood on height and educational attainment. This different choice is made to maximize 
sample size and variation across age at bereavement on the one hand and minimize the possibility 
of catch-up in terms of human capital accumulation on the other hand. Both samples are based 
on the group of children who were non-orphaned at the first interview during KHDS-I (1991-
1994), but lost their mother or father previous to the re-interview in KHDS-II (2004) and before 
the age of 18. The cut-off point at age 18 follows the most common definition of orphanhood 
(UNAIDS et al., 2004; Skinner et al., 2006). 
                                                 
23 The World Bank (2004) provides detailed information on KHDS-I and KHDS-II. 
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3.4.2 Height Attainment 
Although health clearly is a multidimensional phenomenon, body height is frequently taken as a 
marker of long-term health status. It has been shown to capture chronic malnutrition and under-
nutrition as well as frequent or chronic illness during childhood and adolescence (Case and 
Paxson, forthcoming; O’Donnel et al., 2008). Thus, if losing a parent really has an adverse impact 
on children’s overall health in addition to what coping strategies can mitigate, this impact is likely 
to show up in orphans’ final height. 
Apart from capturing health and nutrition status during childhood, it is widely acknowledged that 
body height is also correlated with important determinants and indicators of individual welfare 
later in life. Almond and Currie (forthcoming) review the related literature and conclude that 
health and socio-economic status during childhood have a significantly positive impact on 
educational and labor market outcomes in adulthood. This underlines the central role of health in 
human capital and its predictive power for other outcomes relevant to individual welfare. 
To maximize sample size, we use a relative measure of height referred to as height-for-age z-
score. An individual’s height-for-age z-score is the difference between her height and the average 
height in her specific reference group, that is, individuals of the same sex and age, expressed in 
standard deviations of this reference group. Accordingly, height-for-age z-scores can take any real 
values, typically in the range of -5 to 5. Z-scores have the advantage of being standardized by 
gender and age in such a way that the z-score of an individual who follows a normal growth path 
does not follow a time trend. Thus, including adolescents who are still in the process of physical 
growth does not generate a problem of truncation because their z-scores can still take arbitrary 
values and are not confined to a certain range due to their lower age. 
Considering all orphans who were aged below 18 at baseline (first interview during KHDS-I), our 
health sample contains 369 individuals. Since some of them did not reach adulthood at the time 
of KHDS-II in 2004, however, catch-up growth among the younger children in our sample 
cannot be excluded. Yet, as noted by Case and Paxson (forthcoming), there is considerable 
correlation between height at any given age and final height attained. Moreover, a large fraction 
of our sample should have lived through the adolescent growth spurt which coincides with the 
onset of puberty and reaches its peak at age 12 for girls and age 14 for boys (Ulijaszek et al., 
1998). We are thus confident that there is only limited potential for catch-up growth in our 
sample. 
The average z-score is about -1.6, which implies that the individuals in our sample are 
considerably smaller than their counterparts in the UK reference group. This can be understood 
as evidence of a generally poorer health and nutritional status during childhood and adolescence. 
It is important to note that the choice of the reference group should not have an impact on our 
results. The reference group merely serves as an anchor affecting the absolute values, but not the 
variation of z-scores. Across populations, growth patterns are predominantly determined by 
environmental factors and individuals from different ethnic backgrounds would on average be 
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equally tall if they grew up under similar circumstances (Bogin, 1999; Ulijaszek et al., 1998; 
Steckel, 1995). Using a different reference group would only result in a parallel shift of the 
distribution of observed z-scores as the shape of growth paths across age is predominantly 
determined by biological factors and thus unlikely to vary significantly across countries. 
3.4.3 Educational Attainment 
The sample used to analyze the long-run effect of age at bereavement on educational attainment 
only includes those orphans who were aged below 18 at baseline and at least 19 years old at the 
time of KHDS-II in 2004. After this age, a significant catch-up in terms of formal education is 
unlikely to occur. Most adolescents have left school by this age and re-enrolment after having 
entered the labor force is rare. This restricts our education sample to 184 orphans and leaves us 
with no children who lost a parent prior to 6 years of age. This limited age range is a shortcoming 
of our education sample since we want to look at heterogeneity across different ages at 
bereavement and pre-school years could be of particular interest. 
Primary schooling in Tanzania is completed after grade seven, lower secondary schooling after 
grade 11 and upper secondary schooling after grade 13 (Ainsworth et al., 2005). While statutory 
enrolment age is seven, about 84 percent of all children actually started school significantly later 
in the mid-1990s, when our baseline data were gathered (World Bank, 1999). Average enrolment 
age was about ten and nine years for boys and girls, respectively. Thus, the youngest individuals 
in our sample (aged 19 in 2004) could in principle still have been visiting school at the time of 
KHDS-II. However, given the fact that only seven percent of secondary-school-age children 
were enrolled in secondary school in the mid-1990s (World Bank, 1999), this possibility is 
unlikely to be relevant. In fact, only seven individuals of our sample were still at school in 2004. 
We follow Beegle et al. (2010) and take the highest grade completed in 2004 as our dependent 
variable. We refer to this variable as years of schooling, counting each grade as one year. Ideally, one 
would investigate the effects of parental loss on standardized test scores or even cognitive ability. 
Educational attainment and a more holistic measure of education can vary largely between 
adolescents who have completed the same grade. However, given the data at hand, we have to 
resort to years of schooling as the arguably best proxy for educational attainment available. 
3.4.4 Econometric Setup 
We take advantage of the longitudinal dimension of the dataset by regressing final outcomes 
(KHDS-II, 2004) on age at parental loss and a set of pre-orphanhood characteristics, which are 
taken from the first interview during KHDS-I (1991-1994). If available, we include information 
on orphans’ month of birth and the month in which parental death occurred in order to use as 
much variation in age at bereavement as the dataset allows for. 
 
41 




where Yi2004 is the outcome of interest, height-for-age z-score or highest grade completed, of 
individual i in 2004 and Ai is the age at bereavement. Squared terms of Ai allow for potentially 
non-linear effects across Ai, thus helping to identify critical periods of parental death. The 
possibly more adverse impact of double orphanhood on a child’s human capital formation is 
captured by the dummy variable Di. 
Pre-orphanhood characteristics xijt at the household and individual level are measured at baseline. 
Depending on the identification strategy used, we add baseline fixed effects fikt at the community 
or family level. The last term represents control for cohort effects via age dummies ai2004 in 2004. 
To determine whether the impact of parental loss differs by the gender of the deceased (or 
surviving) parent, one could generate a variable for both age at maternal and paternal death. 
However, the fact that most children in our sample are single orphans (79 percent and 83 percent 
in the health and education sample, respectively) would create many missing values for these 
variables. We circumvent this problem by only considering age at first bereavement and 
interacting Ai and its squared term with a dummy variable Pi indicating whether it was the father 
who died first. As the effects of orphanhood are likely to vary for boys and girls, we also add 
interactions with a dummy variable for boys (Mi). Given the limited sample size, this procedure is 
preferred to splitting the sample into female and male subsamples. 
εi2004 is an individual-specific independent and identically distributed error term. The above model 
is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares.24 Standard errors are clustered at the household level 
to take into account that outcomes of children living in the same household are likely to be 
correlated. 
3.4.5 Identification 
We follow two complementary strategies to identify the effect of age at bereavement on human 
capital formation. First, we propose that, controlling for pre-orphanhood characteristics, the 
timing of parental loss is exogenously distributed across children’s ages. Second, we add family 
fixed effects to the above equation and exploit the variation created by the fact that siblings lose 
their parent at the same time, but at different periods in their human capital formation. 
Orphanhood as such is unlikely to be a random event. In Africa, HIV is a disease that is 
predominantly sexually transmitted and hence subject to selection into risky sexual behavior or 
                                                 
24 For years of education censoring to the left is a potential source of concern as this variable can only take positive 
values if a child was ever enrolled in school. However, only 15 orphans in the education sample have never attended 
school. Given this low share and the difficulties of interpreting interaction terms in non-linear models (Ai and 
Norton, 2003), we follow Beegle et al. (2010) and use linear regression models. 
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dependencies (Beegle and de Weerdt, 2008). If factors attributable to parental self-selection are 
correlated with children’s health and educational outcomes, however, any observed differences 
between orphans and non-orphans might have already existed before orphanhood. Nonetheless, 
this problem does not apply to our analysis. Being interested in the ages at which orphanhood is 
most critical, we do not compare orphans and non-orphans; our sample only includes children 
who lost at least one parent. 
Still, this does not exclude the possibility that the timing of parental death is endogenously 
determined. There might be confounding factors that affect both age at bereavement and 
children’s human capital accumulation. In this case, observed differences in the dependent 
variables between children who were orphaned at younger age and those who lost their parents 
later in their development process might be driven by pre-orphanhood characteristics, too. For 
instance, children from initially richer households could not only have completed more years of 
schooling at the time of parental death. Ceteris paribus, their age at parental loss could also have 
been higher on average because more resources could have been devoted to parents’ terminal 
care. A similar argument can be made when considering coping strategies. Arguably, initially 
richer households are better equipped to cope with the death of an adult. They can more easily 
afford to send their children to school and forgo their potential earnings or labor supply at home. 
Their higher ability to safeguard (food) consumption may also positively influence orphans’ 
health.25 Even after controlling for such observable pre-orphanhood characteristics, the alleged 
impact of timing of parental death may still be driven by unobservable factors. While it is 
conceivable that such factors are related to selection into orphanhood as such, it is much less 
obvious why they should be systematically associated with age at bereavement. 
Nonetheless, we address the concern of unobserved heterogeneity by regressing baseline 
outcomes of interest on future age at bereavement and the full set of baseline controls (compare 
Beegle et al., 2010; Case and Ardington, 2006). Only if timing of parental loss is correlated with 
omitted variables we do not control for would we expect future age at bereavement to be a 
significant predictor of baseline outcomes. The underlying assumption is that such unobserved 
variables would adversely affect outcomes already before orphanhood. Yet, Table A3.3 in the 
appendix shows that the timing of parental death is not significantly related to height or 
educational attainment. We are hence confident that age at bereavement is sufficiently exogenous 
to warrant identification, at least after controlling for important pre-orphanhood characteristics. 
An alternative identification strategy is to compare siblings by using family fixed effects. This 
approach effectively neutralizes any observed and unobserved confounding factors at the family 
level. Before parental death, siblings share the same environment including genetic factors, 
extended family, family norms, neighborhoods as well as parents’ general attitudes towards 
education and health. However, they experience the loss of a parent at different stages in their 
                                                 
25 Lundberg et al. (2000) discuss households’ coping strategies and sources of external funding following an adult 
death in Kagera. However, nothing suggests that external support in Kagera during the time of the survey benefited 
children differently across age at bereavement. 
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development. We exploit this plausibly exogenous variation for identification. In addition, this 
approach takes care of sample selection bias. To the extent that selection into orphanhood is 
related to family-level factors, the fixed-effects results for our orphan sample are valid for the 
entire child population in Kagera.26  
The use of family fixed effects, however, ignores differential treatment of children within 
households. First of all, human capital outcomes might have been affected by the date of birth, as 
the economic condition of a given household is likely to change over time. Depending on their 
age difference, children of the same parents might have grown up under circumstances more or 
less favorable for their human capital formation. Birth order may also play a role. First-born 
children are often found to fare better in terms of both health (e.g. Horton, 1988) and 
educational attainment (e.g. Black et al., 2005). Such discrimination against later-born siblings 
might be explained by increased competition for parental resources. In the case of parental death, 
however, first-born children may also bear a disproportionately large burden, as older children 
are more likely to take over some of the tasks that were previously performed by the deceased 
parent. To address these complications, we include a dummy marking first-born children. We 
also add a full set of age (in 2004) dummies to control for cohort effects. While the age dummies 
pick up general trends in living conditions, the indicator of being first-born captures 
heterogeneity between siblings related to order and timing of birth. 
The elimination of any confounding factors at the family level is a clear advantage of the siblings 
analysis. However, it comes at the cost of reduced sample size. Under this approach, the sample 
only includes orphans with at least one sibling. This lowers the number of observations to 267 in 
the health and 104 in the education sample. By contrast, the other proposed identification 
strategy uses the full sample. Relying on variation between families, it is also more robust to 
concerns regarding differential treatment of children within families. 
3.4.6 Control Variables 
Our regression models include various baseline characteristics at the individual and household 
level. These are meant to control for confounding pre-orphanhood differences and capture 
heterogeneous adoption of coping strategies with adverse impact on human capital accumulation. 
The family fixed effects model draws on a more parsimonious specification and only considers 
individual characteristics. 
A household’s longer term welfare status is approximated by a wealth index which is the first 
principal component of a set of important household assets and durable consumption goods. 
These comprise per-adult equivalent land holdings, ownership of a motor vehicle, the number of 
rooms in the dwelling as well as indicators of housing quality.27 
                                                 
26 A similar argument is made by van den Berg et al. (2009). 
27 Housing quality is captured by the availability of electrical lighting, the type of roof, wall and floor materials, 
access to a private toilet, a private or public water source and the type of water source. 
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Given the importance of parental inputs and parents’ attitude for children’s schooling and health 
outcomes, we control for parents’ own educational background (Kenkel, 1991; Thomas et al., 
1991). Specifically, we include dummy variables indicating whether mothers and fathers have 
attended school and whether they were present in the household at baseline. The latter should 
also provide a proxy for the level of nurture given by each parent. Unfortunately, numerous 
missing values impede including parents’ highest grade completed in our regressions which would 
give a more detailed picture of the family’s educational background. 
To capture competition for parental resources as well as a household’s demographic possibilities 
to cope with the loss of an adult, we add measures of the size and composition of the household. 
Potential differences in preferences for children’s well-being before orphanhood are proxied by 
the gender of the household head. 
We also try to control for genetic factors which should play an important role in determining 
children’s body height. A natural step would be to include both mother’s and father’s 
anthropometrics as control variables. Because of many missing values for father’s height, 
however, we follow Beegle et al. (2010) and only include mother’s height.28 Doing so should at 
least partially capture genetic endowments and might be more reliable than using father’s 
measures who may not always be the biological father. 
Orphans’ baseline health and educational outcomes are included to further isolate the impact of 
parental death from effects of unobserved background characteristics that might influence 
children’s human capital formation. In the health regressions, we include orphans’ baseline 
height-for-age z-scores to capture individual health histories and heterogeneous endowments 
before losing a parent. In the education regressions, we use a relative measure of years of 
schooling defined as the difference between a child’s years of schooling at baseline and the years 
of schooling a child of her age would have attained had she been enrolled at age seven, the 
statutory enrolment age in Tanzania. Compared to an absolute measure, this schooling-for-age 
variable does not follow a time trend and should hence be less correlated with age at 
bereavement. 
Community fixed effects are added to eliminate the confounding impact of community 
characteristics that have not changed over the 13-year period covered by the survey. Certainly, 
communities develop over time and infrastructure including the accessibility and quality of 
schools as well as health facilities is likely to change. However, in order to bias the parameter 
estimates of interest, these characteristics would have to have changed differentially across 
orphans’ average age at parental death in different communities. This case seems very unlikely. 
                                                 
28 Another potentially important control variable is parents’ age at baseline. Many missing values, however, prevent 
us from doing so. Still, running the regression on the reduced sample for which mother’s age is available does not 
change our results. This may be due to the fact that parents’ age is not perfectly correlated with children’s age. Some 
parents have their first child earlier than others, parents may be of different ages, and they typically have several 
children in the first place. 
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Besides, the set of age dummies take care of general trends or shocks that occur at the regional or 
national level. 
3.5 Results 
The following two sub-sections present the main findings from our econometric analysis of 
orphans’ height and educational attainment. Due to the multiple and non-linear interaction 
effects the interpretation of the regression results is most easily done graphically. Full regression 
tables are provided in the appendix. Besides examining the general impact of age at bereavement 
on human capital outcomes, we distinguish between four types of orphans: male and female 
paternal orphans as well as male and female maternal orphans. For each type we evaluate the 
impact of age at bereavement on human capital outcomes at the mean or most typical values of 
the other independent variables, depending on whether they are continuous or binary. Together 
with the confidence intervals, these predicted values show at which ages parental loss is most 
critical for the outcome under consideration. In addition, the differential impact of orphanhood 
can be assessed by the slope of the fitted line, which is given by the marginal effect of age at 
bereavement: 
∂Yi2004/∂Ai=α1+2α2Ai+β1Pi+γ1Mi+δ1[Pi*Mi]+2β2[Ai*Pi]+2γ2[Ai*Mi]+2δ2[Ai*Pi*Mi] 
Age periods in which the marginal effect is significantly different from zero indicate when and 
how the relationship between age at paternal loss and health and education later in life changes. 
An upward-sloping curve would imply that parental death is more detrimental to younger 
children, while the reverse would be true in the case of a downward-sloping curve. 
Since we do not perform a comparison with the counterfactual scenario of both parents being 
alive, our estimation results should not be confused with the impacts of parental loss as such. 
Our focus is on investigating at which ages parental loss is most critical to children’s human 
capital formation. However, children who lost their first parent around the age of 18, our cut-off 
point used for defining orphanhood, may serve as a reference category. Becoming an orphan at 
this age should no longer have a major effect on a child’s human capital formation. By the age of 
18, body growth is generally completed (Bogin, 1999) and children in Tanzania at the end of the 
1990s had typically reached their final educational attainment (World Bank, 1999). 
3.5.1 Height Attainment 
Figure 3.1 summarizes our findings on heterogeneous impacts of parental death on children’s 
long-term health outcomes. For the different kinds of orphans, the left column presents the 
results from the regressions with community fixed effects, while the right column presents the 
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Figure 3.1: Body Height Attainment in Early Adulthood
Notes - column 1: predicted values (community fixed effects), column 2: predicted values (family fixed
effects); dashed lines: 90% confidence interval; shaded areas: marginal effect of age at bereavement
significantly different from zero.
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Estimating the relationship between age at bereavement and height-for-age z-scores without 
interactions with the gender of the late parent and the child, the death of a parent appears to be 
most critical to body growth when children are young. However, this general impression conceals 
considerable impact heterogeneity across the different types of orphans. 
For boys, paternal loss has the most adverse impacts on their long-term health status early in 
their lives. Boys whose father died before their teenage years achieve height-for-age z-scores that 
are on average about one unit lower than those of boys who lost their father close to reaching 
adulthood. The predicted values suggest that the detrimental impact of age at bereavement on 
height attainment is relatively flat until age eight. In fact, the marginal effect of age at 
bereavement is not significantly different from zero before this age. After age eight, however, the 
unfavorable health impact of paternal orphanhood significantly decreases with age at 
bereavement. Up to the age of 18, the marginal effect of age at paternal loss is significantly 
positive for boys. Basically the same observations can be made for brothers. Boys who lose their 
father in early ages grow significantly shorter than their older brothers. This finding is in line with 
the medical literature suggesting that pre-adolescent growth is generally more sensitive to 
environmental factors than adolescent growth (Bogin, 1999). It also corresponds to the 
theoretical predictions from various transmission channels. Outcomes resulting from 
psychological trauma and lost income such as chronic stress and malnutrition stifle young 
children’s development the most. The result can also be explained by the change of parental 
preferences. The loss of a father and the increasing importance of maternal preferences might 
imply that boys lose their privileged status and receive relatively less investments. Given the 
importance of early child development, the discontinuation of positive discrimination may be 
particularly harmful for boys’ health formation when they are young. 
As regards girls, the long-run health impact of paternal death does not appear to depend on the 
age at bereavement. Although the curve is slightly upward-sloping the marginal effect of age at 
paternal loss is not significantly different from zero. Psychological and income-related factors are 
unlikely to account for the divergent effects of father’s death on girls and boys, as they should 
apply regardless of the sex of the child. However, as indicated above, the death of a male 
household head may change a household’s resource allocation in favor of girls and thus 
compensate for income losses and distress. Young girls may particularly benefit from a growing 
role of maternal preferences.  
Our findings for the death of a mother mirror those for the death of a father. While age at 
maternal bereavement does not seem to affect boys’ long-term health status, girls suffer most in 
terms of height attainment when they lose their mother prior to age ten. In contrast to paternally 
orphaned boys, however, the marginal effect of age at bereavement for maternally orphaned girls 
is positive before teenage years and then becomes insignificant. A girl whose mother passes away 
around her first birthday attains height-for-age z-scores in young adulthood which are almost two 
units lower than those of a girl whose mother survives until she becomes a young teenager. These 
effects are not significant at the family level though. Younger and older sisters do not appear to 
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be differentially affected by their mother’s death. Again, the change in parental preferences may 
explain why maternal loss has heterogeneous impact across age at bereavement for girls, but not 
for boys. The lack of maternal safeguarding of sufficient resource allocation towards girls is likely 
to be most adverse for health formation in early childhood. 
The estimates of the other explanatory variables are mostly in line with expectations. Orphans’ 
baseline height-for-age z-score and mothers’ height are statistically highly significant predictors of 
higher 2004 z-scores. Thus, children who are relatively short at a given age are also likely to reach 
a relatively low height in adulthood. Parental education and a household’s baseline wealth status, 
however, are not significantly associated with children’s long-term health. 
3.5.2 Educational Attainment 
Figure 3.2 shows our findings on the relationship between age at bereavement and years of 
schooling attained in early adulthood. Again, the two identification strategies yield highly 
comparable results. It is important to keep in mind that the education sample does not include 
children who lost a parent prior to age six. 
Overall, children who lose their parents earlier in life seem to attain lower levels of schooling in 
early adulthood. However, the marginal effect of age at bereavement is not significantly different 
from zero and the general specification without interactions terms masks differential impacts of 
orphanhood. 
Concerning paternal death, the results resemble those for long-term health status. Educational 
outcomes of boys are most severely affected when their father dies before adolescence. This 
effect is particularly pronounced for brothers. Boys who lose their father at age six attain up to 
five years less of schooling than their older brothers. Age at paternal bereavement, however, does 
not significantly matter for girls’ educational level in young adulthood. As in the case of health, 
maternal preferences seem to protect younger girls from the adverse income effects that are 
typically associated with the death of the male household head. With respect to opportunity costs, 
we do not find evidence that older boys or girls spend less time in formal education than younger 
children following the death of their father. This result might be due to the fact that men often 
engage in wage employment and can hence not easily be substituted. 
For maternal death, the picture looks different. Neither for boys nor for girls do we find 
heterogeneous impact across age at maternal bereavement. In particular, there is no evidence for 
increased opportunity costs of children’s time as especially older daughters should be a relatively 
good substitute for female adult labor in domestic tasks. 
As regards other covariates, children with relatively high educational levels at baseline have 
attained more years of schooling in early adulthood. So have children from initially richer 
households. Maternal education also improves orphans’ long-run educational attainment. Fathers’ 
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Figure 3.2: Educational Attainment in Early Adulthood
Notes - column 1: predicted values (community fixed effects), column 2: predicted values (family fixed
effects); dashed lines: 90% confidence interval; shaded areas: marginal effect of age at bereavement




3.5.3 Robustness Checks 
Despite the high re-contact rates of 93 percent and 82 percent on the household and individual 
level, respectively, non-random attrition poses a potential source of bias. We address this 
problem by predicting the probability of an individual to be re-interviewed in 2004 based on the 
same baseline characteristics used above. We then use the inverse of these probabilities as 
weights in our regressions. Our results, however, are fully robust to this weighting procedure 
(available upon request). This finding does not come as a surprise given the low overall attrition 
rates and similar findings by Beegle et al. (2010) who also find that their results on the human 
capital impact of orphanhood as such remain unchallenged after accounting for potential attrition 
bias. 
Another issue of concern is the role of parental morbidity. If the death of a parent was preceded 
by a long period of severe illness, orphans’ health and educational status at baseline could already 
be contaminated by their parents’ chronic disease. For instance, AIDS-related deaths, which are 
common in the study area, typically follow up to two years of opportunistic diseases like diarrhea, 
tuberculosis and acute respiratory infections (Morgan et al., 2002).29 Such episodes inflict a heavy 
financial and emotional burden upon affected households and could adversely affect human 
capital accumulation of orphans before the actual death. Since we do not reliably observe the 
cause of parental death, we control for parents’ health status by including a dummy variable 
indicating whether they reported to have been chronically ill during the six months prior to the 
baseline survey. Again, our results remain virtually unchanged (available upon request) and are 
thus unlikely to be confounded by earlier parental morbidity. This finding is also in line with the 
previous observation that future age at bereavement is not significantly related to baseline height 
or educational attainment. 
3.6 Conclusion 
There is ample theoretical ground to suspect that the age at which a child loses her parent(s) 
affects the magnitude of the resulting impacts on her overall human capital formation. Using 
longitudinal data from North-Western Tanzania, we provide empirical evidence in support of this 
view. Overall, however, the impact of orphanhood is less heterogeneous for the death of 
opposite-sex parents. Preferences of the surviving parent or the foster family seem to partly make 
up for income losses and psychological stress which typically accompany the loss of a parent. 
This finding also indicates that risks are not shared equally within households. 
Our results may inform policy interventions to take an age-specific approach. Yet, optimal 
targeting of particularly vulnerable orphans remains challenging in the context of broad-based 
support schemes as the adverse effects of orphanhood not only vary with age at bereavement, 
but also with the sex of the deceased parent and the type of human capital. More research on 
                                                 
29 41 percent and 31 percent of the orphans in the education and health sample, respectively, have lost a parent up 
to two years after their baseline interview. 
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critical periods for child development in developing countries is needed in order to design 
targeted interventions that provide favorable conditions for human capital formation after age 
five. Such interventions may be crucial for reaping the benefits of previous parental investments 
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TABLE A3.1: NUMBER OF ORPHANS BY SAMPLE AND CATEGORY 




Total 184 369  
Notes - The gender distribution is very even. Boys represent 
49.5 percent and 48.8 percent of the education and health 
sample, respectively. Entries in one column do not sum to the 
total because double orphans are also included as both 
maternal and paternal orphans. 
TABLE A3.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
height-for-age z-score in 2004 -1.56 1.04 -4.31 1.49 - - - -
years of schooling in 2004 - - - - 5.99 2.68 0.00 13.00
age at bereavement 10.90 4.44 0.75 17.92 13.59 2.93 6.67 17.92
father died first 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
double orphan 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
male 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
height-for-age z-score -1.76 1.34 -4.98 3.28 - - - -
schooling for age - - - - -2.08 1.88 -9.00 1.00
first-born 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
mother present at baseline 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
father present at baseline 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00
# hh members 0-18 years 5.17 2.29 0.00 19.00 5.24 2.32 1.00 19.00
# hh members 19-60 years 2.31 1.19 0.00 8.00 2.30 1.27 0.00 8.00
# hh members 61+ years 0.51 0.58 0.00 2.00 0.57 0.60 0.00 2.00
male hh head 0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00
asset index -0.07 1.53 -1.67 7.46 -0.03 1.42 -1.62 5.86
mother attended school 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00
father attended school 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00
age in 2004 18.11 4.69 9.00 30.00 22.63 2.80 19.00 30.00
height of mother 125.67 63.78 0.00 173.20 - - - -
height of mother missing 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 - - - -
Health sample (n=369) Education sample (n=184)
 
TABLE A3.3: PREDICTING BASELINE OUTCOMES WITH FUTURE AGE AT BEREAVEMENT AND A 
FULL SET OF BASELINE COVARIATES 
Baseline outcome Estimation 
method
Coefficient Std. err. P-value Observations
Health
   height-for-age z-score OLS -0.009 0.023 0.695 369
Education
   years of schooling OLS -0.018 0.032 0.571 184
   years of schooling Tobit -0.025 0.036 0.499 184
   enrolled Probit 0.013 0.043 0.755 184  
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TABLE A3.4: EFFECTS OF AGE AT BEREAVEMENT ON BODY HEIGHT ATTAINMENT IN EARLY 
ADULTHOOD 
coef se coef se coef se coef se
age at bereavem. 0.037** 0.015 0.019 0.039 0.067 0.061 0.008 0.057
age at bereavem.*male 0.001 0.047 -0.054 0.080
age at bereavem.*father died -0.007 0.039 0.062 0.052
age at bereavem.*father died*male 0.064 0.050 0.098 0.082
(age at bereavem.)² -0.001 0.002 -0.014** 0.007 -0.000 0.004 -0.006 0.012
(age at bereavem.)²*male 0.015+ 0.009 0.003 0.013
(age at bereavem.)²*father died 0.012+ 0.008 0.007 0.013
(age at bereavem.)²*father died*male -0.007 0.010 0.003 0.015
male -0.560** 0.096 -0.707** 0.235 -0.500** 0.129 -0.448 0.408
father died -0.074 0.215 0.276 0.783
father died*male -0.031 0.255 -0.219 0.441
double orphan 0.151 0.120 0.159 0.119 -0.019 0.285 -0.020 0.278
baseline H/A z-score 0.345** 0.042 0.348** 0.043 0.378** 0.077 0.355** 0.073
first-born 0.113 0.114 0.135 0.113 -0.211 0.172 -0.178 0.194
mother present at baseline 0.175 0.262 0.149 0.271 0.680
father present at baseline 0.148 0.133 0.134 0.136
# hh members 0-18 years 0.006 0.025 0.004 0.023
# hh members 19-60 years -0.034 0.045 -0.025 0.051
# hh members 61+ years 0.199** 0.098 0.190* 0.097
male hh head 0.063 0.133 0.057 0.138
asset index -0.061+ 0.041 -0.065+ 0.040
mother attended school 0.079 0.111 0.075 0.110
father attended school 0.090 0.182 0.140 0.192
mother's height 0.047** 0.008 0.043** 0.008
mother's height missing 7.660** 1.295 7.030** 1.238
constant -9.738** 1.385 -8.652** 1.339 -3.188** -3.276** 0.665




0.403 0.412 0.342 0.368
Family fixed effects
no interactions with interactions no interactions with interactions




**/*/+ denote significance at the 5/10/15 percent level, respectively. Standard errors 




TABLE A3.5: EFFECTS OF AGE AT BEREAVEMENT ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN EARLY 
ADULTHOOD 
coef se coef se coef se coef se
age at bereavem. 0.123 0.091 -0.054 0.189 0.408 0.293 0.370 0.645
age at bereavem.*male 0.070 0.206 0.113 0.726
age at bereavem.*father died 0.208 0.245 0.067 0.695
age at bereavem.*father died*male 0.036 0.269 0.331 0.764
(age at bereavem.)² 0.012 0.023 0.018 0.058 0.002 0.040 0.119 0.216
(age at bereavem.)²*male -0.020 0.077 -0.038 0.224
(age at bereavem.)²*father died 0.009 0.072 -0.138 0.209
(age at bereavem.)²*father died*male -0.013 0.089 0.026 0.247
male -0.284 0.439 -0.774 0.971 0.376 0.738 3.231 2.373
father died -1.237 1.066 3.256 2.717
father died*male 1.071 1.379 -3.105 2.359
double orphan -0.418 0.599 -0.377 0.575 0.510 1.097 0.528 0.846
schooling for age 0.290** 0.143 0.325** 0.153 0.532** 0.245 0.779** 0.240
first-born 0.142 0.510 0.158 0.543 0.098 0.782 0.038 0.878
mother present at baseline 0.262 0.446 0.184 0.480
father present at baseline -0.585 0.450 -0.244 0.510
# hh members 0-18 years 0.003 0.073 0.049 0.081
# hh members 19-60 years -0.079 0.143 -0.113 0.164
# hh members 61+ years -0.430 0.380 -0.332 0.417
male hh head 0.502 0.661 0.283 0.774
asset index 0.778** 0.202 0.704** 0.268
mother attended school 0.900** 0.420 0.940** 0.442
father attended school 0.324 0.741 0.313 0.877
constant 5.290** 1.362 6.013** 1.258 7.353** 1.901 5.719** 2.906
age in 2004 dummies
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
Community fixed effects Family fixed effects
no interactions with interactions no interactions with interactions
Years of schooling in 2004
yes
184 184 104 104
yes yes yes
0.096 0.412 0.342 0.368  
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Abstract 
Using data from Western Kenya, we confirm the existence of a dichotomous non-
agricultural sector. The poverty and inequality implications of the differently motivated 
diversification strategies only partly correspond to expected patterns. While high-return 
activities are indeed confined to richer households, low-return activities constitute an 
important income source for households across the entire income distribution. Finally, we 
examine the wider implications of our findings for rural livelihoods. We find that only 
engagement in high-return non-agricultural activities is significantly associated with 
increased agricultural productivity. It seems that such high-return activities play a key role 
in triggering cumulative effects of relative livelihood success. 
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A number of studies have shown that rural households in sub-Saharan Africa derive their 
incomes from a variety of sources with non-agricultural activities accounting for a substantial 
share of total income.32 Despite the importance of non-agricultural activities for rural farm 
households, we still know little about the impact of such activities on the distribution of income 
and, hence, on poverty. 
Broadly, one may classify diversification strategies of rural households as survival-led or 
opportunity-led. It has been observed that poor households with low asset endowments embrace 
multiple livelihoods, in particular engagement in non-agricultural activities, to ensure survival. 
These households are forced to diversify mainly because they lack sufficient agricultural assets to 
sustain subsistence (Reardon and Taylor, 1996; Haggblade et al., 2005). Returns to these activities 
may well be below those in agriculture. At the same time, richer rural households with higher 
asset endowments will choose to diversify their livelihoods to maximize returns on their assets. 
Such activities will have at least the same returns as agricultural activities and exhibit entry 
barriers that the poor are not able to overcome. 
The existence of these two types of non-agricultural activities implies a U-shaped relationship 
between the share of income derived from non-agricultural activities and household wealth as 
well as household income. The poverty and distributional impact of non-agricultural incomes 
should hence be ambiguous: Survival-led engagement in non-agricultural activities should be 
inequality-decreasing through increasing the incomes of the poorer parts of the population and 
hence reduce poverty. Opportunity-led diversification, however, should increase inequality and 
have a minor effect on poverty, as it may be confined to non-poor households. Some authors 
have pointed to this ambiguity (Ferreira and Lanjouw, 2001; Haggblade et al., 2005), but only 
few, e.g. Elbers and Lanjouw (2001) for rural Ecuador, explicitly address the relationship between 
different diversification strategies, on the one hand, and poverty and inequality outcomes, on the 
other. This paper intends to fill this gap by providing evidence from sub-Saharan Africa. We test 
for the dichotomy of the non-agricultural activities and examine their distributional consequences 
using household survey data from Kakamega district in Western Kenya that can be considered as 
representative for the densely populated rural areas of many parts of Eastern sub-Saharan Africa. 
We proceed as follows. In the first section we shortly review the theoretical and empirical 
literature on non-agricultural activities and their poverty and distributional implications. Then, we 
provide evidence on the incidence and characteristics of the non-agricultural economy in the 
study region. Subsequently, we present the results of the choice model and, based on this 
typology of non-agricultural incomes, examine the poverty and inequality implications. We then 
briefly examine the relationship between the different non-agricultural activities and agricultural 
                                                 
32 Reardon (1997), Reardon et al. (1998), Ellis (2000), Haggblade et al. (2005). 
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productivity. The last section concludes with policy implications and an outlook for future 
research. 
4.2 The Rural Non-Agricultural Economy: Theory and Empirics 
The non-agricultural economy involves employment outside the realm of direct soil cultivation 
and cattle breeding and includes activities such as services, construction, mining, commerce, 
manufacturing and processing. Such activities are often pursued through self-employment, but 
there is also a non-agricultural wage labor market, although this market is typically small in the 
rural sub-Saharan African context. The contribution of these activities to household income in 
the developing world in general and sub-Saharan Africa in particular is substantial. Haggblade et 
al. (2005) observe that non-agricultural income contributes between 30 to 45 percent of rural 
household incomes in the developing world. Reardon et al. (1998) put this share at 42 percent for 
sub-Saharan Africa, while Reardon (1999) gives estimates of 32 percent and 40 percent for Asia 
and Latin America, respectively. Ellis (2000) reports somewhat higher figures from case studies in 
sub-Saharan Africa in a range of 30 to 50 percent. Jayne et al.’s (2003) estimates for five sub-
Saharan African countries lie between 8 percent for Ethiopia and 40 percent for Kenya. 
4.2.1 Low- vs. High-Return Activities and Drivers of  Participation 
Rapid population growth and the related pressure on the natural resource base, in particular land, 
have been identified as major causes for the rise of non-agricultural activities in sub-Saharan 
Africa.33 Other driving forces are supply factors, such as technological advances and the 
expansion of educational attainment, as well as demand shocks, including higher per capita 
incomes and increased demand for non-food goods and services (Reardon, 1997). 
In order to understand how these variables affect the participation in and patterns of non-
agricultural employment and the related incomes, it is useful to differentiate between survival-led 
and opportunity-led diversification into non-agricultural activities.  
When non-agricultural diversification is pursued to ensure survival, for example because of land 
constraints, it is also referred to as distress-push diversification (Islam, 1997; Reardon et al., 2000; 
Barrett, Reardon and Webb, 2001). Such diversification will be in low-return non-agricultural 
activities and may be an indication that the non-agricultural sector is absorbing labor that cannot 
be employed in agriculture. In contrast, rural households may face new opportunities outside 
agriculture because of technological advances, the intensification of links with markets outside 
the local economy, or local engines of growth, such as commercial agriculture or proximity to an 
urban area.34 If non-agricultural income diversification can be traced back to such factors, it is 
also regarded as demand-pull diversification. 
                                                 
33 Bryceson and Jamal (1997), Barrett et al. (2000), Bryceson (2002). 
34 Reardon (1999), Haggblade et al. (2002). 
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While the aggregate prevalence of the specific type of non-agricultural diversification in a region 
(or country) will hence be driven by meso (or macro) determinants, household characteristics will 
decide on the individual household’s diversification strategy. The literature has stressed asset 
availability and educational endowments as key participation determinants of non-agricultural 
diversification (Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001; Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Barrett, Reardon and 
Webb, 2001; Escobal, 2001; Matsumoto et al., 2006). Whereas entry barriers to low-return 
diversification should be low, they can be considerable for high-return activities (Abdulai and 
CroleRees, 2001). In the presence of underdeveloped credit markets, the latter typically require 
sufficient cash income, in particular from livestock, cash cropping, and/or remittances, both for 
initial investment and as working capital (Reardon et al., 2000; Barrett, Bezuneh and Aboud, 
2001). Skill requirements may impose another important entry constraint (Abdulai and Delgado, 
1999; Dercon and Krishnan, 1996; Reardon, 1997). Some high-return non-agricultural activities 
such as skilled wage employment are restricted to those with formal education.35 
Non-agricultural diversification constitutes an important means to deal with risk and smooth 
income and consumption in rural areas. This is not surprising since agricultural livelihoods are 
often subject to great uncertainty. In such an environment, diversification aims at lower covariate 
risk between different household activities to smooth consumption (Bryceson, 1999; Dercon, 
1998; Francis and Hoddinott, 1993). For our discussion, it is useful to distinguish between ex-
ante risk management and ex-post risk coping strategies. Engagement in high-return non-
agricultural activities represents an ex-ante risk management strategy, as it is unlikely that entry 
barriers can be easily overcome after a negative shock. In contrast, low-return non-agricultural 
diversification will figure prominently as an ex-post coping strategy, i.e. households will relocate 
labor towards these activities after they have been hit by a negative agricultural shock, typically a 
weather shock. Yet, in particular poorer household may also be willing to accept lower returns 
than in agriculture ex-ante in exchange for lower covariate risk. 
While rural households can reduce risks by venturing into non-agricultural activities, risk 
considerations may also play a role when deciding between different types of non-agricultural 
activities. If high-return activities are more risky than low-return activities, households able to 
overcome possible entry barriers may engage in both types of non-agricultural activities according 
to their risk preferences.  
The empirical literature on the rural non-agricultural economy has emphasized the drivers of 
participation in these activities at the individual, household, and community level. Some of the 
empirical contributions have distinguished between low- and high-return activities in doing so. 
Studies in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America have confirmed that the level of formal 
education is positively correlated with participation in non-agricultural activities, in general, and 
high-return activities, in particular (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Ferreira and Lanjouw, 2001; 
Lanjouw, 2001; van den Berg and Kumbi, 2006). Land and other productive assets have also 
                                                 
35 Corral and Reardon (2001), Lanjouw (2001), Reardon (1997). 
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been demonstrated to be important determinants of different types of diversification strategies 
(Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001; Seppala, 1996; Elbers and Lanjouw, 2001; Marenya et al., 2003). 
For instance, Elbers and Lanjouw (2001) show that land scarcity is a driving force of participation 
in a low-return non-agricultural activity while more landholdings seem to provide collateral for 
investment in high-return non-agricultural businesses. Another household level factor correlated 
with participation in non-agricultural activities is the size and structure of the household (Corral 
and Reardon, 2001; Reardon, 1997; van den Berg and Kumbi, 2006). On the one hand, a larger 
household size enables households to supply more labor to non-agricultural activities, since 
sufficient family members remain at home to meet labor demands for agricultural subsistence. 
On the other hand, however, large households are also more likely to suffer from land 
constraints. Thus, they might find themselves forced to engage in non-agricultural activities to 
ensure survival. As regards community level determinants, most empirical studies confirm an 
important role for physical and institutional infrastructure, such as paved roads, efficient 
communication facilities and provision of rural electrification (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; Jalan 
and Ravallion, 2002; Lanjouw and Feder, 2001). 
4.2.2 Non-Agricultural Incomes, Poverty and Inequality 
There are limited empirical accounts of the relationship between farm households’ income 
composition and inequality, in particular for sub-Saharan Africa.36 Moreover, most existing 
studies do not distinguish between different types of non-agricultural activities (e.g. Adams, 
2002). From the above discussion, it has become apparent that the equity impact of non-
agricultural employment depends on the type of activity. Early work on the informal sector (ILO, 
1972) claims that, given their intrinsic characteristics, such as easy entry, non-agricultural activities 
will decrease income inequalities, particularly through self-employment. While low-return 
activities undertaken by poorer households should hence be inequality-decreasing, high-return 
activities may well increase inequality, as they tend to reinforce asset inequalities. Accordingly, 
Haggblade et al. (2005) observe that because of the differing equity impact of various segments 
of these activities, their overall effect on income distribution remains mixed. Thus, depending on 
the nature and motivation of non-agricultural activity undertaken, aggregate non-agricultural 
earnings improve equity in some instances, while they aggravate inequality in others. 
This explains the differing results of empirical studies on the equity impact of non-agricultural 
activities. In fact, most empirical studies tend to find that non-agricultural incomes go primarily 
to the better-off so that higher non-agricultural incomes (as opposed to more non-agricultural 
income earners) are associated with higher income inequality. For example, case studies on 
Burkina Faso by Reardon et al. (1992) and on Ecuador by Elbers and Lanjouw (2001) find that 
                                                 
36 Some exceptions that explicitly address the poverty and inequality implications of non-agricultural activities in 
sub-Saharan Africa include Jayne et al. (2003), Kijima et al. (2006) on Uganda and van den Berg and Kumbi (2006) 
on Ethiopia. From a more comprehensive livelihood perspective, the four studies summarized by Ellis and Freeman 
(2004) examine the link between income portfolios and welfare outcomes. A case study from Kenya can be found in 
Freeman et al. (2004). 
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the income share from non-agricultural sources increases with per capita income. For Mexico, de 
Janvry and Sadoulet (2001) show non-agricultural wages to be inequality-increasing, while non-
agricultural self-employment tends to decrease inequality. Some empirical studies show an 
inequality-decreasing effect of non-agricultural activities, e.g. by Norman et al. (1982) on rural 
households in Northern Nigeria, Adams (2002) in Egypt, or van den Berg and Kumbi (2006) in 
Ethiopia. 
It is likely that these seemingly contradictory findings could be reconciled through an analysis of 
the underlying type of non-agricultural activities. Once this is understood, the conditions that 
drive the prevalence of one type of non-agricultural activity or another should be addressed, as 
they eventually represent the fundamental causes of the inequality implications. According to 
Reardon et al. (1998) such conditions include the proximity to urban markets, physical and 
market infrastructure, resource endowments and the distribution of productive resources within 
rural areas. In the following, we will (i) assess which kind of activities prevail in the poverty-
ridden context that we have studied and (ii) examine whether the poverty and distributional 
consequences correspond to the patterns one could expect under the specific conditions in the 
study region. 
4.3 The Patterns of  Non-Agricultural Activities in Kakamega 
The data for our analysis come from a household survey which was conducted in Kakamega 
district, a densely populated and poor rural area of Western Kenya, in the last quarter of the year 
2005. In this year, Kakamega district had a population of about 700,000 with a mean population 
density of approximately 500 persons per square kilometer. The largest urban agglomeration in 
the region, the district capital Kakamega Town, has a population of about 85,000, which only 
partly resides in a strictly urban setting. The region is considered to have good agricultural 
potential, yet population growth and further subdivision of land has led to land fragmentation 
and extremely small farm sizes in parts of the district. These developments have also caused high 
rates of out-migration.37 
The survey was designed with a focus on economic activities of rural households in both 
agriculture and non-agricultural sectors. This focus allows for a very detailed analysis of these 
activities taking into account regional specificities. Yet, it also constrains the subsequent empirical 
analysis to those characteristics and leaves out many social and cultural aspects that certainly play 
a role in determining activity choices and hence welfare outcomes. Only some of those aspects 
can be captured in a proximate way in the following empirical setup, for example the socio-
culturally determined control over household resources. 
                                                 
37 Detailed descriptions of similar rural livelihoods in nearby Kisumu district with a focus on migration can be 
found in Francis (2000). The study also contains insightful accounts of employment histories in the non-agricultural 
sector. For more details on Kakamega district see Government of Kenya (2002). A recent analysis of migration using 
the same data as this paper is provided by Giesbert (2007). 
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The survey used a two-stage sampling technique and covered 375 households with a total of 1950 
household members, which were spread over 20 clusters. One cluster, however, was excluded 
from our sample as it was mainly inhabited by teachers who had been sent to the study region.38 
Six of the remaining clusters were located in urban or peri-urban areas. Nevertheless, households 
in these clusters derive a substantial amount of their income from agriculture-related activities 
and therefore form part of our sample. It is important to note that this paper focuses on locally 
conducted non-agricultural activities. This is why non-agricultural activities, as used subsequently, 
exclude migration, another important diversification strategy of rural households in the region. 
In the following, we give an overview of the structure of household income and non-agricultural 
employment patterns in the study region, taking into account the different character of low-
return and high-return non-agricultural activities. In contrast to other authors, e.g. Ferreira and 
Lanjouw (2001) who define high-return non-agricultural activities as those whose monthly 
returns are above the poverty line our definition of such activities takes a different approach. On 
the one hand, activities based on self-employment are considered to be high-return activities if 
the household enterprise employs at least one hired worker or two household members. Given 
the rural character of the Kakamega district, such-defined enterprises can well be assumed to 
generate higher incomes than traditional agricultural activities. On the other hand, the definition 
of wage-based high-return activities draws on specific sectors which typically exhibit entry 
constraints. In our view, these entry barriers should not only encompass special skills or asset 
requirements, but also such seemingly simple hurdles like a clean and healthy appearance, which 
some poor households may well not be able to overcome. Accordingly, the following sectors 
offer high-return wage employment in the study region: repair of motor vehicles, medical 
services, hair dressing and beauty, churches/NGOs/international organizations, and hotels and 
restaurants. This definition is bolstered by the fact that high-return wage employment can only be 
found as primary occupation and not as a secondary one for all individuals in the sample. It is 
important to note that we exclude employment in the public sector from our analysis. Entry 
barriers in this segment are likely to be very different from those in other high-return activities, as 
public employment is often arranged by nepotistic and corrupt structures. 
All remaining forms of non-agricultural employment, i.e. household enterprises which are run by 
one household member only and wage employment in non-agricultural sectors other than those 
mentioned above, constitute the group of low-return non-agricultural activities. With this 
definition of low-return and high-return non-agricultural employment, we believe to adequately 
reflect the idea of survival-led and opportunity-led income diversification. 
Table 4.1a shows the participation rates of households in different types of activities. It reveals 
that households in Kakamega district earn income from a variety of activities.39 As can be 
                                                 
38 Though non-agricultural employment comprises teaching activities, the observed patterns in this cluster are not 
compatible with the idea of rural income diversification. 
39 Our analysis includes both primary and secondary non-agricultural employment. 
 
67 
expected for a rural region, the vast majority of the households (86 percent) work at least partly 
in agriculture. Still, 46 percent engage in low-return and 20 percent in high-return non-agricultural 
activities. In addition, migration is a common phenomenon in the area. A fourth of all 
households reports income in the form of remittances. 
Table 4.1b presents a matrix of agricultural and non-agricultural income-generating activities of 
households. The rows show in which activities households are engaged in addition to the 
activities indicated in the columns. Accordingly, households on the diagonal line do not diversify 
their income sources. 
Out of all farming households, only 26 percent are fully specialized in agriculture, while about 55 
percent diversify into non-agricultural activities, primarily into low-return activities. With a 
participation rate of 26 percent, migration is also an important diversification strategy of 
agricultural households. Non-agricultural income constitutes the sole income source for roughly 
17 percent of all households. This relatively high proportion is principally due to the fact that our 
sample still includes the urban and peri-urban clusters to give a more complete overview of the 
income-generating activities in the study region. Moreover, the table illustrates that more than a 
third of the households engaged in high-return activities in the non-agricultural sector also pursue 
some low-return activity. Among the households with non-agricultural activities, about 18 
percent also report receiving remittances. 
TABLE 4.1A: PARTICIPATION OF HOUSEHOLDS IN INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES 





314 214 166 73 26 90 4





The total number of households is 365. 
TABLE 4.1B: INCOME DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES OF HOUSEHOLDS 
All Low-return High-return
82 174 134 56 22 82
26.11% 81.31% 80.72% 76.71% 84.62% 91.11%
174 36 6 39
55.41% 16.82% 23.08% 43.33%
134 166 21 25 5 28
42.68% 77.57% 12.65% 34.25% 19.23% 31.11%
56 73 25 6 2 15
17.83% 34.11% 15.06% 8.22% 7.69% 16.67%
22 6 5 2 3 9
7.01% 2.8% 3.01% 2.74% 11.54% 10%
82 39 28 15 9 3
26.11% 18.22% 16.87% 20.55% 34.62% 3.33%

















Due to the fact that a number of households are involved in more than two income-generating activities, the 
percentage shares do not add up to 100 percent. 
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Since the focus of this paper is on rural income diversification, we now confine our sample to 
households which have access to at least half an acre of land and engage in agricultural activities. 
This step makes the sample more likely to include only those households which diversify out of 
agriculture and not the ones which have some limited supplementary agricultural activities. 
Virtually all excluded households are from urban or peri-urban areas. 
Based on this sample, we compile a detailed profile of non-agricultural activities in Kakamega 
district, which clearly reveals that the rural non-agricultural sector is dominated by low-return 
activities and provides relatively little space for high-return activities. In addition, most non-
agricultural activities take the form of household enterprises. In total, we find 136 such 
enterprises in the sample, 99 of which belong to the low-return segment. This compares to 37 
wage-employed individuals, out of which 19 are in the low-return segment. Thus, in the case of 
wage employment the frequency of low-return and high-return activities seems to be roughly 
equal. 
As regards high-return wage employment, all recorded activities belong to the service sector. 
Most individuals work with churches, NGOs or international organizations, followed by hotels 
and restaurants. Interestingly, the same number of men and women are engaged in these 
activities, suggesting that both sexes have equal access to them. In contrast, low-return wage 
employment seems to favor men as it often requires physical strength though most activities 
again belong to the service sector. Only four out of the 19 individuals in this segment of non-
agricultural employment are women. The most frequent low-return wage activities include 
security, food production, and retailing. Women, however, are solely active in retailing, house-
help, and informal services. 
Micro and small businesses are involved in a fairly wide range of activities, primarily retailing, 
informal services such as shoe-shining and washing, boda-boda transportation40, and 
construction. Only in the sphere of retailing can we find a concentration of both low-return and 
high-return household enterprises. This suggests that low-return and high-return businesses 
operate in relatively segmented markets. Informal services and boda-boda transportation are 
exclusively provided by low-return enterprises, whereas formal services and food production are 
clearly dominated by high-return businesses. Some manufacturing activities can be observed in 
non-agricultural self-employment. These comprise food production, carpentry, and the 
manufacturing of textile products. 
We now turn to the analysis of the determinants of rural non-agricultural employment in the 
study region. First, we inspect the shares of income from agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities by basic characteristics of the household head and the household itself. Subsequently, 
we estimate a multivariate choice model of participation in different types of non-agricultural 
activities. 
                                                 




Table 4.2 presents income shares from different sources tabulated by some key determinants of 
participation in non-agricultural activities.41 Overall, income from non-agricultural activities 
constitutes a major source of income in rural areas of Kakamega district, accounting for 23 
percent of total household income on average. Yet, this share is below the averages that have 
been found in similar studies for sub-Saharan Africa. 










All 100% 23% 16% 7% 67% 10%
Age of  household head
  -25 6% 40% 28% 12% 53% 7%
  25-35 25% 29% 20% 9% 64% 7%
  35-45 22% 29% 20% 9% 59% 11%
  45-55 18% 18% 11% 6% 67% 16%
  55- 29% 12% 9% 4% 78% 9%
Sex of  household head
  male 72% 27% 18% 9% 65% 9%
  female 28% 12% 10% 3% 74% 14%
Level of  f ormal education of  household head
  no formal education 26% 16% 14% 3% 74% 9%
  uncompleted 
primary school 46% 25% 18% 7% 71% 4%
  completed primary 
school 18% 24% 16% 8% 67% 9%
  completed secondary 
school and higher 10% 24% 12% 12% 53% 23%
Land size in acres
  0.5-1.5 38% 27% 21% 6% 62% 11%
  1.5-3.5 42% 19% 13% 6% 71% 10%
  3.5- 20% 23% 12% 10% 69% 9%
Location
  rural 88% 21% 15% 6% 70% 9%






We find that in all age groups of the household head agriculture remains the dominant income 
source, as it always accounts for at least half of all household income. As the age of the 
household head rises, however, the share of agricultural income increases significantly while the 
share of income from non-agricultural employment drops sharply. This observation is true for 
both low-return and high-return non-agricultural activities though the share of low-return income 
is consistently higher than the share of high-return income. We may relate this pattern to the fact 
                                                 
41 The household’s total gross monthly income is computed as the sum of all income from wage or self-employment 
in the low and high-return non-agricultural sector, farm income including the imputed value of unsold farm produce 
as well as other income sources such as remittances or pensions. Income from employment in the public sector is 
also subsumed under other income. 
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that under traditional land subdivision and inheritance norms older household heads have better 
claim to land resources (Jayne et al., 2003). This gives them a head start when it comes to 
agricultural activities, whereas younger household heads will have to embrace non-agricultural 
strategies to secure their livelihoods. 
Looking at the sex of the household head, the table shows that households with a female head 
earn considerably lower income shares from both types of non-agricultural activities. Given the 
lower number of adult members in female-headed households and the numerous tasks of their 
heads in agriculture, housekeeping and child-rearing, these households’ ability to engage in non-
agricultural employment is likely to be limited. 
The share of non-agricultural income does not rise with the level of formal education and 
accounts for roughly 25 percent of total household income. With 16 percent, however, this share 
is considerably lower in the case of household heads without any formal education at all. Yet, the 
actual relationship between non-agricultural income and educational attainment is clouded by the 
dichotomy of the non-agricultural sector.42 The share of low-return non-agricultural income falls 
with the educational level of the household head, whereas the reverse is true for the share of 
high-return non-agricultural income. 
The tabulation of the share of total non-agricultural income with total land holdings generates a 
U-shaped relationship. Whereas households with low endowments of land earn about 27 percent 
of their income from non-agricultural activities, this share falls to 19 percent for medium-
endowed households, and then rises again to 23 percent for households that are highly endowed 
with land. A separate inspection of the shares of income derived from low-return and high-return 
activities again reveals the two-pronged diversification behavior. The share of income from low-
return activities drops sharply with increasing landholdings. The opposite effect is observable for 
the income share of high-return activities. For many households in sub-Saharan Africa, land is a 
key asset and serves multiple uses including cultivation, sustaining livestock, storing wealth, and 
providing collateral for financial credit. The findings hence support the notion that declining 
farm sizes and related declines in soil fertility force land-poor households to diversify into non-
agricultural employment to ensure survival. At the same time, higher land endowments may 
enable households to diversify into high-return activities as land may serve as collateral for credit 
or simply provide higher cash flows from agriculture for the necessary start-up capital. 
Even in our restricted sample, the share of non-agricultural income considerably varies with the 
location of the household. Whereas rural households earn about 21 percent of their income in 
the non-agricultural sector, the corresponding figure climbs to 35 percent for households in peri-
urban areas. In particular income from high-return activities plays a more important role for 
                                                 
42 The observation that the income share from agricultural activities steadily decreases with educational attainment 
can be explained by the income earned from employment in the public sector, which is included in income from 
other sources. As can be clearly seen, the share of the latter rises strongly with educational attainment. Households 




households in those places. This lends credence to the notion that rural non-agricultural activities 
are closely linked to the infrastructural benefits in the urban areas, which also provide access to 
markets and linkages to the formal sector. 
With the results of the univariate analysis above in mind, we now turn to a multivariate choice 
model to shed more light on the possible determinants of engagement in the rural non-
agricultural sector. This allows us to consider individual choice determinants beyond the 
household head’s characteristics and to test whether the univariate results also hold once we 
control for other factors. We estimate a multinomial logit model where we allow individuals (not 
households) to choose between the two types of non-agricultural activities and staying on the 
farm. The results are presented in Table 4.3. The table reports odds ratios of low-return and 
high-return non-agricultural activities vis-à-vis agricultural ones in the first two columns and the 
odds of choosing high- vs. low-return activities in the last column. In line with the theory 
outlined above and existing empirical work, the set of explanatory variables comprises individual 
characteristics, such as age, gender, position in the household and formal education, and 
household composition variables. It also includes household assets, such as land and livestock, 
and a dummy indicating whether or not a household receives remittances. In addition, the 
distance to the nearest access road and an urban dummy are used as proxies for access to 
infrastructure and markets. We expect the diversification behavior of sugarcane farmers to be 
different from other farm households as the period between the cash flows from sugarcane 
harvests can be longer than three years.43 Given this cycle and lacking access to financial markets, 
we expect sugarcane farmers to invest their considerable cash income in non-agricultural 
activities, particularly in the high-return segment, in order to smooth their income. Sugarcane 
farmers, however, may also be forced into the low-return segment once the last harvest’s cash has 
been consumed. 
Since the two types of non-agricultural activities might be more similar than staying on the farm, 
we test for independence of irrelevant alternatives using the Hausman test. The null hypothesis, 
i.e. the odds of choosing between alternatives a and b are affected by the existence of alternative 
c, can be rejected at the one percent level. Hence, the test does not reject our hypothesis of the 
different characteristics of low-return and high-return non-agricultural activities. 
Most effects of the included explanatory variables have the expected sign, but some variables do 
not turn out to be significant. Yet, the analysis also yields some unexpected results that we will try 
to explain below. The effect of age corresponds to expectations, as younger individuals are more 
likely to be engaged in both low- and high-return non-agricultural activities rather than in 
agriculture. The reported odds ratios of 0.97 and 0.95 imply that the odds of being engaged in 
non-agricultural activities decrease by three percent for low-return and five percent for high-
                                                 
43 On average, it takes twenty-four months before a commercial sugarcane crop is harvested. Even after harvest, it 
may take more months before payments are actually made to the farmers. 
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return activities for a unit change in the predictor, i.e. for one additional year of age. According to 
the estimation, age does not seem to affect the choice between low- and high-return activities. 
The position of a member in the household is quite important in choosing a non-agricultural 
activity. Household heads are considerably more likely to take up a high-return activity as 
compared to both a low-return or agricultural activity. Yet, agricultural activities still seem to be 
more attractive to them than engaging in the low-return segment of the non-agricultural sector. 
The latter effect, however, is not significant. This finding may suggest that the control over 
resources, as typically exerted by the household head, could be crucial for building up the 
necessary start-up capital to invest into high-return activities. Hence, the decision to diversify into 
such activities may not solely be taken at the household level, but also reflect individual 
considerations and possibilities. In view of that, it is not surprising that household composition 
variables with the exception of the number of young adults do not appear to be important for the 
decision to diversify. 
With regard to gender, we find that females are more than twice as likely to engage in the high-
return non-agricultural sector as in agriculture. Yet, this observation is only close to being 
significant. In contrast, being female does not seem to be associated with involvement in low-
return activities. Interestingly, we find different effects for individuals who live in female-headed 
households. Individuals from these households are much less likely to participate in high-return 
non-agricultural employment as compared to agriculture. If they participate in non-agricultural 
activities, they do so in the low-return segment. 
In contrast to expectations, education seems to have a significant positive impact on entering 
low-return non-agricultural employment only. Although the odds ratios indicate a stronger effect 
of education on the probability of taking up a high-return activity rather than being in agriculture, 
these results are not significant. Taken together, the effects of education, derived from 
multivariate analysis, are quite different to those from the univariate analysis above. Apparently, 
education is correlated with other observed characteristics, for which we already control in our 
estimation framework. Thus, the additional impact of education seems to be limited when it 
comes to provide the skills necessary to grasp the few business opportunities available in the 
study area. Barrett et al. (2006) make very similar observations about the difficulties of school 
leavers to find remunerative employment in Vihiga district that neighbors Kakamega. They relate 
this observation to the considerable decline in Kenyan public sector employment and 
infrastructure in the region. 
Our analysis considers two types of assets, land and livestock holdings. To better capture the 
potentially non-linear effects of landholdings, we split the households into three groups: 
households with landholdings between 0.5 and 1.5 acres, between 1.5 and 3.5 acres, and larger 
than 3.5 acres. We use households in the second group as reference category. We find that the 
likelihood of engaging in low-return non-agricultural vs. agricultural activities is almost twice as 
high for individuals in households with few landholdings. As hypothesized, we find the opposite 
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effect for diversification into high-return activities, although this effect is imprecisely measured 
and hence not statistically significant. Individuals in households with large landholdings are more 
than twice as likely to engage in the high-return segment of the non-agricultural sector. This 
supports the view that land endowments play a key role in explaining both survival-led and 
opportunity-led diversification strategies. Land size, however, turns out to be insignificant, when 
considering the odds of engaging in high vs. low-return activities. It is also interesting to note that 
not having a title deed is also a significant predictor for choosing low-return instead of 
agricultural employment. More secure land rights hence seem to provide an incentive for people 
to engage more heavily in agriculture. The effects for livestock holdings are very similar to the 
ones observed for land holdings. Higher values of livestock seem to increase the odds of 
diversifying into high-return activities. The reverse is true in the case of low-return activities. All 
in all, the asset variables clearly support our hypothesis on the dichotomous character of the non-
agricultural sector. 
Since migration is a wide-spread phenomenon in Kakamega district, remittances may be 
commonly used to invest into non-agricultural enterprises. Our results, however, suggest that 
receiving remittances is not associated with either form of non-agricultural activities. 
For sugarcane farmers, we find the expected effects. Growing a profitable crop, they are less 
likely to involve in the non-agricultural sector. Yet, the period that has passed since the last 
sugarcane harvest seems to have a significant positive impact on participation in either type of 
non-agricultural activity. 
The effects of infrastructure are less clear-cut. Whereas being located in an urban area appears to 
considerably increase the likelihood of high-return non-agricultural employment, the distance to 
the nearest access road does not seem to play a role in the decision to involve in non-agricultural 
activities. Yet, better access to markets also implies that it is easier to sell agricultural produce, 
thereby making agriculture a more profitable activity. 
The investigation into the patterns of non-agricultural activities in Kakamega district has shown 
that income diversification is a widely observed phenomenon and that non-agricultural income 
contributes significantly to farm households’ income. We observe that households primarily 
pursue low-return non-agricultural activities. The results of the multinomial logit model support 
the hypothesized dichotomy of non-agricultural activities and point to the existence of entry 
barriers to high-return activities.44 We now turn to the analysis of the distributional implications 
of these different diversification strategies and test for the existence of virtuous spirals linked to 
high-return activities. 
                                                 
44 Yet, the results are less clear-cut than one might expect from the univariate analysis that was based on household 
head characteristics. It should be borne in mind though that our sample is relatively small and that we estimate a 
simple reduced form model without controlling for potential endogeneity of some variables. 
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distance to nearest access road
urban
number of adults (25-60)
number of old people (>60)
female household head
landsize (0.5-1.5 acres) 
dummy




completed secondary and 
higher
number of children (0-4)
number of children (5-14)





***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses. 
 
75 
4.4 Poverty, Inequality and Virtuous Cycles 
Table 4.4 shows the participation rates in non-agricultural activities and the respective income 
shares by per adult equivalent expenditure quintiles. Note that the income share is calculated only 
for those households that engage in the non-agricultural sector. Surprisingly, participation in low-
return activities is not concentrated among poor households. In fact, participation is even lowest 
among households in the poorest quintile, peaks in the second and third quintile, and is still 
around 40 percent in the two highest quintiles. Yet, despite relatively low participation, the 
income share derived from low-return activities is by far the highest for households in the 
poorest quintile. With increasing living standards, this share declines considerably. As regards 
high-return activities, barriers seem to effectively exclude the poorest households from such 
diversification strategies. Only starting from the second quintile do households pursue high-
return activities. Participation in the high-return sector as well as the derived share of income 
then increase strongly with higher consumption levels. 
TABLE 4.4: PARTICIPATION RATES AND INCOME SHARES OF LOCAL NON-AGRICULTURAL 













bottom 38% 36% 2% 45% 43% 3% 47% 43% 0%
2nd 63% 50% 16% 38% 31% 7% 31% 31% 0%
3rd 55% 45% 18% 44% 32% 12% 36% 24% 0%
4th 61% 39% 25% 39% 24% 15% 38% 14% 0%
5th 62% 42% 29% 41% 17% 24% 37% 14% 0%
Expenditure 
Quintile
Participation Average share of non-
agricultural income
Median share of non-
agricultural income
 
To better understand the inequality implications of the different types of non-agricultural 
activities, we decompose the Gini coefficient of income inequality by income source, using the 
approach described in Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and in Stark et al. (1986). The decomposition 
allows us to determine the impact that a marginal change in a particular income source would 
have on overall inequality. The results are reported in Tables 5a and 5b. The last column of the 
two tables refers to the point change in the Gini that would be brought about by a one percent 
increase in the respective income source. Three additional elements are included in the result 
tables: The share of each income source in total income, the Gini of the income source, and the 
correlation of income from the respective source with a household’s per adult equivalent total 
income rank. Table 4.5a considers both diversifying and non-diversifying households whereas 
Table 4.5b only looks at diversifying households. 
Despite the significantly lower participation rates for high-return activities, both tables show that 
the total income share of high-return activities is not much lower than that of low-return 
activities. The previous observation that participation in the high-return sector increases with 
living standards is reflected in the strong correlation of high-return income with the rank of per 
adult equivalent total income. The source Ginis (0.88 and 0.93) demonstrate that income from 
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high-return activities is the most inequitably distributed source of income. Accordingly, we find 
that a percentage change in income associated with high-return activities brings about a 
remarkable rise in inequality (Gini elasticities of 0.106 and 0.062). 
In contrast, the source Ginis for income from low-return activities (0.70 and 0.83) are markedly 
lower. This echoes the fact that income from low-return activities constitutes an important 
income source for households across the entire income distribution, which can also be seen by 
the relatively low correlation of low-return income with the rank of total income. Consequently, 
the effect of a marginal increase in low-return income on overall inequality is small (Gini 
elasticities of 0.009 and 0.022). 
TABLE 4.5A: INEQUALITY DECOMPOSITION BY SOURCES, ALL HOUSEHOLDS 
Income source Income share Gini coefficient of 
income source
Correlation with rank 
of total income
Elasticity of overall 
Gini coefficient
Low-return 19% 0.83 0.68 0.02
High-return 14% 0.93 0.80 0.06
Agriculture 50% 0.45 0.78 -0.16
Other income 17% 0.90 0.82 0.08
Total income 0.51  
Other income includes income from public employment. 
TABLE 4.5B: INEQUALITY DECOMPOSITION BY SOURCES, ONLY DIVERSIFYING HOUSEHOLDS 
Income source Income share Gini coefficient of 
income source
Correlation with rank 
of total income
Elasticity of overall 
Gini coefficient
Low-return 28% 0.70 0.66 0.01
High-return 20% 0.88 0.77 0.11
Agriculture 44% 0.41 0.70 -0.15
Other income 8% 0.91 0.74 0.04
Total income 0.45  
Other income includes income from public employment. 
Agricultural income, in contrast, stands out as the most equitably distributed source of income. A 
marginal increase of agricultural income would even result in a sizeable reduction of overall 
inequality. This mirrors the earlier finding that for the poorest quintile overall participation rates 
in the non-agricultural sector are particularly low. 
We now examine the impact of changes in a particular income source on different poverty 
measures. For this purpose, we increase a household’s income from the respective sources by 50 
percent to create sizeable poverty effects. We then calculate the corresponding per adult 
equivalent amount of this additional income and add it to the actually observed per adult 
equivalent expenditure level. Table 4.6 summarizes the results. The first and the second column 
show the poverty headcount and the average normalized poverty gap before increasing the 
respective incomes. The third and fourth columns present the resulting changes in the poverty 
measures after the simulated income increases. 
The table illustrates that the Kakamega district is indeed a very poor region. The overall 
headcount ratio is about 76 percent with an average normalized poverty gap of 45 percent. On 
average, households involved in non-agricultural activities fare considerably better. However, the 
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dichotomy of the non-agricultural sector is strongly reflected in poverty outcomes. Whereas 72 
percent of people living in households which are engaged in low-return activities are below the 
poverty line, the headcount for their counterparts in high-return activities is considerably lower, 
but still amounts to 63 percent. In addition, the average normalized poverty gap is markedly 
smaller for the latter households. The poverty headcount of low-return diversifiers is thus 
comparable to the headcount of all households. Yet, the intensity of poverty, measured by the 
poverty gap, is much lower for households that are active in the low-return non-agricultural 
sector. This again reflects the fact that the poorest households engage relatively less in this sector. 
TABLE 4.6: POVERTY EFFECTS OF A 50 PERCENT INCREASE IN NON-AGRICULTURAL INCOME 
P0 P1 P0 P1
Increase of  non-agricultural income by 50%
all households 75.96 45.26 -3.14 -3.24
only households involved in non-
agricultural activities
70.35 37.04 -5.52 -5.70
Increase of  low-return non-agricultural income by 50%
all households 75.96 45.26 -2.42 -2.18
only households involved in low-
return activities
72.28 37.94 -5.67 -5.11
Increase of  high-return non-agricultural income by 50%
all households 75.96 45.26 -0.33 -1.08
only households involved in high-
return activities
63.31 31.20 -1.80 -5.97
Before After
 
Changes are reported as percentage points. The poverty line is defined on per adult equivalent expenditures. It is 
based on the rural poverty line used for the 1997 poverty assessments, KSh 1239 for rural and KSh 2648 for urban 
areas (Welfare and Monitoring Survey of that year), and adjusted to reflect inflation. Comparing maize and beans 
prices in urban and rural areas of the study region, we assume the urban price level in Kakamega district to be 25 
percent above the rural price level. The resulting poverty lines are then KSh 1843 for rural and KSh 2304 for urban 
areas, respectively. 
A 50 percent increase in incomes from all non-agricultural activities would result in a 3.14 
percentage point decrease in the overall poverty headcount and a 3.24 percentage point decrease 
in the poverty gap. The bulk of this poverty reduction would be attributable to higher earnings 
from low-return activities which alone would reduce the headcount by 2.42 and the poverty gap 
by about 2.18 percentage points. The corresponding figures for incomes from the high-return 
sector are 0.33 and 1.08 percentage points, respectively. The relatively large poverty reduction 
potential of low-return activities becomes even more apparent when examining the poverty 
effects for households involved in the low-return and high-return non-agricultural sector 
separately. A 50 percent rise in incomes from low-return activities would reduce the poverty 
headcount by 5.67 and the average normalized poverty gap by 5.11 percentage points for 
households which engage in the low-return sector. This compares to 1.80 and 5.97 percentage 
points if the same exercise is undertaken for households with high-return activities. The larger 
simulated poverty impact for incomes from low-return activities reflects the participation rates 
and income shares observed above. These activities constitute an important source of income 
throughout the entire income distribution. 
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A more detailed view on the distributional consequences can be obtained by looking at growth 
incidence curves, which plot the growth impact of a 50 percent rise in non-agricultural income on 
per adult equivalent income by per adult equivalent income vintiles (Figures A4.1 and A4.2 in the 
appendix). Considering all households, Figure A4.1 shows that by and large increasing incomes 
from low-return activities would be rather pro-poor. Among the poorer half of the sample, per 
adult equivalent income increases by roughly eight percent. Only from the tenth vintile upwards, 
does the growth rate consecutively drop to reach less than four percentage points for the highest 
expenditure vintile. In contrast, the growth incidence curve for high-return activities is almost 
strictly pro-rich.45 Whereas the poorest households are virtually excluded from this segment of 
the non-agricultural sector, the richest vintiles would experience a per adult equivalent income 
growth rate of about five percentage points. This low growth rate reflects the relatively low 
participation rates and low income shares even among the very rich. All in all, households in the 
middle of the income distribution would profit most from an overall increase in non-agricultural 
incomes. 
The picture changes, in particular for low-return activities, when only considering diversifying 
households (Figure A4.2). Then, rising incomes from low-return activities would be strictly pro-
poor while an increase in incomes from high-return activities would be strictly pro-rich. 
However, given the relative dominance of the low-return sector in the study region, the growth 
impact of high-return activities would be much lower than the corresponding growth impact of 
low-return activities. Thus, in the case of diversifying households a rise in total non-agricultural 
income would be in favor of the poor, above all the very poor diversifiers who could boost their 
incomes by more than 25 percent. Most households in the interior parts of the income 
distribution would see their per-adult equivalent income grow by roughly the same rate of just 
under 20 percent. 
The analysis and simulation in this section represents a very simplistic and purely statistical 
exercise that is useful to illustrate the de facto distribution of non-agricultural income. Yet, it 
ignores many facets of the complex relationships shaping rural livelihoods. In particular, it does 
not account for possible interactions between agricultural and non-agricultural activities that have 
been stressed in the livelihood literature. It has been noted that high non-agricultural earnings are 
often associated with high agricultural productivity (Evans and Ngau, 1991; Ellis and Freeman, 
2004). This link may be explained by non-agricultural income providing households with the cash 
necessary to purchase agricultural inputs such as fertilizer or improved seeds as well as hired wage 
labor. The resulting improvement in production technologies would then increase agricultural 
yields. This, in turn, would raise the resources available to further invest into non-agricultural 
activities, thus triggering a virtuous spiral of income. 
                                                 
45 We define a growth pattern as strictly pro-poor (pro-rich) when the growth incidence curve is monotonically 
decreasing (increasing). In the present case, the curve is ‘almost pro-rich’ as it falls slightly for the richest vintile. 
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Departing from the dichotomy of the non-agricultural sector, we expect the agricultural 
productivity implications to depend on the type of non-agricultural activities pursued. Cleary, 
high-return activities would give rise to this welfare-enhancing cumulative process. Low-return 
activities, however, due to their survival-led character, would most likely not generate sufficient 
cash income to initiate such a virtuous spiral. Their impact on agricultural productivity might 
therefore be limited. Similar to pure agricultural households, low-return diversifiers may find 
themselves in a poverty trap, since high-return activities constitute one of the few opportunities 
for resource-poor household to accumulate assets and eventually exit poverty. 
To test for the existence of such virtuous circles, we examine the relationship between different 
diversification patterns and agricultural productivity by regressing the value of agricultural output 
per acre on two dummies indicating a household’s engagement in high-return and low-return 
non-agricultural activities respectively. Control variables include the characteristics of the 
household head, household composition, land holdings, and location as well as some basic inputs 
into agricultural production such as household farm labor or the use of fertilizer and pesticides. 
Table 4.7 reports the results.  
TABLE 4.7: OLS REGRESSION OF AGRICULTURAL YIELDS 
high-return non-agr. activity 0.52** (2.49)
low-return non-agr. activity 0.09 (0.68)
female household head 0.38*** (2.96)
uncompleted primary (hh head) 0.30* (1.81)
completed primary (hh head) 0.37** (2.38)
completed secondary and higher (hh head) 0.20 (0.80)
number of children (0-4) 0.01 (0.08)
number of children (5-14) -0.03 (-0.52)
number of old people (>60) 0.02 (0.20)
household size 0.04 (0.99)
land size per adult equivalent -0.18*** (-3.53)
land size (0.5-1.5 acres) dummy 0.39*** (2.63)
land size (>3.5 acres) dummy -0.29 (-1.47)
number of hh farm workers 0.15 (1.49)
fertilizer dummy 0.39* (1.76)
pesticides/herbicides dummy 0.54** (2.51)






Log (value of agricultural 
production per acre)
 
***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively. Robust t 
statistics in parentheses. 
Most variables have the expected sign and many turn out to be significant. Like other studies (e.g. 
Bardhan, 1973), we also find a negative relationship between agricultural yields and the size of 
land holdings. As expected, high-return activities are strongly and significantly associated with 
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higher agricultural productivity. This is even true although we already control for the utilization 
of fertilizer and pesticides, two important agricultural cash inputs that might be purchased with 
the income earned from high-return activities.46 In contrast, low-return activities do not appear 
to have productivity effects. This finding supports the view that there are cumulative and 
reinforcing relationships between assets, opportunities, and income sources (Ellis and Bahiigwa, 
2003). Yet, as we have shown, it is important not to attribute this relative livelihood success to 
engagement in non-agricultural activities in general. It is only the high-return segment of the non-
agricultural sector that potentially gives rise to the positive dynamics described above. This 
segment, however, accounts for a small portion of the sector in our study area. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This paper empirically confirms the existence of a dichotomous non-agricultural sector in a fairly 
typical poor rural East African context. Low-return activities with some but low entry barriers 
account for the bulk of local non-agricultural activities, while only few households have the skills 
and assets to engage in activities that offer higher returns. We provide evidence that involvement 
in such high-return activities may trigger virtuous spirals as exemplified by positive spillovers to 
agricultural productivity. Higher income from high-return activities consequently tends to 
aggravate existing inequalities, as these activities are confined to richer households. In contrast, 
engagement in low-return activities does not seem to affect agricultural productivity, an 
indication that this sector does not provide a path out of poverty. Finally, our findings suggest 
that some extremely poor households are even excluded from the latter activities, which makes 
them particularly vulnerable to shocks that frequently affect agriculture in this climatic zone. 
The dominance of low-return activities is possibly the finding that calls most for additional 
explanation. If engagement in low-return activities is driven by desperation, as implied by the 
concept of survival-led diversification and backed by our analysis of determinants, we would 
expect these activities to be pursued primarily if not exclusively by poorer households. This is not 
the case and, in fact, participation rates for low-return activities of richer households are 
comparable to those of poorer ones. 
One might argue that these results are owed to Kakamega district being a particularly poor 
region, where just too many households are not able to overcome the entry barriers to high-
return activities. However, we find a number of richer households in both low- and high-return 
activities. These households may not be able to employ their available resources more 
productively than in low-return activities. This implies that households do not only face asset 
constraints or other types of entry barriers. Possibly, demand for non-agricultural products that 
are produced by high-return activities in small spatially segmented markets may just be too 
limited. Furthermore, the simultaneous diversification into low- and high-return activities may 
                                                 
46 This finding may also be explained by unobservables that affect both the capacity to engage in high-return 
activities and agricultural yields and that eventually give rise to virtuous circles. 
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reflect the high risk being associated with high-return activities, which these households 
compensate by venturing into low-return activities. Another explanation for our observation of 
rich households in low-return activities might be that some individuals do only have limited 
access to household resources. Our empirical analysis supports this view, showing that the 
relevant decision unit is not necessarily the household. 
Of course, one has to be careful in drawing too far-ranging conclusions from findings from a 
specific region. In addition, the static “snapshot” character of our analysis limits its contribution 
towards understanding the mechanisms that would explain the emergence of either type of non-
agricultural activity. Research on rural livelihoods is already trying to examine such dynamics (e.g. 
Barrett, 2004), but both cyclical movements and long-run changes in non-agricultural 
participation have been somewhat neglected in empirical research.47 
Along similar lines, our work hints at a shift of research focus away from the analysis of 
household behavior and household level constraints towards a closer examination of meso- or 
macro-level determinants of structural transformation in rural areas, in particular in sub-Saharan 
Africa. It is well known that poor rural households face important asset and skill constraints. Yet, 
if we want to understand the structural transformation and the emerging of the non-agricultural 
economy, we need to look beyond the household level and also investigate the meso- or macro-
level drivers and facilitators of change, such as demographic pressure, resource degradation, 
technical change, urbanization processes, and rural infrastructure. 
Because of the limited amount of cultivable land, the demographic developments in East Africa 
will necessarily force people out of agriculture. Despite the effects of HIV/AIDS, the population 
of Kakamega district is projected to grow from 660,000 to 780,000 between 2005 and 201548 – a 
district where average farm size already stands at less than a hectare to meet the subsistence 
needs of more than five people. Under such circumstances, the prospects for growth and poverty 
reduction will crucially depend on the performance of the non-agricultural sector. 
                                                 
47 There are some important exceptions. Reardon and Taylor (1996) and Kijima et al. (2006) focus on short-term 
dynamics. In general, contributions from non-economists have more often assessed medium to long-run changes in 
rural livelihoods (Bryceson, 2002; Francis, 2000) 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates changes in income diversification patterns for the case of Burkina 
Faso between 1994 and 2003. Contrary to common beliefs, our empirical analysis shows 
that rural households are not increasingly diversifying their income portfolios. Beyond 
insuring against and coping with weather shocks, diversification behavior reflects structural 
change. Higher returns to agricultural activities, in particular in the cotton and livestock 
sectors, appear to be the root cause for less non-agricultural diversification and some of 
our findings hint at better opportunities in the non-farm sector. Yet, average returns in the 
non-farm sector appear to remain relatively low and migration increasingly turns into a 
desperation-led strategy. Overall, structural change seems to be biased in favor of richer 
households. Regarding responses to droughts, we confirm earlier findings, especially that 
the poorest households are hit particularly hard being forced to sell livestock, often their 
only asset. 
Keywords: income diversification, shocks, non-agricultural activities, migration, cotton, 
Burkina Faso 
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A number of studies have illustrated the diversity of rural livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa and 
shown that income diversification serves as a coping strategy in risky agricultural environments. 
Still, relatively little is known about changes in patterns of income diversification in the medium 
to long run. Farming typically constitutes the main source of livelihood for rural households and 
leaves them vulnerable to crop failures in drought-prone environments, in particular in the Sahel 
zone. Still, it has been demonstrated that households insure themselves against harvest shortfalls 
through engagement in activities outside crop farming (e.g. Reardon et al., 1992). A common 
insurance mechanism is the selling of livestock, but households also diversify into local non-
agricultural activities or by sending household members elsewhere (Reardon and Taylor, 1996). 
Such an insurance view on off-farm income diversification is clearly too narrow. When 
diversification is pursued to ensure survival, for example because of land constraints, it is also 
referred to as distress-push or desperation-led diversification (Islam, 1997; Reardon et al., 2000; 
Barrett et al., 2001). In contrast, rural households may face opportunities outside agriculture, e.g. 
due to higher demand for non-food products (Reardon, 1997). In this case, non-agricultural 
income diversification is also regarded as demand-pull or opportunity-led diversification. For 
Asia, country case studies show a dramatic increase of the share of non-farm income in high-
growth countries like Thailand. This opportunity-led diversification is accompanied by a shift 
towards more diversified farming systems with a more important role for high-value cash-crops 
and livestock (Otsuka and Yamano, 2006). While it seems to be common ground that sub-
Saharan rural households also increasingly diversify their livelihoods – yet mainly driven by 
desperation (Bryceson, 2002a) – systematic evidence on the patterns of change over longer time 
periods is rather scarce. Accordingly, most existing studies on income diversification in the sub-
Saharan context rely on cross-sectional or short-term panel data.51 
This paper intends to fill this gap. More specifically, we examine income diversification patterns 
of farm households in rural Burkina Faso between 1994 and 2003. After structural adjustment in 
the early 1990s, the country experienced fairly high per capita income growth that went along 
with substantial poverty reduction in rural areas (Grimm and Günther, 2007a), although the 
economy was recurrently hit by droughts and other external shocks. In particular, Burkinabe 
households were affected by the political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, its major destination for 
temporary work migration. 
Our empirical analysis indicates that rural households are not increasingly diversifying their 
income portfolios in Burkina Faso. In addition, the motivations for diversification are subject to 
change and our findings do not support the view that desperation-led diversification is (or 
becomes) the rule in poor African countries. Rather, a nuanced picture emerges: Better 
opportunities in agriculture, in particular in the cotton and livestock sectors, allow households to 
                                                 
51 Exceptions include Block and Webb (2001) and Lemi (2006) on Ethiopia. 
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specialize in these activities although richer households are more likely to do so. Non-farm 
activities become somewhat more opportunity-led. Yet, average returns in the non-farm sector 
appear to remain relatively low and migration increasingly turns into a strategy pursued by more 
desperate households. In addition, farmers’ responses to the 1997/98 drought are very similar to 
the pattern that could be observed in earlier work by Reardon and Taylor (1996) for the early 
1980s. The poorest households are forced to sell livestock, often their only asset, which may keep 
them in a poverty trap. In the remainder of the paper, we first shortly review the literature on the 
determinants and effects of diversification, with a focus on distinct motivations. We then present 
some more detailed country background and an empirical analysis of changes in income 
portfolios for the case of Burkina Faso. The paper closes with some concluding remarks. 
5.2 Determinants and Effects of  Income Diversification 
A large number of rural households in sub-Saharan Africa rely on earnings generated outside 
home agriculture (Otsuka and Yamano, 2006; Reardon, 1997). Besides soil cultivation and 
livestock breeding, non-agricultural activities in the local non-farm sector and non-local income 
generation via migration are important income sources, so that “diversification is the norm” 
(Barrett and Reardon, 2000). Such behavior is difficult to reconcile with economies of scale in 
any of the activities and comparative advantage, which would imply a specialization in one 
activity. Yet, it may be explained by the following factors that can be categorized into insurance, 
desperation and opportunity motives. 
If credit and insurance markets are incomplete and formal safety nets are missing – which is the 
case for most parts of rural sub-Saharan Africa – households will choose to diversify their 
income sources in order to smooth consumption (Murdoch, 1995). Under climatically unstable 
conditions rainfall shocks play a major role in activity decisions. In regions with high rainfall 
variability households may opt to diversify incomes ex-ante to manage the risk of possible 
shocks. Alternatively, household may be pushed into diversification ex-post as soon as harvest 
shortfalls occur (Reardon et al., 1992). For instance, they may be forced to sell their livestock 
(Dercon, 1998, Reardon and Taylor, 1996). Alternatively, households may send members to 
engage in markets at other places, where returns are not correlated to the returns at home (Lucas 
and Stark, 1985). 
It has been emphasized in the sub-Saharan context that households may be forced to diversify if 
land endowments become too small to sustain subsistence following subdivision at inheritance 
(Bryceson and Jamal, 1997; Barrett et al., 2000a). This may hold particularly for female-headed 
households, which often have limited access to land due to poor enforcement of land property 
rights (Chapoto et al., 2006). Such desperation-led diversification may also be observed in areas 
with generally low agricultural potential (Matsumoto et al., 2006). 
In contrast, agriculturally favored regions may exhibit higher levels of opportunity-led non-farm 
diversification through intersectoral linkages (Haggblade et al., 1989, Liedholm and Kilby, 1989). 
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In these regions, demand for non-food products may be higher (consumption linkage) and food 
processing can become an important non-farm activity (production linkage). Certainly, the 
existence of such local non-farm opportunities is linked to access to markets (de Janvry et al., 
1991). 
The capacity for diversification is often shaped at the household level. Obviously, entry barriers 
are higher for opportunity-led diversification, but even desperation-led diversification may be 
constrained. Household decisions for migration are facilitated by home-village networks at the 
destination place (Hampshire, 2002). Educational attainment determines earning possibilities off 
the home-farm (Abdulai and Delgado, 1999; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001; Yúnez-Naude and 
Taylor, 2001). Lucrative non-farm activities often require some capital that asset-poor households 
are not able to provide (Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001; Woldenhanna and Oskam, 2001; Dercon 
and Krishnan, 1996). For instance, launching a non-farm enterprise requires business expertise 
and some capital, even though most rural non-farm activities are labor-intensive (Norcliffe, 
1983). Barrett (1997) reveals that many households lack access to lumpy assets (e.g. machinery 
and other equipment) to enter profitable niches in the non-farm sector. Where credit markets 
exist, livestock assets can serve as collateral (Fafchamps et al., 1998). When credit is not available, 
households need liquid assets for such investments, so that cash-cropping can be an important 
means for overcoming entry constraints. Alternatively, the necessary cash capital can come from 
remittances (Lucas, 1987; Francis and Hoddinott, 1993). 
All these conditions that constrain or foster both opportunity- and desperation-led income 
diversification – at the household, regional, or national level – are subject to change. Rapid 
population growth and the related pressure on the natural resource base are often identified as 
the major cause for the rise of non-agricultural activities and migration in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Bryceson and Jamal, 1997; Barrett et al., 2000b; Bryceson, 2002b). While shortages of fertile land 
may hence push households increasingly into diversification, other factors at the household-level, 
in particular the expansion of education, may enable them to earn higher returns from local non-
farm activities or migration. In addition, technological advances, better infrastructure, the 
intensification of links with markets outside the local economy, local engines of growth, such as 
commercial agriculture or proximity to an urban area, or simply per capita growth and increased 
demand for non-food goods and services can lead to a growing non-farm sector (Abdulai and 
Delgado, 1999; Abdulai and CroleRees, 2001; Reardon, 1999; Haggblade et al., 2002). 
The structural reform programs that many African countries have undergone in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s have certainly shaped the patterns of growth and household portfolios in these 
countries since then. Possibly, reforms had their most pronounced impact on income portfolios 
through altering the returns in agricultural activities, in particular in cash crop sectors, which 
often had been subject to heavy regulation. Furthermore, macroeconomic stability that has been 
recorded by most reform countries since the mid-1990s may have strengthened farmers’ trust 
into markets thereby contributing to increased market participation. 
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Changes in the patterns of income portfolio will also have important poverty and inequality 
implications. Again, the existing evidence typically builds on cross-sectional or short-term panel 
data. All in all, there seems to be a positive correlation between wealth and diversification in rural 
Africa (Barrett et al., 2001). If diversifying incomes go mainly to the better-off, growth in these 
sectors is inequality-increasing (Elbers and Lanjouw, 2001). However, others find that non-farm 
income is concentrated among the poor, so that an increase in these incomes is eventually pro-
poor (van den Berg and Kumbi, 2006; Adams, 2002). These seemingly contradictory findings can 
possibly be reconciled by taking into account the distinct motivations for diversification. 
Accordingly, Lay et al. (2008) find the expansion of opportunity-led diversification to have little 
impact on poverty, while growth of income from desperation-led activities significantly reduces 
poverty. In such a case, the overall impact of diversification on the income distribution remains 
mixed. 
It is against the background of this variety of empirical findings that we analyze Burkina Faso’s 
income diversification patterns and their determinants.  
5.3 Income Diversification and Inequality in Burkina Faso: Patterns and 
Changes 
5.3.1 Country Setting: Shocks and Change 
We use three country-wide representative household surveys for Burkina Faso, Enquete 
Prioritaires (EP) that were conducted in 1994 (EP I), 1998 (EP II), and 2003 (EP III). Between 
1994 and 2003, annual per capita growth averaged 2 percent due to a wide range of economic 
reforms and rural poverty rates fell from 63.4 percent to 53.3 percent (Grimm and Günther, 
2007a). 
In this West-African country rainfall levels are low and vary over regions. Drought periods occur 
regularly, like in 1997/98 and 2000/01. Harvest shortfalls often involve an explosion of staple 
prices, as for example after the 1997/98 drought. This price hike contributed to the high levels of 
poverty in 1998, when the headcount rose to 68.7 percent, as most of the rural poor are net 
buyers of food (Grimm and Günther, 2007a). Agriculture has a strong seasonal character with a 
short rainy season from May to August, so that the agricultural labor force faces a long lean 
season (Delgado and Ranade, 1987). Therefore, there is a tradition of seasonal migration to 
agriculturally more favorable regions in Côte d’Ivoire, where household members temporarily 
work on cocoa and coffee farms (Konseiga, 2007). Furthermore, quite a few Burkinabe 
households rely on remittances from relatives who have settled down permanently in Côte 
d’Ivoire. However, in 2002 the ongoing political crisis in Burkina Faso’s neighboring country 
gave rise to a civil war, which affected these labor movements. In both 1998 and 2003, Burkinabe 




Another though rather positive shock, at least for rural households, was the CFA Franc 
devaluation in 1994. The devaluation favored Burkina’s main export sector, cotton, which 
became the main driver of agricultural growth in the period under consideration. The share of 
cotton farmers increased significantly from 8 percent in 1994 to 24 percent in 2003.52 Yet, change 
in agriculture was not limited to the cotton sector: Despite little or no improvement in overall 
agricultural productivity, market integration of staple-food farmers also improved considerably. 
Furthermore, the livestock sector grew rapidly. Own calculations based on the survey data reveal 
that cattle ownership increased from 40 percent of rural households in 1994 to 67 percent in 
2003, with the average number of cattle conditional on ownership remaining constant at 
approximately 8.5. 
These developments in the agricultural sector as well as the external shocks shaped the patterns 
of income diversification that we analyze below. In the Burkinabe context, diversification and its 
welfare impact have been investigated earlier by Reardon et al. (1992) and Reardon and Taylor 
(1996). These studies were based on a panel dataset for the cropping seasons 1983/84 and 
1984/85 and focused on household responses to drought.53 They show that poor households 
depend mainly on crop income and lack access to non-farm income that could cushion the effect 
of harvest failures (Reardon et al., 1988; Reardon et al., 1992; Reardon and Taylor, 1996). As a 
result, poor households turn to selling their livestock during periods of drought, thereby 
increasing inequality and possibly trapping these households in poverty (Reardon and Taylor, 
1996). As the 1998 survey data should also capture the impact of the 1997/1998 drought, the 
subsequent analysis also sheds light on the question of whether Reardon and Taylor’s findings 
still hold 13 years later. 
We first provide a simple descriptive analysis of the patterns of income diversification for 1994, 
1998, and 2003. These observations allow us to identify some broad patterns of change that will 
then be put to scrutiny and refined in a multivariate framework. 
5.3.2 Pattern of  Income Diversification in Burkina Faso 
Table 5.1 presents a matrix of participation in different income portfolios. We consider 
participation in crop-farming, livestock selling, non-farm activities, such as wage and self-
employment, and migration within the country and to Côte d’Ivoire. The columns show the 
different types of farm households and the rows further classify them according to their 
engagement in non-agricultural activities. Accordingly, the first row illustrates that in 1994 most 
of the sample households were engaged in cropping (62 percent), whereas only a few were 
engaged in livestock selling as their only farm activity. About 40 percent of the farmers derived 
                                                 
52 Compare Grimm and Günther (2007b). All cotton in Burkina is bought by the parastatal Sofitex, which 
guarantees a fixed price at the beginning of the season. While the gains from the devaluation therefore mainly 
benefited Sofitex, cotton producers were protected from the subsequent decline in world market prices between 
1998 and 2003. 
53 The survey covers only 150 households, 50 in each agro-climatic region, which somewhat impairs the significance 
of the results. 
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their income from both agricultural activities. In 1998, the drought year, farmers heavily moved 
into livestock selling and the share of those who only sold livestock increased significantly, most 
likely reflecting complete harvest failure. In 2003, agricultural portfolios were similar to 1994. 














total 0.62 0.01 0.37 0.35 0.09 0.56 0.64 0.03 0.33
no non-agricultural 0.21 0.01 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.18 0.32 0.01 0.15
non-farm 0.25 0.00 0.14 0.11 0.02 0.17 0.23 0.01 0.13
migration 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.03

















In each year, the (4x3) diversification matrix shows pure crop households at the top left, e.g. 21 
percent in 1994, while households at the bottom right fully diversify, deriving income from 
cropping, livestock selling, the non-farm sector and migration, e.g. 7 percent in 1994. The degree 
of diversification is highest in the shock year, 1998, but households seem to become more 
specialized, when 2003 is compared to 1994. In 1994 non-agricultural diversification was 
dominated by non-farm activities although quite a large share of households (15 percent) receives 
income from both remittances and local non-farm activities. For 1998, rising numbers at the 
bottom right of the matrix indicate increased diversification through livestock selling and 
migration. After 1998, migration decreases significantly, as does non-farm participation. Even 
compared to 1994, income portfolios of farm households in Burkina Faso have become less 
diversified. 
Table 5.2 provides information on participation in and income shares (average for all households 
as well as conditional on participation) from different activities by per capita expenditure 
quintiles. The crop income shares went down considerably in 1998 due to harvest shortfalls. 
While rates of participation in crop farming recovered by 2003, the income share remained at the 
low levels of 1998. It might be that this reflects biases resulting from differences in data 
collection. Whereas the EP I and EP II collected annual income data, the EP III only recorded 
income in the last month. As the EP III survey was undertaken in a pre-harvest month, income 
from cropping is most likely to be underreported. This seasonal bias in the data prevents us from 
putting too much trust into the income shares for 2003 and we focus on participation rates 
instead. More specifically, underreporting of crop income is very likely to lead to an upward bias 
in other shares. We are, however, confident that we can minimize these biases for participation 
rates (see data description in the appendix). 
Participation in livestock selling and income shares from this source rose significantly from 1994 
to 1998. This increase was highest in the lowest expenditure quintiles implying that pressure on 
poor households to sell their livestock, often their only asset, was particularly strong. In 2003, 
overall participation rates were again at the same level as in 1994, but now richer households 
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participated more in income generation from livestock selling – possibly indicating a tendency 
towards commercialization of this sector. 
TABLE 5.2: PARTICIPATION RATES AND INCOME SHARES FROM DIFFERENT ACTIVITIES 
Quintile 1994 1998 2003 1994 1998 2003 1994 1998 2003 1994 1998 2003
Participation rates
1 0.98 0.89 0.99 0.38 0.67 0.34 0.48 0.45 0.37 0.27 0.40 0.12
2 0.99 0.91 0.98 0.38 0.68 0.35 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.28 0.36 0.14
3 1.00 0.90 0.98 0.38 0.68 0.34 0.56 0.48 0.44 0.27 0.34 0.15
4 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.40 0.63 0.36 0.55 0.45 0.44 0.30 0.31 0.14
5 0.98 0.93 0.94 0.35 0.57 0.39 0.58 0.46 0.44 0.30 0.27 0.16
Total 0.99 0.91 0.97 0.38 0.65 0.36 0.54 0.47 0.43 0.28 0.33 0.14
Share in total income
1 0.75 0.48 0.61 0.07 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.05
2 0.77 0.53 0.58 0.06 0.20 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.05
3 0.77 0.55 0.58 0.06 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.05
4 0.74 0.58 0.59 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.04
5 0.70 0.60 0.53 0.06 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.05
Total 0.75 0.55 0.58 0.06 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.05
Shares conditional on participation
1 0.74 0.54 0.62 0.25 0.34 0.43 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.18 0.45
2 0.74 0.59 0.58 0.19 0.30 0.41 0.21 0.27 0.29 0.15 0.23 0.40
3 0.75 0.61 0.58 0.19 0.29 0.46 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.12 0.21 0.35
4 0.72 0.61 0.60 0.20 0.27 0.45 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.14 0.21 0.38
5 0.69 0.64 0.55 0.24 0.28 0.53 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.15 0.19 0.37
Total 0.72 0.60 0.58 0.21 0.29 0.47 0.24 0.28 0.29 0.15 0.22 0.38
Cropping Livestock selling Non-farm activities Migration
 
Participation in non-farm activities was negatively affected by the drought and participation rates 
dropped significantly. This appears to contradict the perception of non-farm activities as an 
insurance strategy. Yet, it may just reflect that households use this strategy to insure ex-ante by 
maintaining some level of non-farm activity. It seems plausible that returns to non-farm activities 
fall during the drought since local demand for non-agricultural products and services is likely to 
decline when a region is hit by a drought. Non-farm activities still serve as an insurance 
mechanism, as the associated losses may still be lower than those in cropping activities. 
Interestingly, households from upper quintiles withdraw disproportionately from this activity. At 
the same time, income shares conditional on participation increased strongest in the lowest 
quintiles. It may be that the poorest households were forced to stick to this income source 
whereas wealthier households were in the position to withdraw from the non-farm sector as a 
response to falling returns. Participation rates further dropped in 2003 and this decline of the 
non-farm sector affected all household groups equally. Surprisingly, shares from this income 
source were not significantly higher than in 1994 or 1998, as should be expected as a result of 
underreported crop incomes. Thus, it seems that non-farm income shares shrank in reality. 
Overall participation rates in migration went up in 1998, disproportionately in the lowest 
quintiles, while they decreased in the highest quintile. This suggests that the most desperate 
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households turned to this strategy in order to mitigate the drought impact. By 2003, migratory 
activities had declined significantly mainly due to the Ivorian crisis, affecting all households to the 
same extent. 
In sum, these observations suggest the following broad patterns of changes in income portfolios: 
First, in the drought year livestock selling and migration were coping mechanisms for dealing 
with harvest shortfalls. Mainly the most desperate households seemed to turn to these strategies. 
Non-farm activities did not serve as coping mechanism through increased participation in that 
sector, but income shares rose in shock years. Second, between 1994 and 2003 income portfolios 
became less diversified. Overall participation in livestock selling remained constant, but 
participation rates over expenditure quintiles reversed, with richer households becoming more 
likely to sell livestock. The decline of non-farm activities and of migration affected all quintiles 
equally. 
5.3.3 Determinants of  Income Portfolio Diversification 
We estimate a multivariate probit model to illustrate the importance of specific determinants of 
diversification behavior. Furthermore, the multivariate framework allows us to more rigorously 
assess the determinants of change. In the model, households choose to engage in livestock 
ownership, livestock selling, non-farm activities, migration, and cotton farming. The reason for 
distinguishing livestock selling and ownership in the choice model is to disentangle the 
determinants of the former, which often represents an ex-post reaction, from the latter that can 
be seen as an ex-ante diversification strategy for insurance against shocks.54 Both of course 
capture livestock breeding and selling as a commercial activity. The model is estimated on the 
pooled cross-sections, using year interaction terms for most variables to allow for changes in 
coefficients over years. 
At the regional or community level, we incorporate market access, the availability of a village-
based migration network, and rain-variables at the provincial level.55 We include mean rainfall to 
proxy for agricultural potential, rain variability to proxy for the risk of harvest shortfalls and the 
deviation from average rainfall levels in the respective year for capturing the effect of agricultural 
performance. At the household level, household composition variables and household head 
characteristics, like education and age are used. 
Table 5.3 presents the estimation results. The hypothesis that the correlations between the error 
terms of each equation are all zero can be rejected at a very high significance level, so that that 
the multivariate probit model seems to be appropriate. The residuals of the models for livestock 
owning and selling are highly correlated. The positive and significant sign proves that these two 
strategies are complementary, which is not surprising by definition. All pair-wise correlations 
                                                 
54 More than 40 percent of the sample households own livestock, but do not generate any income by selling it. 
55 Burkina Faso is divided into 13 regions, subdivided into 45 provinces. A detailed description of all the included 
variables is provided in Appendix 2. 
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between the error terms of the migration and other activity choices considered turn out to be 
significantly negative. This suggests that migration is an important substitute for the other 
income-generating strategies. In principle, some of these strategies could also be complementary, 
e.g. if remittances could be used by the household to set up a non-farm activity. Although these 
effects may still be present, our results imply that they are not strong enough. Given the high 
average number of children in Burkinabe households, the departure of an adult member is likely 
to make it too difficult for the remaining members to pick up a non-crop activity, which are often 
quite labor-intensive. In contrast, the error terms indicate important complementarities between 
activities in the cotton and livestock sectors. Livestock holdings, especially in the form of cattle, 
play an important role in Burkina Faso, indicating social status (Nianogo and Somda, 1999) and 
serving as a store of wealth (Fafchamps et al., 1998). It seems that households able to engage in 
the attractive cotton sector use these returns to invest in livestock. Doing so, they were also able 
to take part in livestock selling. Yet, the correlation coefficient between cotton and livestock 
ownership is considerably higher than between cotton and livestock selling, so that cotton 
farmers predominantly hold livestock for storing wealth and not for selling it. Although cotton 
could provide the necessary start-up capital for non-farm activities, the correlation of the 
respective error terms does not support this view. For cotton farmers it is not attractive to engage 
in the non-farm sector as returns relative to cotton are low. 
Most controls at the household level show the expected signs. Several household composition 
and size variables are significantly linked to diversification strategies. While the availability of 
male, female or child labor may favor engagement in a certain activity, more members, in 
particular prime age adults, may also put pressure on the household’s resource base, forcing it 
into non-crop activities.56 The positively significant coefficients of all age and gender groups on 
livestock ownership as well as livestock selling may indeed reflect both effects. Non-farm 
activities appear to be undertaken mainly by households with a relatively high number of female 
adults, while many male adults in a household increase the likelihood of engaging in migration or 
the cultivation of cotton. The decision to migrate is negatively affected by the number of 
children, since parents would not want to leave their children behind. Accordingly, the number of 
old members is positively linked to it, since they may step in and take care of children. The 
number of female adults is negatively linked to migration, as they would be left in a weak position 
in the Burkinabe society (Diallo, 2002) after the departure of male household members. 
Older household heads are more likely to send household members elsewhere, while younger 
household heads tend to diversify more into non-farm activities and especially cotton. At least in 
1994, better educated households tend to participate more in non-farm activities and migration as 
well as cotton. However, the education coefficients vary significantly across the years, a finding 
that we interpret in more detail below. 
                                                 
56 Note that household composition variables may be jointly determined with activity choices, as households’ 
fertility choices may depend on future diversification plans (e.g. migration). 
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TABLE 5.3: DIVERSIFICATION DETERMINANTS, MULTIVARIATE PROBIT ESTIMATION FOR 
POOLED CROSS-SECTIONS OF 1994, 1998, AND 2003 






children < 10 0.0162*** 0.0133*** -0.0106*** 0.0061*** 0.0069***
male children 10-15 0.0167*** 0.0165*** -0.0173*** -0.0017 0.0043
female children 10-15 0.0135*** -0.0001 -0.0075 0.0127** -0.0005
male adults 0.0307*** 0.0253*** 0.0864*** 0.0032 0.0157***
female adults 0.0244*** 0.0137*** -0.0198*** 0.0248*** -0.0001
old > 64 0.0215*** -0.0039 0.0269*** -0.0038 -0.0102**
age of head -0.0004* -0.0004 0.0016*** -0.0021*** -0.3635***
education of head -0.0403** -0.0214 0.0491** 0.0793*** 0.0446***
education of head*1998 0.0128 -0.0786* -0.0493* 0.0743* -0.0166
education of head*2003 -0.0123 -0.1025** -0.0600** 0.0694* -0.015
poor accessibility of markets 0.0693*** 0.0841** -0.0723* -0.0747** 0.0421
poor accessibility of markets*1998 -0.1063*** -0.1125** 0.0393 -0.0633 -0.0396
poor accessibility of markets*2003 -0.0551 -0.0671 0.0375 -0.0041 -0.0511
mean rain -0.0132*** -0.0497*** -0.0232*** -0.0237*** 0.0198***
rain variability 0.0017* 0.0015 0.0027** -0.0004 -0.0005
rain deviation 0.0001 -0.0006* -0.0004** 0.0002 0.0005**
Sahel zone 0.0650*** 0.1659*** -0.1501*** -0.1535*** -0.1113***
Sahel zone*1998 0.0371 0.0254 -0.1094*** 0.0308 0.0079
Sahel zone*2003 0.0234 0.3115*** 0.2496*** 0.0988*
Sub-Sahel zone 0.0764*** 0.2520*** 0.0017 -0.0166 -0.0802***
Sub-Sahel zone*1998 0.0167 0.0323 0.0671* 0.0082 -0.0181
Sub-Sahel zone*2003 -0.0643** -0.1475*** -0.0196 -0.0963** 0.0136
South Sudanese zone -0.0401 -0.0895* -0.0235 0.1107*** 0.0880**
South Sudanese zone*1998 -0.0163 0.0029 -0.0178 -0.0663 -0.0108
South Sudanese*2003 0.0580** 0.2955*** 0.0683** 0.0961 -0.0161
village migration network 0.1568***
year dummy 1998 0.1268*** 0.2855*** -0.023 -0.0142 0.0951***
year dummy 2003 0.1347*** 0.0162 -0.0928*** -0.0344 0.1331***
Correlation between error terms
rho 21 0.6553*** rho 42 -0.0051
rho 31 -0.1533*** rho 52 0.0480**
rho 41 -0.0111 rho 43 -0.0360**
rho 51 0.1743*** rho 53 -0.1787***
rho 32 -0.0681*** rho 54 -0.0264
Likelihood ratio test of  rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho51 = rho32 = rho42 = rho52 = rho43 = rho53 = rho54 = 0
chi2(10) =  2229.88   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively. Marginal effects are computed holding all 
other variables constant at their mean. Effects of dummy variables: discrete change from 0 to 1. Effects of rain 
variables consider 10 percent changes. The Sahel zone dummy interacted with the 2003 dummy is a perfect predictor 
for non-participation in cotton and is hence dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the locality level. 
At the community level, migrant networks play an important role in facilitating migration. As 
expected, good access to markets increases the likelihood of participating in non-farm activities 
and migration. Yet, if markets are far and farm and non-farm products cannot be sold easily, 
livestock ownership seems to be an alternative strategy for income generation. Accordingly, 
livestock selling is also more likely to occur where markets are inaccessible. Another explanation 
might be that livestock selling is the only way of income generation when organized market 
places are absent, as livestock may just be traded among neighboring households not requiring a 
market place. In fact, this would explain the switch in the sign of the coefficient in 1998: Trade 
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between neighbors may collapse in case of a shock that affects all villagers simultaneously, which 
implies a more important role for markets for livestock trading.  
In such a diverse country in agro-climatic terms, diversification patterns of course differ over 
regions. In the Sahel and Sub-Sahel zone, where soil quality is poor, many farm households do 
not depend on cropping including cotton but are herders. Moreover, in the Sahel region 
diversification into non-agricultural activities is rare. A small population scattered over vast areas 
would render most non-farm activities unprofitable. By contrast, rural households in the South-
Sudanese belt, which comprises tree-covered and cotton regions, are more likely to engage in 
non-farm activities and the cultivation of cotton, but are less likely to sell livestock. 
The negative effect of average rainfall in all activity choices except cotton indicates that 
households in provinces with low levels of rainfall are forced to diversify into non-cropping 
activities. As expected, livestock owning serves as an ex-ante diversification strategy that is most 
relevant in provinces with high rainfall variability. Accordingly, households turn to selling 
livestock when rain falls short of long-run averages. Similar to livestock ownership, migration 
tends to be more prevalent in provinces with high rainfall variability serving as an insurance 
mechanism. In addition, migration appears to occur in response to negative shocks, as the 
number of households receiving remittances increases with the short-run rain deviations.  
So far, the multivariate analysis illustrates that diversification in Burkina Faso is mainly pursued as 
an insurance strategy. In particular, rainfall variables indicate that participation in non-cropping 
activities takes place in provinces with the poorest agro-climate. Both migration and livestock 
selling appear to serve as direct responses to negative shocks. In line with the above descriptive 
findings on participation, non-farm activities are an ex-ante diversification strategy that is pursued 
in better connected and more densely populated areas. Unfortunately, we lack data on 
landholdings to investigate more rigorously the hypothesis of diversification being driven by 
desperation. 
From these more general patterns, we now turn to changes over time. The year dummies include 
year-specific effects and time trends that are not captured by other controls. Both the 1998 and 
2003 time dummies are large and significant for livestock ownership and cotton reflecting the 
abovementioned expansion of these sectors. The 2003 year dummy is negative for migration 
reflecting the negative effects of the unstable situation in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Education becomes more important in non-farm participation, possibly reflecting better 
opportunities and higher returns, but also higher barriers to better remunerated non-farm 
activities. Thus, it seems that there is a shift to more sophisticated, skill-based activities for 
generating income from this sector. For migration, we observe the opposite: the positive effect of 
education is offset in 1998 and 2003. This points to migration being less determined by 




Most existing studies of income diversification in rural sub-Saharan Africa provide a snapshot 
view on household behavior. Often, these snapshots yield pessimistic views on non-farm 
activities as being mainly driven by desperation. Furthermore, in countries with unfavorable and 
unstable climatic conditions, as for example Burkina Faso, the literature has stressed income 
diversification as a means to smooth income and cope with recurrent droughts. Our empirical 
analysis shows that diversification behavior is indeed dominated by insurance motivations. Yet, 
there are also signs of more profound structural changes. We observe a tendency for non-farm 
activities to become more opportunity-led, while poorer households seem to resort to migration 
although overall migration flows decline significantly because of the political crisis in Côte 
d’Ivoire. 
This paper hence argues that a more comprehensive view on income diversification (beyond 
insuring or coping with risks) even in shock-prone environments is needed. Clearly, the analysis 
of three cross-sections has important limitations. In particular, it is difficult to establish causal 
relationships and to isolate the effects of shocks. Nonetheless, our rather descriptive approach 
based on imperfect data yields interesting insights into the relationship between growth, income 
diversification, and inequality in a shock-prone agricultural environment. 
Had we examined only household reactions to the 1997/98 drought, we might have concluded 
that the livelihoods of Burkinabe farmers had not changed much between the mid-1980s and the 
mid-1990s. Although the non-farm sector shields households against crop shortfalls, it is also 
negatively affected by the drought and households resort to selling livestock to smooth 
consumption or ensure survival. This may turn out to be particularly harmful to very poor 
households that are deprived of their asset base. While these patterns can still be observed in 
Burkina Faso, there are also signs of structural change that are reflected in income portfolio 
choices. Between 1994 and 2003 income portfolios become less diversified, mainly since 
agricultural activities, in particular cotton and livestock, appear to offer higher returns. In 
addition, some of our findings hint at better opportunities in the non-farm sector. Both findings 
reflect a more important role of a household’s comparative advantage in income portfolio 
choices, which implies that diversification is increasingly opportunity-led. This seems to be a 
favorable development that can be attributed to economic reforms to some extent. Yet, as 
outlined by Barrett et al. (2001, p. 326), “the key point is that the wealthy have greater freedom to 
choose among a wider range of options than do the poor.” In fact, some of our findings illustrate 
that this (increasingly) holds for the Burkinabe context. Low returns in non-farm activities go 
hand in hand with higher entry barriers and migration seems to be more desperation-led. 
Furthermore, richer households appear to be in a better position to participate in livestock and 
cotton. Finally, one should not be overly optimistic with regards to the increased agricultural 
specialization of rural Burkinabe households. Such a strategy entails important risks that may not 
be limited to climatic factors: Between 2004/05 and 2006/07 the parastatal Sofitex recorded 
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losses of USD 128 million. This puts a big question mark behind the sustainability of Burkina 
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The surveys were conducted by the Institut National de la Statistique et de la Demographie de Burkina Faso in 
collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank. Each survey covers 8,500 
households.  
From the approximately 5,800 rural households per year we exclude households that fully specialize in non-
agricultural activities to focus on diversification patterns out of agriculture. This leaves us with a sample of 5,608 
households in 1994, 5,325 households in 1998 and 5,460 households in 2003.  
Crop income includes cash income from selling crops and the value of self-consumed crops.  
Livestock income contains sales of cattle, goats, sheep and pigs.  
Non-farm income is composed of income from wage and self-employment. Only two percent of the households in 
the sample receive wage income. 
Migration only considers remittances from national migration and from migration to Côte d’Ivoire. We expect these 
migration flows to follow quite similar patterns due to the geographical and cultural proximity of the two countries. 
The EP I was undertaken in the post-harvest months of 1994, but the EP II and EP III were conducted in the pre-
harvest months of 1998 and 2003 respectively. Even though taking yearly incomes, this difference can lead to 
seasonal biases, as the latest incomes would be recalled more accurately. 
The EP III only presents information about monthly incomes, creating some seasonal bias. We reduce the bias by 
adjusting crop incomes with the value of self-consumed food items and non-farm incomes with profit of non-farm 
enterprises in the last 12 months. 
TABLE A5.1: VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND MEAN VALUES 
Variable  Description 1994 1998 2003 
per-capita expenditure constructed by Grimm and Günther (2007c) based 
on household consumption data, deflated to the 
base year 1994 by using urban and rural decile 
specific price deflators 
56,222 43,002 64,307 
children < 10 number of household members under 10 years 4.74 4.32 3.36 
male children 10-15 number of male household members between 10 
and 15 years 
0.88 0.87 1.37 
female children 10-15 number of female household members between 10 
and 15 years 
0.80 0.78 0.64 
male adults number of male household members between 16 
and 64 years; for all migrant households that do not 
list any potential migrant, this number is adjusted 
with a factor of 1 to reflect household size before 
the departure of the migrant; migrants are typically 
male adults. (Konseiga 2007, Hamphshire 2002) 
2.71 2.64 1.96 
female adults number of female household members between 16 
and 64 years 
3.08 3.09 2.36 
old > 64 number of household members older than 64 years 0.46 0.45 0.33 
age of head age in years of household head 50.66 50.39 47.76 
education of head dummy taking the value 1 if household head has 
ever attended any school 
0.08 0.05 0.08 
poor accessibility of 
markets 
dummy taking the value 1 if the next market cannot 
be reached in less than two hours 
0.07 0.13 0.07 
village migration 
network 
dummy taking the value 1 if the share of migrant 
households within a ZD is higher than 10%, 
excluding the respective household itself in the 
share 
0.86 0.81 0.63 
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mean rain mean of provincial rainfall within the last four years 
prior to the harvest year reported in the survey 
60.51 66.74 65.87 
rain variability standard deviation of provincial rainfall within the 
last four years prior to the harvest year reported in 
the survey 
9.23 14.58 10.39 
rain deviation difference between rainfall in the year of the 
reported harvest and mean rain relative to mean 
rain (mean rain again based on the four years prior 
to the harvest year) 
0.39 -0.12 -0.06 
Sahelian zone dummy for households living in the Sahel region 0.06 0.07 0.06 
sub-Sahelian zone dummy for households living in one of these 
regions: Nord, Centre-Nord, Est, Plateau Central or 
Centre  
0.35 0.39 0.38 
North-Sudanese zone dummy for households living in one of these 
regions: Mohon, Centre-Sud, Centre-Ouest or 
Centre-Est  
0.38 0.37 0.38 
South-Sudanese zone dummy for households living in these regions: 
Haut-Bassins, Sud-Ouset or Cascades 
0.21 0.17 0.18 
livestock ownership dummy for households owning cattle or small stock 
(sheep, pigs, goats) 
0.79 0.92 0.90 
livestock selling dummy for households selling cattle, sheep, pigs, 
goats or donkeys 
0.38 0.65 0.36 
non-farm  dummy for households engaged in wage 
employment, non-farm enterprises or other non-
farm self-employment 
0.54 0.47 0.43 
migration dummy for households receiving remittances from 
urban or rural areas from Burkina Faso or from 
Côte d'Ivoire 
0.28 0.33 0.14 
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Many countries have witnessed large-scale emigration over the past decades. In parallel, 
remittances by migrants to their families have increased dramatically and become a central 
component of capital flows to developing countries. Migration and remittances have a strong 
impact on the development of migrant-sending communities. Amongst others, the departure of 
migrants and the subsequent receipt of remittances have been found to reduce household 
poverty levels, improve child health, and spur entrepreneurship (Adams, 2005; McKenzie, 2005; 
Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007). 
Recently, the literature has paid more attention to the effects of migration and remittances on 
labor markets of source countries. A question of particular interest is how the departure of a 
household member influences the labor market behavior of those who stay behind. There is 
growing evidence that individuals in migrant households supply less labor, meaning that they 
work fewer hours and are less likely to be active on the labor market.59 Many studies have 
attributed this finding to potential disincentive effects of remittances including moral hazard 
problems. 
The economic rationale for this interpretation is that regular transfers from abroad raise 
recipients’ reservation wages and may also lower their work efforts, thus increasing their 
consumption of leisure. Supposedly, unearned income from remittances makes remaining 
household members “lazy” (Azam and Gubert, 2006, p. 426) so that they “simply stop working 
and wait from month to month for the overseas remittance” (Kapur, 2005, p. 152). If such 
effects were widespread, they would obviously have detrimental consequences for development. 
In the worst case, emigration and remittances could lead to a culture of dependency in source 
communities, along with a reduction of productive activities, labor shortages and other adverse 
economic impacts.  
Building on the non-separability of migration and remittances, this paper argues that reduced 
labor supply in migrant households is not necessarily due to increased leisure consumption. 
Instead, remaining family members might respond to migration and remittances by allocating 
more time to home production and higher education. The departure of a migrant implies that 
two helping hands might be missing for household duties, child care or work on the subsistence 
farm. Accordingly, individuals in migrant-sending households may provide less labor on the 
market because they find it more rewarding to get involved in home production activities. In 
addition, young adults in migrant families might be more likely to engage in higher education, be 
it due to the flow of remittances relieving credit constraints or migration-induced incentives for 
additional education. Pursuing college or university studies would then reduce young adults’ labor 
supply. 
                                                 
59 E.g. Funkhouser (1992), Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001), Acosta (2006), Hanson (2005), Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo (2006), Kim (2007), Grigorian and Melkonyan (2008), Lokshin and Glinskaya (2009), Binzel and Assaad (2009), 
and Mendola and Carletto (2009). 
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We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we use a unified framework to test whether 
living in a migrant household affects an individual’s probability (i) to be active on the labor 
market, (ii) to be voluntarily inactive (disincentive effect), (iii) to engage in home production (labor 
substitution effect), and (iv) to pursue higher education (education effect). This approach differs from 
the existing literature, which has not systematically accounted for the actual reasons for reduced 
labor supply. Our analysis draws upon an exceptionally rich and large household survey from 
Moldova, a country which has experienced high rates of outmigration during the past ten years. 
Second, we use a novel instrumental variable strategy that exploits the substantial diversity of first 
emigrants’ destination choices to address the issue of endogenous selection into migration. Our 
instrument is based on the degree to which initial regional migrant networks in the different 
destination countries differentially exposed Moldovan regions to economic performance and job 
opportunities abroad, thus affecting the subsequent departure of new migrants. 
In line with previous studies, we find that persons living in migrant households are significantly 
less likely to be active on the labor market. However, we cannot attribute this finding to the 
disincentive effect of remittances. Rather, our results are strongly in favor of the labor 
substitution and education effect. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss the theoretical 
background of our analysis and review the related literature. Section 3 presents the setting and the 
dataset used for the analysis as well as the econometric strategy. Section 4 summarizes our 
empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
6.2 Theoretical Considerations and Related Literature 
This section first reviews the general literature on the labor market impact of emigration and 
remittances. We then discuss the theoretical considerations behind the disincentive, labor 
substitution and education effect and review the related empirical literature. 
Funkhouser (1992) is one of the first to examine the labor supply effects of migration and 
remittances. Using simple probit regressions, he finds that the receipt of remittances is a negative 
determinant of labor force participation in Managua. Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) investigate 
the labor market decision of migrant relatives in Manila. They find that having a migrant in the 
household strongly reduces remaining members’ labor supply.  
More recent research accounts for the potentially severe problem of endogenous selection into 
migration. Using an instrumental variable strategy, Acosta (2006) confirms previous findings for 
the case of El Salvador. Hanson (2005) employs parametric and non-parametric methods and 
shows that individuals in Mexico with a migrant abroad are less likely to participate in the labor 
force. Recent years have seen further studies on the effects of migration and remittances on labor 
supply (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Kim, 2007; Grigorian and Melkonyan, 2008; Lokshin 
and Glinskaya, 2009). However, to the best of our knowledge, the literature has not systematically 
examined the reasons for reduced labor market activity in migrant households in a unified 
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framework. Building on the non-separable impacts of migration and remittances (McKenzie and 
Sasin, 2007), we propose three potential explanations of labor market inactivity. 
6.2.1 Disincentive Effect 
The theoretical foundation for the disincentive effect follows directly from the neoclassical 
theory of labor supply. Under the usual assumption that leisure is a normal good, non-labor 
income raises the reservation wage of a potential worker. If the prevailing market wage is lower 
than her reservation wage, an individual is voluntarily inactive on the labor market. In our 
context, remittances from migrants abroad are a source of non-labor income and thus increase 
the reservation wage of the remaining household members. Assuming identical preferences and 
the same wage offer to similar persons in migrant and non-migrant households, the disincentive 
effect then suggests that persons in remittances-receiving households are less likely to participate 
in the labor market. 
There is extensive evidence on the effects of non-labor income on labor supply. For developing 
countries, Rosenzweig (1980) and Schultz (1990) show that unearned income has a negative 
effect on labor supply. Bertrand et al. (2003) find that working-age adults reduce their labor 
supply in response to large pension transfers to elderly household members. Studying the labor 
market behavior of migrant-sending households, Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001), Acosta (2006) 
and Grigorian and Melkonyan (2008) suggest that lower labor supply in migrant households can 
be attributed to increased leisure consumption. Similarly, Fullenkamp et al. (2005) point to 
disincentive effects on work effort and even moral hazard problems as likely explanations for 
finding aggregate remittances flows to be negatively correlated with GDP growth.60 
6.2.2 Labor Substitution Effect 
The labor substitution effect can be derived from the neoclassical model of labor supply that 
allows for the production and consumption of non-market household goods.61 Under the 
assumption that home production is subject to diminishing marginal productivity, the absence of 
the migrant can raise the marginal productivity of home production for those who stay behind. If 
an individual was engaged in home production before migration, her departure may hence induce 
remaining household members to reallocate their labor from market work to work at home. 
Ceteris paribus, individuals in migrant households would then allocate more time to home 
production than their counterparts in non-migrant households. 
We are not aware of studies that explicitly estimate the effect of migration and remittances on 
intra-household labor substitution. Some authors, however, have noted the possibility of 
                                                 
60 Azam and Gubert (2005) and Rozelle et al. (1999) take agricultural yields as dependent variable to identify 
potential disincentive effects of remittances. 
61 Gronau (1977), Juster and Stafford (1991) or Chiappori (1997) show that it is crucial to distinguish between time 
used for home production and leisure time. 
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increased intra-household specialization of labor in migrant households (e.g. Acosta, 2006; 
Hanson, 2005). 
6.2.3 Education Effect 
The theoretical literature proposes two arguments for how migration and remittances affect 
educational investments in migrant-sending communities (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1997; 
Stark and Wang, 2002). First, remittances can alleviate credit constraints, enabling receiving 
households to send their children to school or university. Second, the brain gain hypothesis 
proposes that the prospect of future migration can stimulate individuals to invest in human 
capital, as labor markets in destination countries typically offer higher returns to education than 
those at home.62 Given the direct access to the migrant network, the incentives for educational 
investments should then be stronger for members of migrant households. 
Empirical studies on the impact of migration on education show rather mixed results.63 Hanson 
and Woodruff (2003), Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003), Mansuri (2006) and Yang (2008) provide 
evidence for a positive effect of migration and remittances on schooling using data from Mexico, 
El Salvador, Pakistan and the Philippines, respectively. Batista et al. (2007) and Chand and 
Clemens (2008) also find a positive impact of emigration on tertiary education. By contrast, 
Acosta (2006) reports that remittances-receiving households in El Salvador do not invest more in 
children’s human capital. For Mexico, McKenzie and Rapoport (forthcoming) and McKenzie 
(2005) illustrate that migration might even discourage educational attainment. They argue that 
most Mexican migrants in the U.S. work in low-skilled jobs, so that young Mexicans have little 
incentives to invest in higher education. Under these circumstances, returns to education are 
ultimately higher in Mexico. 
Taken together, the disincentive, labor substitution, and education effects define the optimal time 
allocation strategy. Assuming that prices equal one, an individual would supply labor up to the 
point where the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is not only equal 
to the wage rate, but also to the marginal productivity of home production, as well as to the net 
marginal return of investing in further education. In this framework, the theoretical arguments 
from above suggest that, ceteris paribus, members of migrant households are likely to allocate 
less time to market work, but more time to home production, leisure, and higher education. The 
relative importance of the three effects, however, is difficult to establish a priori as it depends on 
local labor market characteristics, the availability of higher education and other socio-economic 
factors. 
                                                 
62 Under certain conditions, these additional investments in human capital can outweigh the human capital loss 
brought about by the departure of high-skilled migrants. In this case, emigration would leave the country of origin 
with higher levels of human capital, leading to a brain gain. 




6.3. Empirical Strategy 
6.3.1 Data and Setting 
Our analysis draws upon data from Moldova’s Labor Force Survey in 2008. The survey contains 
rich information on individuals’ labor market activities as well as their engagement in home 
production including subsistence farming. It also provides detailed information on migration 
patterns at the individual level. The Labor Force Survey is nationally representative and with a 
sample of about 10,000 households the largest household survey in Moldova. 
The sample is based on all individuals at working age (18-64 years) who were resident in Moldova 
at the time of the survey with the exception of early-age pensioners and individuals in 
compulsory military service. Besides, we do not include households with recently returned 
migrants as their time allocation might differ from both current migrant and non-migrant 
households. The sample also excludes households from the only two urban agglomerations in 
Moldova (Chisinau and Balti). Labor markets in these cities are structurally not comparable to 
those in the rest of the country. This leaves us with a final sample of 8,817 individuals out of 
which 1,601 reside in migrant households. 
Moldova is a small, landlocked and densely populated country with large parts of the population 
living in villages or small towns. Having undergone a sharp economic decline after independence 
in 1991, Moldova remains the poorest nation in Europe. The economy is predominantly based 
on agriculture and related industries and has not experienced a promising structural change since 
independence. 
In recent years, the country has witnessed large-scale outmigration. The regional economic crisis 
in 1998 is generally seen as the main trigger for mass emigration from Moldova. Starting from 
very low levels, the number of migrants has been rising steadily since then. Current estimates 
suggest that out of Moldova’s population of 3.6 million at least half a million people have 
become migrants (Lücke et al., 2009). Poverty and access to migrant networks are the principal 
determinants of Moldova’s massive emigration flows (Cuc et al., 2005; Görlich and Trebesch, 
2008). Parallel to the growing rates of outmigration, remittances have considerably increased in 
recent years. According to the World Bank, the level of remittances has surpassed a share of 30 
percent of GDP in 2008 (Ratha et al., 2009).  
Similar to other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) migrant-sending countries like 
Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan, the typical Moldovan migrant is male (62 percent), relatively young (35 
years), comes from rural areas (74 percent) and engages in physical work. The most popular 
destinations are Russia (57 percent) and Italy (21 percent). Other frequent destinations include 
Ukraine, Israel, and Turkey. Typically, only one family member works abroad (78 percent) so that 




6.3.2 Definition of  Dependent Variables 
To test whether reduced labor supply in migrant-sending households is due to the disincentive, 
labor substitution or education effect, we would ideally observe the time allocation of each 
individual. Since the Labor Force Survey does not provide information on the amount of time 
spent in different activities, we have to resort to binary indicators of the four outcomes of 
interest: labor market activity, voluntary labor market inactivity, home production, and education. 
An individual is defined to be active on the labor market if she is in any form of wage 
employment or self-employment. Farmers are included in this definition as long as they sell at 
least parts of their agricultural produce on the market. This classification is summarized in the 
dummy variable “market work”.64 
To capture the disincentive effect, we construct the binary variable “voluntarily inactive”. This 
dummy variable takes the value of one if an inactive person reported voluntary inactivity as the 
main reason for not wanting to work.65 In line with our theoretical considerations, we suppose 
that these persons’ reservation wages are higher than the wages available to them so that they opt 
for leisure consumption. 
The labor substitution effect is proxied by the dummy variable “home production” indicating that an 
individual was active in family duties, housekeeping or subsistence work on the household farm. 
According to our theoretical propositions, we assume that individuals engage in home production 
until they have equalized their marginal productivity to the wage rate. 
The education effect is reflected by the binary variable “education”, which simply describes 
whether or not an individual was following any form of higher education. Investigating the 
education effect for adults is relevant in this context since Moldova features relatively high rates 
of secondary and tertiary education. Hence, the decision of additional investments in human 
capital becomes interesting only after the age of 18.66 
Table 6.1 compares the activities of individuals in migrant and non-migrant households. In line 
with the empirical literature, living in a household with a migrant abroad is associated with 
considerably lower rates of labor market activity. Members of migrant families are also much 
more active in home production and engage more often in higher education. However, there are 
no indications that voluntary inactivity is significantly more common in migrant than in non-
migrant households. 
                                                 
64 Our analysis does not consider unemployed individuals. In the absence of considerable unemployment benefits, 
official unemployment rates in Moldova are notoriously low. Most individuals would still engage in some kind of 
work, though they are often underemployed or have to work in the informal sector. In fact, the Labor Force Survey 
identifies only 150 unemployed persons in our sample. 
65 Other answer categories included education or training, family responsibilities, disease and seasonal agricultural 
reasons. While there might be underreporting of voluntary inactivity, it is not obvious why reporting patterns should 
systematically differ between members of migrant and non-migrant households. 
66 According to the Labor Force Survey, 91 percent of 15 to 17 year olds attended school in 2008. 
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TABLE 6.1: ACTIVITIES OF INDIVIDUALS IN NON-MIGRANT AND MIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS 
Members of non-migrant 
households
Members of migrant 
households
Test of equality of proportions 
(probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis of equality)
market work 77.33% 66.46% 0.00
voluntarily inactive 3.42% 4.00% 0.26
home production 45.69% 52.59% 0.00
education 9.47% 15.05% 0.00  
6.3.3 Econometric Setup 
The starting point for our econometric specification is the following four-equation model: 
marketworki = c1 + α1migranthhi + xi1’β1 + ε1i      (6.1) 
voluntarilyinactivei = c2 + α2migranthhi + xi2’β2 + ε2i     (6.2) 
homeproductioni = c3 + α3migranthhi + xi3’β3 + ε3i      (6.3) 
educationi = c4 + α4migranthhi + xi4’β4 + ε4i      (6.4) 
where marketworki, voluntarilyinactivei, homeproductioni and educationi are the observed realizations of 
the respective latent variables. 
Our regressor of interest is the binary variable migranthh denoting whether an individual lives in a 
migrant household. We deliberately opt for an indicator of having a migrant abroad rather than 
receiving remittances because we intend to capture the overall impact of migration on remaining 
household members, i.e. not only the monetary, but also the physical and informational impact of 
a person abroad.67 The vectors x1, x2, x3, and x4 include other explanatory variables which control 
for observable differences between migrant and non-migrant households. 
As argued above, the decisions to work, to consume leisure, to engage in home production or 
follow education are not independent of each other. An individual allocates her time to equalize 
the marginal returns of each activity. As a result, the error terms ε1i, ε2i, ε3i, and ε4i are likely to be 
correlated and call for a simultaneous estimation approach (Maddala, 1983). Under the 
assumption that the error terms are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with a mean of 
zero and a variance-covariance matrix Σ with values of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations 
of the form ρjk=ρkj as off-diagonal elements, equations 6.1-6.4 can be jointly estimated with the 
multivariate probit model. Since the evaluation of the resulting likelihood function involves the 
computation of multivariate normal distribution functions, it is based on simulated maximum 
likelihood using the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane smooth recursive simulator (Greene, 2008; 
Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003 and 2006). The appropriateness of the multivariate probit model can 
be assessed by testing whether the pair-wise correlations between the error terms are jointly 
                                                 
67 Including both migranthh and a variable capturing remittance flows would ignore the non-separability of migration 
and remittances. According to the Labor Force Survey, 77 percent of Moldovan migrants send money to their 
families. As stated in McKenzie and Sasin (2007), disentangling the impact of migration and remittances is inherently 
difficult and remains an unresolved empirical challenge. 
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significantly different from zero. If this is not the case, equations 6.1-6.4 could be estimated 
separately with simple univariate probit models. 
6.3.4 Identification 
Unobserved characteristics between migrant and non-migrant households constitute a major 
challenge in estimating the causal impact of migration and remittances on the activity choices of 
those who stay behind. If such characteristics are correlated with both migration and time 
allocation patterns, any observed differences between members of households with and without a 
migrant might have already existed before the departure of the migrant. Depending on the 
direction of self-selection into migration, we would then over- or underestimate the true effect of 
migranthh. 
Following Maddala (1983), we estimate a recursive multivariate probit model to address the 
potentially endogenous nature of the binary variable migranthh. The resulting simultaneous-
equation model comprises the previous four activity equations and a fifth equation to account for 
selection into migration: 
migranthhi = c5 + γzi + xi5’β5 + ε5i       (6.5) 
Assuming that the error terms of the reduced-form equations 6.1-6.4 and the structural equation 
6.5 are multivariate normally distributed, the estimation of the full recursive system follows the 
same procedures as described above (Greene, 2008). 
Identification of recursive multivariate probit models rests on the exclusion restriction. Like in 
the standard linear IV case, this restriction requires the presence of at least one variable, the 
instrument z, in the structural equation that is excludable from the reduced-form equations 
(Maddala, 1983). 
Our instrumental variable strategy rests on the differential degree to which Moldova’s 35 
different districts have been exposed to demand for migrant labor from abroad. The central idea 
is that economic conditions in the foreign destinations determine job opportunities for new 
migrants, which already established migrants then channel to their home communities. Migrant 
networks have been shown to play a pivotal role in shaping migration flows by providing 
information on jobs abroad and lowering migration costs for subsequent migrants (Munshi, 2003; 
Winters et al., 2001.; Carrington et al., 1996). This observation also applies to Moldova, where 
local migrant networks are among the principal determinants of migration (Görlich and 
Trebesch, 2008). The overall strength of the signal transmitted back home ultimately depends on 
the size and composition of the established migrant population abroad. Ceteris paribus, districts 
with an initial migrant network at a booming destination would subsequently experience more 
outmigration than districts with a network of the same size at an economically depressed 
destination. Over time, economic conditions abroad would exogenously determine growth of a 
given migration network and ultimately drive current migration flows. Our identifying 
assumption is that previous district-level exposure to demand for migrant labor from abroad does 
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not affect time allocation patterns directly, but only indirectly through its impact on the current 
propensity of migration at the household level.68 
For each district k, we measure exposure to economic conditions abroad as the weighted sum of 
destination countries’ GDP growth between 1999 and 2007, where the weight for each 
destination j is given by district k’s prevalence of migration to country j in 1999: 
exposurek = ∑j (growthj1999-2007 * prevalencekj1999)      (6.6) 
As an alternative to GDP growth, we also consider absolute changes in the unemployment rates 
for the period 1999-2007. GDP and unemployment data are taken from the World Development 
Indicators, district migration patterns come from census data. 
Table 6.2 summarizes GDP and unemployment statistics for Moldova’s six most important 
destination countries in 1999. Most countries experienced considerable GDP growth and also 
saw unemployment decline between 1999 and 2007. However, there are remarkable differences 
between countries. While Russia and Ukraine could boost their GDP by about 75 percent, Italy’s 
economy only expanded by 12 percent. Similarly, Turkey’s unemployment rate increased by two 
percentage points, whereas Russia, Ukraine, but also Italy were able to reduce their 
unemployment rates by more than five percentage points. These figures illustrate that there has 
been substantial variation in economic conditions in the different destinations. 
Table 6.3 shows district-specific prevalence of emigration to the same countries in 1999. Both 
overall emigration prevalence and the direction of emigration flows varied tremendously across 
districts. Although Russia was the most common destination, the share of migrants to Russia was 
on average lower than 50 percent and in some districts even as low as 20 percent. Moreover, 
emigrants from different districts often concentrated in different sets of destinations. Based on 
this initial stock and distribution of migrants, one can expect that different districts have 
experienced varying degrees of exposure to demand for migrant labor from abroad. 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 demonstrate that our instruments are indeed highly correlated with current 
migration prevalence. Districts that were previously exposed to higher GDP growth or larger 
reductions in unemployment abroad report substantially higher shares of households with a 
migrant abroad. 
                                                 
68 McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) employ a related identification strategy. However, when calculating the push 
factors from abroad, they only consider the single most important destination city in the US for each Mexican village. 
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TABLE 6.2: GDP GROWTH AND CHANGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN SIX MAJOR 
DESTINATION COUNTRIES 
Russia Italy Romania Greece Ukraine Turkey
GDP growth 1999-2007 
(percent)
72.52 12.31 54.11 39.54 77.40 49.25
change in unemployment rate 
1999-2007 (percentage points)
-7.40 -5.60 -0.40 -3.60 -5.20 2.20
 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
TABLE 6.3: CENSUS-BASED EMIGRATION RATES (PER 10,000 INHABITANTS) TO SIX MAJOR 
DESTINATION COUNTRIES IN 1999, BY DISTRICT 






Mun. Chisinau 7.23 6.01 3.88 3.90 1.11 0.77 32.70 22.11% 2329
Mun. Balti 32.61 4.47 4.31 5.88 1.73 0.31 56.84 57.38% 725
Anenii Noi 28.64 6.73 4.65 4.28 1.71 2.33 58.38 49.06% 477
Basarabeasca 20.02 14.49 2.76 13.11 5.52 2.07 66.26 30.21% 192
Briceni 9.61 2.18 1.41 0.64 2.82 0.13 20.76 46.30% 162
Cahul 27.59 9.98 9.90 7.55 2.18 4.19 74.56 37.01% 889
Cantemir 20.50 9.00 6.17 3.50 0.33 1.00 47.50 43.16% 285
Calarasi 11.06 15.72 4.66 3.20 0.93 0.40 47.15 23.45% 354
Causeni 24.61 5.08 4.08 1.77 3.09 0.44 42.16 58.38% 382
Cimislia 20.35 23.47 4.43 3.45 1.31 0.33 76.65 26.55% 467
Criuleni 10.24 6.64 3.32 3.60 0.00 0.28 28.37 36.10% 205
Donduseni 23.26 1.51 2.15 0.00 3.23 0.00 33.38 69.68% 155
Drochia 9.76 1.72 3.90 1.72 0.34 0.00 18.26 53.46% 159
Dubasari 7.06 1.18 2.65 2.94 0.88 0.29 19.40 36.37% 66
Edinet 20.52 2.33 2.95 1.47 2.21 0.49 32.56 63.02% 265
Falesti 23.03 2.21 3.21 1.99 1.00 0.33 32.44 70.99% 293
Floresti 16.00 4.36 3.02 1.12 0.34 0.22 27.41 58.37% 245
Glodeni 21.48 5.58 3.44 2.62 2.30 0.16 37.88 56.71% 231
Hîncesti 11.19 14.86 2.76 8.18 0.42 1.09 45.76 24.45% 548
Ialoveni 13.41 6.14 3.58 1.54 0.51 1.02 33.47 40.06% 327
Leova 27.42 7.05 6.86 2.35 0.78 1.57 53.47 51.28% 273
Nisporeni 7.86 14.63 8.01 4.16 0.31 0.31 39.89 19.69% 259
Ocnita 33.98 0.35 2.48 0.53 3.89 0.00 45.13 75.29% 255
Orhei 13.50 6.62 6.88 4.64 1.29 0.34 41.63 32.44% 484
Rezina 16.84 2.70 6.24 1.25 0.83 0.00 32.22 52.26% 155
Rîscani 19.01 1.87 6.19 1.87 0.14 0.43 32.11 59.19% 223
Sîngerei 17.90 7.46 3.67 0.69 1.49 0.34 36.72 48.75% 320
Soroca 14.00 3.05 4.63 4.11 0.95 0.21 30.43 46.02% 289
Straseni 11.47 9.79 6.30 5.96 0.56 0.68 44.77 25.63% 398
Soldanesti 10.42 5.21 3.08 0.95 0.24 0.00 21.79 47.83% 92
Stefan Voda 8.78 2.98 3.26 0.71 2.55 0.14 21.39 41.06% 151
Taraclia 22.48 4.40 2.78 3.24 6.49 3.48 66.51 33.80% 287
Telenesti 13.55 5.28 6.27 1.28 1.00 0.29 30.23 44.81% 212
Ungheni 23.79 5.07 5.79 1.90 1.18 0.36 41.07 57.93% 454
U.T.A. Gagauzia 16.06 0.39 0.77 0.00 1.03 9.19 29.49 54.47% 459
 
Source: Census of the Republic of Moldova in 2004. 
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FIGURE 6.2: REGIONAL EXPOSURE TO PREVIOUS UNEMPLOYMENT CHANGES ABROAD AND 
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A potential concern for the validity of our instrument is that persistent labor market conditions at 
home might be a determinant of migration in both 1999 and 2008. We argue that this is unlikely 
to be the case as emigration was still a very minor phenomenon and just starting to take off in 
1999. In total, the census registered only 13,067 emigrants. In other words, average migration 
prevalence was a mere 0.0036 percent in 1999 and even lower in many districts. Also taking into 
account that these first migrants left for so many different destinations, we make a case that 
emigration patterns in 1999 were not systematically related to labor market conditions at home, 
but rather the outcome of other factors like kinship or friendship ties. Nevertheless, to address 
this concern, our estimations control for a wide range of labor market characteristics at the 
district and locality level. 
To test the robustness of our identification strategy, we also make use of an alternative approach 
suggested by Wilde (2000). He has theoretically shown that identification of recursive multivariate 
probit models is possible without the exclusion restriction as long as there is sufficient variation 
in the data, i.e. each equation contains at least one varying exogenous regressors. 
6.3.5 Control Variables 
While the identification strategy is designed to deal with unobserved heterogeneity, a number of 
explanatory variables at the individual, household, community and district level are used to 
capture observed heterogeneity between migrant and non-migrant households. 
Individual characteristics comprise age, education, gender, marital status and position in the 
household. We control for household composition by including the number of young and older 
children, working-age adults and elderly members.69 A household’s income-generating 
possibilities are proxied by the number of members with higher education and a dummy variable 
indicating whether the household has a farm. In a given context, this set of individual- and 
household-level variables should reflect important determinants of an individual’s time allocation. 
As discussed above, it is essential to control for local characteristics to identify the impact of 
migration and remittances. These characteristics constitute potentially confounding factors that 
affect both the propensity of outmigration and the decision to engage in market work, home 
production or higher education or to be voluntarily inactive. We address this concern by drawing 
on unusually rich data on the local and regional structure of employment patterns and 
development disparities provided by the Ministry of Economy and Trade and the National 
Bureau of Statistics. Specifically, we include the number of non-agricultural enterprises, the 
distance to the nearest city, the population size and the level of local tax revenues for each 
locality to capture the intensity of economic activity. We also control for district-level 
unemployment rates and wage levels. Moreover, we add the share of ethnic Moldovans in each 
                                                 
69 As the Labor Force Survey only identifies migrants who are still considered to be member of the household, we 
treat migrants like household members when computing household composition variables. Our decision is backed by 
the fact that most migrants leave their families only on a seasonal basis (Lücke et al., 2007). 
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district to deal with ethnically motivated migration and employment choices.70 Finally, we also 
include the share of working-age individuals who were involved in the activities under 
consideration. These variables are thought to reflect locality-specific patterns of market and non-
market work and voluntary inactivity. 
6.4 Results 
Table 6.4 displays the marginal effects of migration and remittances on the activity choices of 
those left behind. Full regression results for the base specification are provided by Table A6.4 in 
the appendix. The first column presents the results for our base specification, where we 
instrument migration at the household level with previous exposure of a household’s district to 
GDP shocks abroad. Throughout our specifications, the instrument is highly significant at the 
one percent level, thus not indicating a weak instrument problem. Most of the estimated 
coefficients of correlation of error terms between the different activities including migration turn 
out to be highly significant. In other words, unobserved factors in the different equations are 
significantly correlated, which suggests that selection into migration is endogenous to our 
outcomes of interest and that it is more appropriate to estimate the four activities jointly rather 
than separately.71 
In line with the previous literature, we find that members of migrant households have 
significantly lower rates of labor market activity. Living in a migrant household decreases the 
probability of being active on the labor market by more than 10 percentage points. 
There is no evidence, however, that reduced labor supply is due to the disincentive effect. 
Individuals with a family member abroad are not more likely to be voluntarily inactive on the 
labor market than individuals in non-migrant families. The corresponding marginal effect is very 
small and far from conventional significance levels. 
It rather seems that the labor substitution effect can account for low participation rates in market 
work. Being member of a migrant household significantly increases the probability of engaging in 
home production by about 14 percentage points. Thus, members of families with a migrant are 
presumably more productive in home production than their counterparts in non-migrant 
households. This finding supports our hypothesis that a household may reallocate labor from 
market work to work at home in order to take over the home production activities previously 
performed by the migrant. 
                                                 
70 Although Moldova is relatively homogenous in terms of ethnic composition, there are some regional 
concentrations of ethnic minorities like the Gagauz in the South-West or the Ukrainians in the North. 
71 A formal test of endogeneity corresponds to testing the joint significance of ρ51, ρ52, ρ53 and ρ54. The null 
hypothesis of joint insignificance can be rejected (chi2(4)=475.46, Prob>chi2=0.000). Likewise, pair-wise 




TABLE 6.4: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES ON ACTIVITIES OF 
INDIVIDUALS IN NON-MIGRANT AND MIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS 
Instrument: 
exposure to gdp 
growth abroad 
(base specification)









market work -0.104***  -0.142* -0.060*** -0.103*** -0.102***
voluntarily inactive 0.004 -0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004
home production 0.139*** -0.086 0.089*** 0.139*** 0.139***
education 0.007** 0.171* 0.003* 0.007** 0.006*
 
***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively. Marginal effects are computed holding all 
other variables constant at their mean and using the Stata command mvppred. 
We also find strong evidence for the education effect. Having a family member abroad 
significantly raises the probability of following higher education by 0.7 percentage points. This 
effect may appear small, but one has to keep in mind that the sample includes all working-age 
adults. As enrolment in higher education is likely to be relevant for younger individuals only, we 
re-run the analysis and restrict the sample to individuals who are aged between 18 and 27 years 
(column 2).72 For these individuals, the education effect turns out to be very strong. Being a 
young member of a migrant household increases the probability of engaging in higher education 
by 17 percentage points.73 As discussed above, this positive linkage between migration and 
education might be explained by the potential of remittances to relieve credit constraints or by 
migration-related incentives to engage in education. The non-separability of migration and 
remittances, however, prevents us from discriminating between these two explanations. In 
contrast to the results for the full sample, the labor substitution effect does not apply to this 
subsample of young adults. This finding suggests that the time available to young members of 
migrant households is rather used for higher education and consequently not available for work 
at home. 
For comparison, the third column presents the result of an ordinary multivariate probit 
estimation that ignores the endogeneity of migration. The marginal effects are generally of lower 
magnitude, but the ordering and direction as well as significance levels are not affected. The last 
two columns check the robustness of our findings to the use of our alternative instrument, 
previous exposure to unemployment changes abroad, and to identification based on the variation 
in the exogenous regressors as proposed by Wilde (2000). In both cases, our previously reported 
results remain virtually the same. 
One might argue that having a migrant member is just a proxy for having a working member in 
the household. As our sample is predominantly rural, a migrant and a full-time working member 
might have a similar impact on the time allocation of other household members. Both would be 
cash earners and not be able to heavily engage in home production activities. To verify that our 
                                                 
72 Our complete sample includes only 22 individuals over the age of 27 who were following higher education. 
73 In theory, this finding could also be due to remittances inducing students to take more time to complete their 
degrees. This scenario, however, seems implausible as there are no differences in the age distribution of students in 
migrant and non-migrant households. 
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findings are indeed related to living in a migrant household, we control for the number of full-
time salaried or self-employed family members including migrants. The first column of Table 6.5 
shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of this additional variable. Apparently, the 
permanent absence of a migrant working abroad causes stronger effects than a working member 
who remains at home. 
TABLE 6.5: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS, MARGINAL EFFECTS OF MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES ON 







market work -0.103*** -0.090***
voluntarily inactive 0.008 0.004
home production 0.154*** 0.135***
education 0.008*** 0.007**
 
***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively. 
Marginal effects are computed holding all other variables constant at 
their mean. 
Another issue of concern might be the way in which we measure the disincentive effect. So far, 
we have proxied the disincentive effect by voluntary inactivity. Yet, it could be that our choice is 
too narrow. To check this possibility we broaden the definition to also include inactive persons 
who were not looking for a job because they “did not know how and where to look for a job”, 
“did not feel professionally ready”, “thought that they would not find a job due to their age”, or 
“had unsuccessfully looked for a job before.” Column 2 shows that our results are not affected 
by this change in definition. We still do not find that reduced labor supply is attributable to the 
disincentive effect. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Living in a migrant household does not seem to be a systematic determinant of leisure-driven 
inactivity on the labor market. Rather, we find strong indications that migration increases the 
probability of being active in home production or higher education. However, our results should 
be interpreted with caution. We do not show that unearned income from remittances creates no 
disincentive effects at all. It could well be that individuals in migrant households remain active on 
the labor market but work less hours to consume more leisure. Moreover, we cannot observe 
remaining members’ productivity levels in home production and educational activities. 
Still, our findings suggest that the concerns of remittances creating a culture of dependence in 
areas with high rates of outmigration might be overstated. In Moldova, many migrant households 
seem to use their additional resources to invest in the education of their young adults. Once these 
individuals complete their degrees, they may have higher income-generating capacities and 
become less dependent on future remittances flows. Nonetheless, the long-term benefits of 
higher rates of education for the country are uncertain as those who studied may eventually 
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TABLE A6.1: CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS (N=3,639) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
age 34.623 11.017 15 64
male 0.622 0.485 0 1
secondary education 0.678 0.467 0 1
higher education 0.219 0.414 0 1
hh head or spouse 0.428 0.495 0 1  
TABLE A6.2: CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-MIGRANT HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS (N=7,216) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
market work 0.773 0.419 0 1
voluntarily inactive 0.034 0.182 0 1
home production 0.457 0.498 0 1
education 0.095 0.293 0 1
age 40.599 13.074 18 64
male 0.486 0.500 0 1
secondary education 0.648 0.478 0 1
higher education 0.244 0.430 0 1
hh head or spouse 0.723 0.448 0 1
hh head or spouse has higher 
education
0.347 0.476 0 1
# children 0-6 0.248 0.548 0 3
# children 7-17 0.564 0.830 0 7
# adult members 18-64 2.519 0.962 1 6
# elderly members 65- 0.116 0.358 0 2
# members with higher 
education
0.609 0.883 0 4
farm hh 0.609 0.488 0 1
# non-agricultural enterprises 
in locality
87.302 157.696 3 800
distance to nearest city (in km) 16.983 14.550 0 66.111
locality per-capita revenues 0.922 0.290 0.179 2.174
locality population size 7108.702 8175.375 930 36764
rural 0.779 0.415 0 1
locality share of employed 
people
0.758 0.129 0.200 0.982
locality share of individuals 
involved in home production
0.463 0.280 0 0.946
locality share of voluntarily 
inactive people
0.035 0.050 0 0.259
district unemployment rate 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.043
district wage rate 2103.492 232.821 1689.200 2631.100
share of ethnic Moldovans in 
district
83.509 19.683 4.831 97.783
exposure to gdp growth 
abroad
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004
exposure to unemployment 
changes abroad




TABLE A6.3: CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANT HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS (N=1,601) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
market work 0.665 0.472 0 1
voluntarily inactive 0.040 0.196 0 1
home production 0.526 0.499 0 1
education 0.151 0.358 0 1
age 38.871 13.625 18 64
male 0.385 0.487 0 1
secondary education 0.665 0.472 0 1
higher education 0.194 0.396 0 1
hh head or spouse 0.697 0.460 0 1
hh head or spouse has higher 
education
0.297 0.457 0 1
# children 0-6 0.249 0.519 0 3
# children 7-17 0.668 0.826 0 5
# adult members 18-64 3.245 1.029 2 7
# elderly members 65- 0.086 0.297 0 2
# members with higher 
education
0.586 0.854 0 4
farm hh 0.637 0.481 0 1
# non-agricultural enterprises 
in locality
58.375 119.885 3 800
distance to nearest city (in km) 17.534 12.707 0 66.111
locality per-capita revenues 0.877 0.274 0.179 2.174
locality population size 5486.258 5990.443 930 36764
rural 0.850 0.357 0 1
locality share of employed 
people
0.731 0.139 0.200 0.982
locality share of individuals 
involved in home production
0.498 0.262 0 0.946
locality share of voluntarily 
inactive people
0.036 0.049 0 0.259
district unemployment rate 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.043
district wage rate 2083.893 249.107 1689.200 2631.100
share of ethnic Moldovans in 
district















-0.359*** -0.104 0.087 0.004 0.351*** 0.139 0.272** 0.007
(0.093) (0.147) (0.085) (0.138)
0.205*** 0.049 0.007 3.3E-04 0.071*** 0.028 -0.362*** -0.005
(0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019)
-0.002*** 0.138 -2.4E-04 0.004 -0.001*** 0.113 0.004*** -0.007
(0.000) (2.3E-04) (1.3E-04) (2.5E-04)
0.332*** 0.086 0.042 0.002 -0.329*** -0.129 -0.414*** -0.008
(0.036) (0.056) (0.033) (0.058)
-0.045 -0.013 0.003 1.1E-04 -0.049 -0.019
(0.035) (0.060) (0.035)
0.619*** 0.134 -0.062 -0.003 -0.097* -0.038
(0.061) (0.101) (0.059)
0.101 0.027 0.062 0.003 0.403*** 0.156 -0.408*** -0.011
(0.065) (0.111) (0.066) (0.129)
-0.102*** -0.028 -0.066 -0.003 0.376*** 0.149 -0.735*** -0.007 -0.040 -0.009
(0.031) (0.062) (0.034) (0.074) (0.032)
0.059** 0.015 -0.015 -0.001 -0.008 -0.003 0.069* 0.002 0.148*** 0.038
(0.024) (0.041) (0.021) (0.039) (0.019)
0.096*** 0.024 -0.013 -0.001 -0.145*** -0.057 0.040 0.001 0.435*** 0.126
(0.023) (0.036) (0.021) (0.043) (0.016)
0.156*** 0.038 -0.073 -0.003 0.022 0.009 -0.044 -0.001 -0.006 -0.002
(0.058) (0.110) (0.056) (0.081) (0.051)
-0.197*** -0.056 -0.008 -3.4E-04 0.004 0.002 0.097** 0.002 -0.075*** -0.017
(0.027) (0.049) (0.029) (0.049) (0.019)
-0.340*** -0.086 0.627*** 0.025 0.517*** 0.200 0.063 0.001 -0.209*** -0.051
(0.042) (0.076) (0.038) (0.066) (0.039)
7.4E-06 1.9E-06 5.7E-05 2.5E-06 -2.0E-04 -8.1E-05 -1.1E-04 -2.2E-06 0.001** 1.4E-04
(2.6E-04) (3.9E-04) (3.0E-04) (4.0E-04) (3.0E-04)
0.002 4.1E-04 -0.005*** -2.4E-04 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005** -9.8E-05 -0.001 -1.5E-04
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
0.041 0.003 -0.010 -1.2E-04 0.054 0.006 -0.234** -0.001 -0.312*** -0.021
(0.066) (0.106) (0.058) (0.105) (0.069)
-8.6E-07 -0.002 7.7E-06 0.003 4.9E-07 0.002 3.4E-06 0.001 -2.9E-05*** -0.049
(5.2E-06) (7.8E-06) (5.7E-06) (8.0E-06) (5.8E-06)
0.240*** 0.067 -0.206** -0.010 -0.259*** -0.103 -0.210* -0.005 -0.009 -0.002
(0.076) (0.102) (0.075) (0.120) (0.078)
-1.249 -0.003 -5.333 -0.002 -3.369 -0.013 4.850 0.001 7.098** 0.018
(4.287) (6.488) (3.679) (6.586) (3.445)
-3.2E-05 -0.002 1.2E-04 0.001 1.6E-04** 0.015 3.9E-04*** 0.002 -3.0E-04*** -0.016
(7.4E-05) (1.3E-04) (6.9E-05) (1.3E-04) (7.5E-05)
-0.022 -5.8E-05 -0.064 -2.8E-05 -0.154* -0.001 -0.189 -3.8E-05 -0.072 -1.7E-04











-6.661*** -2.608*** -3.431*** 5.572*** -1.142***
(0.289) (0.497) (0.262) (0.474) (0.201)
log pseudolikelihood = -12647.249




rho21=0.084*; rho31=-0.075*; rho41=0.010; rho51=-0.103; rho32=-0.253***;
rho42=-0.713***; rho52=-0.895***; rho43=0.200***; rho53=-0.130***; rho54=0.219***
constant
(1) Market work (3) Home 
production
(4) Education
share of ethnic Moldovans in 
district
locality share of employed 
people
locality share of voluntarily 
inactive people
hh head or spouse has higher 
education
exposure to gdp growth 
abroad







# adult members 18-64
# elderly members 65-
# members with higher 
education
farm hh




locality share of individuals 
involved in home production









***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively (robust standard errors). Marginal effects are 
computed holding all other variables constant at their mean. They reflect the change in the predicted probability for 
a one-unit change in the continuous regressor under consideration. In case of dummy variables, the marginal effect 
reflects the discrete change from 0 to 1. For the variables “locality per-capita revenues”, “locality population size” 
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Human trafficking is a humanitarian problem of global scale, but quantitative research on 
the issue barely exists. This paper is the first attempt to analyze the economics of human 
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“Like many things that should have been stamped out a long time 
ago, slavery, it seems, is alive and well.” 
The Economist, 9 March 2005 
 
“The trade in people is surely the most morally repugnant of all the 
illicit trades that flourish today. But it’s deeply entrenched and 
interwoven with the world’s ever more complex migration flows.” 
Moises Naim in “Illicit” (2005, p. 89) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The exploitation and trafficking of men, women and children is a humanitarian problem of global 
scale. A recent study estimates that at least 12 million people worldwide are trapped in conditions 
of forced labor. Around a fifth of these are being exploited as a result of human trafficking (ILO, 
2005). These forms of modern day slavery have become one of the most profitable businesses in 
the world – and one of the most horrifying. Human trafficking is said to be the fastest growing 
source of income for organized crime and its third most important, exceeded only by drugs and 
arms trade (Obuah, 2006). 
After decades of neglect, public attention on the problem has increased considerably in recent 
years. Policymakers in international organizations and national governments all over the world as 
well as NGOs have augmented their efforts to combat trafficking and to raise public awareness 
on the issue.76 There has also been a notable increase in donor funding, e.g. by the European 
Union and the US government. 
Despite the policy relevance, academic research on the topic remains scarce, especially when it 
comes to economics. The large economic literature on organized crime and illicit activities (e.g. 
Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1995) has largely ignored the sizeable market of human trafficking and 
migrant exploitation. The same is true for the rapidly growing field on the economics of 
migration, which has been notably silent on the issue. As a result, and despite frequent calls for 
empirical research on the topic,77 there is still very little knowledge on human trafficking as an 
economic phenomenon. One major reason for this is the grave difficulty in gathering reliable and 
representative data. 
                                                 
76 Most prominently, the UN issued the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (UN, 
2000a) and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants (UN, 2000b), which entered into force in 2004 and 2003 
respectively. In March 2007, the UN also formally launched a Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking. The 
work of counter-trafficking NGOs such as Free the Slaves or La Strada and pioneering books such as Bales (1999) 
have helped to increase awareness of the problem. 
77 Gozdziak and Collett (2005, p.122) conclude that “future research needs to move beyond stating that there is a 
problem, to more systematic and rigorous data collection and analysis.” Among others, similar calls have been made 
by Tyldum and Brunovskis (2005), Piper (2005) and Chand (2008). 
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This paper is the first to analyze the drivers of human trafficking with micro data. Our theoretical 
argument is based on simple supply and demand considerations and rooted in the literature on 
the economics of crime and migration. In a nutshell, we argue that trafficking and exploitation 
are the sad but obvious consequence of migration pressure in a world of closed borders. The 
growing, but unsatisfied demand for legal migration options has created a breeding ground for 
criminal organizations and exploitative employers, who have learned to make a profit from 
people’s desire to work abroad. Migration has become a multibillion-dollar industry that can be 
particularly lucrative for those willing to use physical violence and restraint. 
Our focus on the close link between trafficking and labor migration differs from that of many 
recent media and policy reports.78 Most reports point to legislation and law enforcement, poor 
border controls, bribery and corruption, or insufficient education as drivers of human trafficking. 
These factors certainly exacerbate the trafficking problem, but may not explain it at its core. We 
argue instead that it is first and foremost the wish for a better life abroad that puts millions of 
people at the risk of ending up in exploitative work conditions. Their willingness to depart and to 
take risks in the migration process can be easily exploited by criminal agents.  
In line with the above, we expect the risk of human trafficking to be highest in areas with high 
rates of emigration. Simply put, “traffickers fish in the stream of migration” (Coomaraswamy, 
2001, p. 3), so that more people leaving means more people at risk. In addition, two channels 
may explain why individual trafficking risks increase with regional emigration rates.  
The first channel relates to the demand side of the human trafficking market (criminal agents 
recruiting for employers abroad). We predict that recruitment costs for traffickers will be lower in 
areas of large-scale emigration. One reason is that it is easy to find potential victims, simply 
because so many people leave from there. The other reason is the agglomeration of shadow 
migration industries. Large migrant flows attract a variety of middlemen offering services such as 
false documents, smuggling across borders or work procurement abroad. The presence of these 
agents offers ample opportunities for traffickers as they can collaborate or free-ride on their 
reputation (Tamura, forthcoming).  
The second channel is linked to the supply side of the human trafficking market (vulnerable 
individuals willing to work abroad). Migrants departing from high migration areas are likely to be 
negatively self-selected and share characteristics that make them more vulnerable to trafficking. 
High-emigration areas are often disadvantaged in the first place, so that migrants from there may 
be more willing to take risks, and possibly even consent to hazardous working conditions abroad. 
It has also been shown that large-scale emigration can lower the costs of migration, thus fostering 
the migration of poorer, less educated workers (McKenzie and Rapoport, forthcoming; Beine et 
al., forthcoming). In sum, we predict trafficking risks to be higher in high-migration areas (i) 
because traffickers benefit from lower recruitment costs and free-riding opportunities there 
and/or (ii) because those departing from high-migration areas can be more easily deceived.  
                                                 
78 Compare ILO (2005), UNODC (2006), US State Department (2008).  
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To test our arguments, we use a novel and unique survey on human trafficking which covers 
5513 randomly selected households from 82 regions in Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and 
Ukraine. These Eastern European countries are among the most important source countries of 
human trafficking worldwide (ILO, 2005). Human trafficking is defined as a situation in which an 
individual travelling abroad was locked and forced to work for no or little pay via means of 
coercion. As such, trafficking differs importantly from migrant smuggling, a commercial service 
that normally occurs with the consent of migrants, and from illegal migration, which does not 
typically involve any forms of exploitation. About 7 percent of the migrant families (108 out of 
1563 households) identified by the survey reported to have a trafficking victim among their 
members. This includes victims of both sexual and non-sexual forms of human trafficking, but 
not trafficked children.  
To supplement our findings, we present an additional case study of Moldova, which has by far 
the highest prevalence of human trafficking among the five countries under study. The case study 
is based on a second dataset covering 1679 migrants from 211 localities in Moldova. Although 
this second survey does not explicitly focus on trafficking, it allows identifying worst forms of 
migrant exploitation and contains ample additional information on migrants’ characteristics 
including their destination countries.  
The key result is in line with our expectations. Individual trafficking risks increase with the size of 
migration flows from the region (five-country survey) or locality (Moldova case study). Migration 
prevalence and other proxies of migration pressure turn out to be key predictors of trafficking on 
the household level. Thus, we find that trafficking tends to occur where migration flows are 
largest, not in remote regions with no or little migration. This result holds when controlling for 
selection effects and a broad range of household and migrant attributes as well as characteristics 
of the locality, region and country. As to the potential channels explaining this finding, we find 
stronger evidence for demand-side than for supply-side factors. Beyond this, we can report two 
further main results. First, illegal migration patterns increase trafficking risks. Second, we present 
evidence that awareness campaigns could play a successful role in reducing trafficking risks. The 
incidence of trafficking is considerably lower in regions where the awareness of the phenomenon 
of human trafficking is high.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 defines the main concepts and 
summarizes the current state of knowledge on human trafficking. It also provides stylized facts 
on the patterns of migration and trafficking in Eastern Europe. Section 3 sketches our main 
argument. In section 4, we describe the data and our empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the 
results and presents a number of robustness checks. Section 6 presents the case study on 
Moldova. Section 7 concludes. 
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7.2 What Do We Know About Human Trafficking? 
7.2.1 Definitions 
It is crucial to clearly define the concepts that lie at the core of this paper. We follow the UN 
protocols against human trafficking, which, after years of debate, succeeded in clearly defining 
and distinguishing these concepts.79 In accordance with the UN definition, the main purpose of 
smuggling is to facilitate the illegal entry of a person into another country. Typically, migrants are 
smuggled with their consent, paying the smuggler for his service. The smuggler gains a material 
benefit, but does not necessarily exploit the migrant. In contrast, trafficking always involves the 
violation of human rights and severe forms of exploitation. Victims of trafficking are recruited, 
transported and forced to work by means of coercion. The main purpose of trafficking is 
exploitation, either sexual exploitation or other forms of economic exploitation. While these 
definitions are helpful from a legal perspective, trafficking, exploitation and smuggling are often 
interrelated.80 Some migrants using smuggling services may depart voluntarily, but end up being 
exploited. In such cases, smugglers become traffickers. 
7.2.2 Determinants of  Human Trafficking 
A fundamental breeding ground for trafficking and exploitation is the economic situation of 
people in poorer regions of the world, pushing vulnerable people to emigrate and seek better 
opportunities abroad (Bruckert and Parent, 2002; Chand, 2008). The large potential gains from 
migration81, joint with network and herd effects have generated an unprecedented demand for 
legal migration to richer countries (World Bank, 2005). However, with most middle and high-
income country labor markets shut off, there is only very limited supply of legal employment 
opportunities abroad. At the same time, there is a constant demand for cheap manual workers 
and prostitutes in both developed and developing countries.  
This situation has fostered the emergence of shadow migration industries offering services such 
as border crossings and the procurement of illegal work abroad (Orrenius, 1999; Stalker, 2000; 
Gathmann, 2008). These activities, including its worst forms such as human trafficking, offer 
large monetary rewards and have to be seen in parallel to other fields of criminal intermediation, 
e.g. drugs and arms trade. Aronowitz (2001), Salt and Stein (1997) and Schloenhardt (1999) 
provide a detailed analysis of the business of trafficking and exploitation. In essence, the 
organizational structure of trafficking networks is similar to that of providers of legal services. 
Trafficking organizations find and attract people willing to work abroad via advertisements in 
                                                 
79 The exact definitions are given in UN (2000a) and UN (2000b). 
80 In this paper, we use the terms ‘trafficking’ and ‘exploitation’ interchangeably. 
81 For an individual, emigration can be the single most effective strategy to improve economic opportunities and 
increase income, often by a multiple. The large “place premium” in wages between sending and receiving countries is 
carefully documented in a recent paper by Clemens et al. (2008). 
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newspapers, the internet or through employment agencies. They also contact people on an 
individual basis, often via dispersed recruiters who may have even been trafficking victims 
themselves. 
All available evidence indicates that human trafficking is an exceptionally lucrative business for 
criminal groups. In a recent study, the ILO (2005) estimates that sexual and labor exploitation 
yields US$ 32 billion of profits a year to the actors involved. This corresponds to an estimated 
US$ 13,000 of yearly profits for each forced laborer. Another estimated figure is the profit of 
criminal gangs from sex trafficking alone, which is conservatively estimated at US$ 5 to 7 billion a 
year, with Interpol giving a higher estimate of US$ 19 billion annually (ILO, 2005; US State 
Department, 2008).  
The business can be highly attractive for criminal actors. Start-up costs are small and as Väyrynen 
(2005) harshly puts it, “people are a good commodity as they do not easily perish, but they can be 
transported over long distances and can be re-used and re-sold”. Moreover, the risks of 
detection, prosecution or arrest are much lower compared to other fields of illegal activity such as 
drug or arms trade. Exploited victims often feel discouraged to denounce their traffickers, as they 
face the risk of deportation and other legal consequences when contacting authorities in receiving 
countries (Langberg, 2005; Surtees, 2005). And even if traffickers are arrested, penalties are 
relatively low compared to other illicit activities (LexisNexis, 2008). 
In economic research, two recent theoretical papers have shed some light on the link between 
migration and its dark side in the form of trafficking or forced labor.82 Tamura (forthcoming) 
focuses on the interaction of human smuggling and trafficking. In his model, migrants hire a 
smuggler to cross borders and find work abroad. Once migrants depart, it depends on the 
smuggler’s decision and the profitability of exploitation whether they end up being trafficked or 
not. In a different setup, Friebel and Guriev (2006) model the market of illegal migration with 
debt/labor contracts. As most migrants cannot pay for migration costs in advance, criminal 
intermediaries and smugglers offer loans to potential migrants, which they have to pay back in 
the destination country. The contracts between migrants and intermediaries can only be enforced 
in the illegal sector, not in the legal one. Although the enforcement of such contracts can take 
place through coercion and punishment, the possible risk of exploitation and trafficking by the 
intermediaries is ruled out. 
While theory is scarce, empirical evidence is even scarcer. There is very little systematic 
knowledge about which households and regions are most vulnerable to exploitation and human 
trafficking. We are aware of only one econometric study on human trafficking.83 Akee et al. 
                                                 
82 In a further paper, Dessy and Pallage (2006) focus on the tradeoff between trafficking and child labor. In their 
model, the risk of trafficking acts as a deterrent to sending children to work. They come to the conclusion that 
successful policy measures against trafficking may lead to an increase in child labor, because parents will be less 
afraid of letting their children work.  
83 Basu and Chau (2003) provide cross-country evidence on child labor in debt bondage, but do not place their 
analysis in a migration or trafficking context. 
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(2007) analyze the determinants of trafficking of children and women in a cross-section of 
countries. A main result is that the stage of economic development and inequality of incomes 
between countries are major determinants of trafficking. Contrary to expectations, they find that 
granting legal status to trafficked victims in host countries and banning prostitution in source 
countries leads to a higher, not lower, likelihood of trafficking. Despite this pioneering study, 
much remains to be done to uncover the drivers and mechanisms of human trafficking, 
particularly on the micro level. 
7.2.3 Human Trafficking and Labor Migration in Eastern Europe 
There is a small but growing body of literature on the general migration patterns in Eastern 
Europe.84 The countries under study have witnessed large and often seasonal migration flows 
since the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The main drivers of migration in the area are poor 
living conditions and a lack of jobs as well as migration networks. There is little evidence for 
positive self-selection, as most migrants work in low-skilled jobs in sectors such as construction, 
agriculture or in domestic services, often under dismal conditions. As to destinations, Mansoor 
and Quillin (2006) estimate that from 1990 to 2006 about 80 percent of emigrants from the 
former Soviet Union moved within the CIS region, predominantly towards Russia, which is now 
the second largest recipient of international migrants worldwide. Other main destinations, 
particular for migrants from Bulgaria and Romania, are countries in the European Union.  
Countries of the former Eastern bloc have also become major origins of forced labor and human 
trafficking in the last two decades. The exploitation of human beings has a long and sad history in 
the region. In medieval times, Venetian and Genoese merchants established a massive trade with 
slaves from Eastern Europe and the epoch of “second serfdom” implied highly repressive forms 
of exploitation (Blum, 1957; Domar 1970). Today, the main destinations of trafficking victims are 
Western Europe and Russia, but they also include North America, Asia and increasingly the 
Middle East, in particular Turkey, Israel, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates (Surtees, 2005; 
UNODC, 2006). Estimates of the extent of trafficking and forced labor in Eastern Europe vary 
widely. The report by the ILO (2005) estimates that a minimum of 200,000 people from Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia have fallen victim to trafficking, while Mansoor and Quillin (2006) cite 
estimates from the United Nations Population Fund that more than 175,000 persons are 
trafficked annually in Europe and Central Asia. 
Media coverage and reports such as UNODC (2006) suggest that Eastern European trafficking 
victims are mostly young women who are exploited in the commercial sex industry. It is certain 
that many victims from the region are females forced into prostitution. Yet, the IOM (2006) 
report and recent more qualitative surveys from Russia and South-eastern Europe 
(Tyuryukanova, 2005; Surtees, 2005) underline the dominant but neglected issue of male 
                                                 
84 The following stylized facts are based on Bauer and Zimmermann (1999), Kraler and Iglicka (2002), Mansoor and 
Quillin (2006) and Görlich and Trebesch (2008). 
 
134 
exploitation.85 According to these sources, a large share of those trafficked from Central and 
Eastern Europe are men being exploited in agriculture, construction, or warehouse work. 
A further key insight from recent studies in the region is that most of the victims of trafficking 
depart on a voluntary basis (ILO, 2005; Tyuryukanova 2005). They often enter the destination 
countries at legal border crossings and with legal documents (Surtees, 2005; ILO, 2005). 
Typically, victims become subject to coercion and violence only after arrival at the destination, 
where their life in the shadows and a new environment makes them prone to be lured into 
seemingly attractive jobs by traffickers. The role of middlemen in the Eastern European 
trafficking business has also been documented in a small number of studies. According to the 
ILO (2005), trustworthy social networks can lower the risks of being trafficked, while the use of 
middlemen increases it. However, it is important to underline that social networks do not assure 
safety from trafficking. The IOM study by Surtees (2005) illustrates that many victims of sexual 
exploitation in countries like Albania, Bulgaria, or Macedonia were recruited by friends. Similarly, 
Laczko and Gramegna (2003) report that in South-eastern Europe 60 percent of victims are 
recruited by acquaintances, mostly with the promise to find them a job abroad.  
In sum, these stylized facts show that the human trafficking flows from the region run in parallel 
to the general migration flows in Eastern Europe and trafficking affects men and women alike. It 
also appears that many trafficked victims leave voluntarily, but ill-prepared. 
7.3 Human Trafficking as a Side Effect of  International Labor Flows 
This section discusses our theoretical argument and the related channels at work. In line with the 
above, we argue that human trafficking is an unavoidable side effect of migration in a world with 
large income disparities but closed borders. We therefore predict that large migrant outflows will 
increase the incidence of trafficking in a region. Simply put, more people departing means more 
people at risk. Assuming a fixed (low) probability that a departing migrant ends up being 
trafficked, it is straightforward to expect a larger number of trafficking victims to come from 
regions with more emigration.  
Our argument, however, goes beyond this purely mechanical effect. We predict that individual 
trafficking risks increase with the scale of regional emigration. Two channels can explain this. The 
first channel is linked to the demand side of the human trafficking market, as mass emigration 
can lower recruitment costs of traffickers. The second channel relates to the supply side of the 
trafficking market, as those departing from high-emigration regions may share characteristics that 
make them more prone to be trafficked. 
On the demand side, large-scale emigration may create agglomeration and free-riding 
opportunities for traffickers. Just like legal businesses, criminal activities tend to agglomerate in 
                                                 




larger markets. This is true for drug gang concentration in cities (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999) 
and applies to many other crime industries that concentrate geographically (Freeman et al., 1996; 
Zenou, 2003). In the context of trafficking, markets will be larger and more attractive in areas of 
mass emigration which offer high economies of scale. Most importantly, these regions feature a 
continuous supply of potential victims, which can considerably ease recruitment. Additionally, 
traffickers can benefit from the existence of a local shadow migrant industry, in which private 
agents offer all kinds of work procurement or travel services to emigrants. Related industries 
have thrived in Northern Africa or at the US-Mexican border, but also in many emigration 
regions of Eastern Europe. In such settings, traffickers can take advantage of agglomeration 
effects by collaborating with, or free-riding on, other agents such as people smugglers or travel 
agencies (Tamura, forthcoming).86 The result will be a higher concentration of traffickers and, in 
turn, higher trafficking risks in such regions. 
On the supply side, it is mostly negative self-selection that could explain higher risks in 
emigration areas. Localities witnessing large-scale out-migration may be particularly 
disadvantaged in the first place, often suffering from poor economic development and weak 
institutions. In deprived areas, migration may be the only strategy available to increase economic 
opportunities and start a better life. This will have implications for the preference set of those 
departing, as they may be more prone to take risks in the migration process, such as crossing 
borders illegally or accepting jobs in the informal sector abroad. In extreme cases, migrants from 
particularly disadvantaged regions may even consent to exploitative working conditions. They 
may be keen to access so-called “3D” jobs (difficult, dirty, dangerous) because they would do 
nearly everything just to escape their dismal living conditions at home (Bhabha, 2005). Besides 
such risk-taking behavior, skills and education may also play a role. The issue of negative or 
positive self-selection into migration is highly controversial.87 However, recent studies agree in 
that larger migration flows can foster negative self-selection (Beine et al., forthcoming; Chiquiar 
and Hanson, 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport, forthcoming). Larger networks and an established 
migration infrastructure lower the costs of migration, thereby increasing the likelihood that more 
people from lower social classes start to emigrate. These less-qualified late-comers in the 
migration wave may be more vulnerable to deception schemes and less able or willing to 
thoroughly prepare their journey. On the supply side we therefore predict trafficking risks to be 
higher in high-migration areas because those departing from there may be more desperate or 
simply less qualified to handle the many perils of the migration process. 
                                                 
86 Recent research indicates that the markets of migrant smuggling, work procurement and human 
trafficking/exploitation are indeed closely intertwined (Leman and Janssens, 2007; Väyrynen, 2005; Aronowitz, 2001; 
Ruggiero, 1997). 
87 Recent years have seen evidence for positive, intermediate and negative self-selection into migration, depending 
on the data and country investigated. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Mora and Taylor (2005), or Adams (2005) find 
years of schooling and other human capital variables to have a significant positive impact on the decision to migrate. 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) find evidence for intermediate selection in Mexican migration to the U.S., while Borjas 
(1987) predicts negative self-selection from countries with high earnings inequality such as Mexico. 
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Stretching even further, one could imagine the first and second channel to mutually reinforce 
each other. Negative self-selection may be beneficial for traffickers, and pose an additional 
incentive to agglomerate in regions of mass emigration and large networks. The reason is that 
negative self-selection may have relevant feedback effects on network composition or network 
quality. The more low-skilled workers depart, the worse the migrant network might become with 
regard to information filtering and transmission and in safeguarding from exploitation. As a 
result, larger, and thereby less-skilled, regional migrant networks might facilitate recruitment. 
In conclusion, both supply and demand-side channels predict individual trafficking risks to be 
higher in areas of large-scale emigration. Note, however, that this reasoning stands in contrast to 
some of the migration literature. Most authors in the field suggest that risks should be lower in 
areas of mass emigration, mainly because of the protective role of migrant networks. 
Community-level networks are often assumed to decrease information asymmetries and facilitate 
the arrival at the destination abroad, thereby reducing risks (Carrington et al., 1996; Winters et al., 
2001; Munshi, 2003; Bauer et al., 2007). We argue, however, that the role of networks may be 
ambiguous, especially when external agents learn to misuse them. This view is in line with some 
recent sociological research showing how exploitative employers learn to take advantage of 
migrant networks. One example is the study on “Networks of Exploitation” (Cranford, 2005) 
which shows that employers in the Los Angeles janitorial industry rewarded Mexican supervisors 
to recruit vulnerable workers from their home communities into dismal jobs. Migrant networks 
were systematically misused to replace unionized workforce with immigrants, who would earn 
much less and could be more easily exploited. Further studies with related arguments and 
evidence are Martin et al. (2007) who study the exploitation of immigrants’ arriving in the 
Chicago South Side, and Zhang and Chin (2002) who track the decisive role of networks in 
Chinese human smuggling. Thus, it seems that networks on the regional or local level do not 
necessarily shield from the (low) risk of being trafficked. 
7.4 Data and Empirical Strategy 
7.4.1 Data 
The main body of analysis uses a unique household survey which was commissioned by the 
International Organization for Migration and covers five Eastern European countries. In 
addition, we also employ a second household survey from Moldova to check the robustness of 
our results and provide supplementary evidence. This survey is described in section 6.  
Fieldwork for the five-country survey was conducted in Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania and 
Ukraine between August and September 2006. To arrive at nationally representative estimates, 
the survey relied on a multi-stage stratified sampling scheme.88 Accordingly, the survey covers 
                                                 
88 See IOM (2006) for more details. 
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both urban and rural areas and sampled households of all regions in the five countries.89 In each 
country, at least 1000 individuals were interviewed, with slightly larger samples in Bulgaria and 
Ukraine, resulting in a total sample of 5513 households. The interviews were conducted with the 
person whose birthday was last among the rest of dwellers. 
The largest module in the survey was dedicated to human trafficking across borders. Most 
importantly, interviewed persons were asked whether persons in their close surroundings 
(relatives, friends and neighbors), in their close family,90 or they themselves had experienced 
situations which would be classified as trafficking according to the definition above. Since 
households were randomly selected for the interview, selection bias suffered by other datasets 
that are based on the number of assisted victims or the number of border apprehensions 
(Tyldum and Brunovskis, 2005) is avoided here. To the best of our knowledge, the relatively large 
sample and the survey design make it the most comprehensive and representative micro-level 
survey on human trafficking available worldwide.  
7.4.2 Dependent Variable and Econometric Model 
Our dependent variable is a dummy denoting whether the interviewed person reported a victim 
of human trafficking among close family members.91 Given the relatively small number of 
individuals with trafficking in their close family, we combine sexual exploitation and other forms 
of exploitation. More specifically, the dummy takes the value of one if a close family member had 
travelled abroad and experienced one of the following situations: (i) “was offered a domestic or 
nursing job, but was locked and forced to work for no pay”, (ii) “was offered a job at an 
enterprise, on a construction site, or in agriculture, but was locked and forced to work for no or 
little pay” (iii) “was offered employment, but the passport was taken away upon arrival to the 
destination country and was forced to work in the sex business”. In line with the UN definition 
of human trafficking given above, these three situations have in common that the individual was 
forced to work by means of coercion. 
Overall, 108 individuals indicate a victim of human trafficking in their close family. Out of these, 
there are 22 reported cases of members being forced to work in the sex business, while 86 cases 
were associated with non-sexual forms of exploitation. In our sample, most trafficked cases come 
from Moldova (56 out of 1073). The rest is found in Bulgaria (18 out of 1007), Ukraine (15 out 
of 1345), Belarus (11 out of 1071), and Romania (8 out of 1017). A very large number of 
interviewed people had not heard about any case of trafficking among the people they knew 
(4905 out of 5513). 
                                                 
89 Overall, the analysis covers 82 regions. 
90 The term ‘close family’ is defined as only including parents, children, husband/wife, brothers and sisters of the 
interviewed person. The survey generally refers to households as identified by close family ties with respect to the 
interviewee and not by residency. 
91 As the interviewee is by definition part of the close family, we make sure that our dependent variable also includes 
the case when the interviewed person was a victim of human trafficking him- or herself. 
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Our data are likely to suffer from some degree of reporting bias. Victims of human trafficking 
and their relatives might be reluctant to share their experiences, being afraid of stigmatization or 
problems with authorities at home or abroad. This is especially true for the case of sexual 
exploitation, which is a highly sensitive issue (Laczko, 2005). To minimize the degree of 
underreporting, the survey instrument used various ways of reducing the stigma associated with 
human trafficking. First, instead of asking directly whether a family member had been 
“trafficked”, the questionnaire rather referred to typical situations of coerced labor. Second, the 
respondent did not have to reveal the identity of a trafficked family member. Third, if there was a 
case of sexual exploitation in the family, the interviewed person could still “hide” this experience 
in a more general answer category of exploitation. Based on these considerations, we believe that 
the potential under-reporting bias should not seriously invalidate our findings.92 
We estimate the determinants of human trafficking on the household level with binary response 
models. A potential problem in this regard is that human trafficking, although affecting millions 
of people, is a relatively rare event on the household level. King and Zeng (2001) show that the 
maximum likelihood estimator of standard logit or probit models is biased when the number of 
non-events (zeros) is multiple times higher than the number of events (ones). They illustrate that 
standard binary models underestimate the probability of rare events and do increasingly so as the 
event gets rarer. As a baseline method, we therefore rely on the rare event logit model suggested 
by King and Zeng (2001). In essence, their model is based on the basic logit model, but uses a 
bias-corrected estimator for rare events that generates a lower mean square error for coefficients. 
Note that this approach is particularly popular in political science (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003; 
Harff, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) but is also increasingly used in research on economic 
issues (e.g. Hausmann et al., 2005; Leblang and Satyanath, 2008). To test the robustness of our 
results, standard logit models are also applied.93 
7.4.3 Identifying the Channels at Work 
Our empirical approach follows the theoretical arguments above. We first test the general 
mechanical prediction that trafficking is more likely to occur in regions of large-scale emigration. 
We then focus on the subsample of migrant households to establish whether the individual 
likelihood of being trafficked increases with regional migration prevalence. In a final step, we 
investigate the channels behind our finding on the link between trafficking and migration flows. 
More specifically, we use proxies of regional recruitment conditions (demand-side factors) and 
proxies indicating the skill level or desperation of those departing (supply-side factors) and 
                                                 
92 An unavoidable bias in any database on human trafficking or migrant exploitation is that it only provides 
information on victims with known whereabouts or those returned. Another problem might be that the survey did 
not put a focus on marginal social groups, such as Sinti and Roma, among whom trafficking rates could be higher. 
93 In light of the large economic and institutional differences between the countries under consideration, we cluster 
standard errors on the country level throughout the analysis. However, our main results are not affected when 
clustering on regions. 
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interact them with regional emigration rates. This will provide some indication on whether mass 
emigration reinforces the demand and supply-side channels described above.  
Our key variable of interest is the regional migration prevalence rate. It is constructed by taking 
the share of surveyed households in each region that reported to have had a member of the close 
family abroad in the last 3 years. As an alternative, we employ a proxy of low migration pressure. 
Concretely, we construct a regional variable capturing the share of interviewed individuals who 
stated that they could never imagine working abroad (“share of stayers”).94 Following our 
argument, our main proposition is that an increase in migration prevalence in the region should 
increase the risk of trafficking, while a higher share of stayers (lower migration pressure) should 
decrease trafficking risks. 
On the supply side, one proxy for recruitment conditions in the region is the scale of illegal 
migration. The indicator used captures the regional proportion of migrants who work illegally 
abroad. Illegal migration is likely to foster the activities of people smugglers or agents procuring 
false travel documents, with which traffickers can collaborate. And because shadow migration 
industries will tend to be larger the more people depart, the recruitment of illegal migrants may 
be particularly easy in emigration areas. We therefore expect the adverse effect of illegal migration 
to depend on migration prevalence rates, so that that the interaction term of regional migration 
and illegality should be positively signed. The same intuition applies when using a dummy 
variable for illegal migration experience on the household level, which we also interact with 
migration prevalence. As a second demand-side proxy, we include a variable measuring the level 
of criminal activity (reported crimes per 10,000 inhabitants in a region) which we take from the 
Statistical Yearbooks of the respective countries and which we also interact with migration rates. 
We assume that trafficking will be easier the more criminal a region, especially if this region has 
large emigration flows. This would predict positive coefficients of both the crime rate variable 
and its interaction with regional migration prevalence.  
Turning to the supply side of the human trafficking market, our focus lays on indicators of 
desperation and negative self-selection into migration. Because the survey intentionally omitted 
questions on trafficked family members, it is not possible to rely on education-based measures of 
selection. Likewise, we cannot construct a measure of network composition. However, the survey 
allows proxying the degree of desperation-led migration with the share of persons in the region 
who state that they would do “any kind of work” abroad.95 Economic deprivation can cause 
negative self-selection on its own, but this effect will be exacerbated in areas with high emigration 
and larger networks (McKenzie and Rapoport, forthcoming). To test this prior we interact the 
desperation proxy with migration prevalence and expect a positive coefficient. Our intuition is 
                                                 
94 Since this variable could potentially be subject to reverse causality, the share is calculated excluding households 
with a trafficking case in their close or distant family. Note that the share of people not wanting to leave is negatively 
correlated with regional migration prevalence rates, at a coefficient of -0.30. 
95 The question allowed for ten other answer categories. One can thus reasonably interpret the choice of “any kind 
of work” as a strong signal of desperation. To avoid endogeneity, this share is calculated excluding persons who live 
in migrant households or know victims of human trafficking. 
 
140 
that migrant networks will allow an even higher share of low-skilled and vulnerable workers to 
depart from deprived areas, resulting in more trafficking. In a similar vein, we interact a dummy 
capturing a household’s “poor financial status” with migration prevalence rates.96 We expect 
poorer workers, who might not have migrated in the absence of large migrant networks, to be 
more prone to fall victim to traffickers. 
7.4.4 Other Explanatory Variables 
Two variables are used to assess the role of information asymmetries and access to information. 
First, we code a dummy for households that use the TV, as opposed to other media and social 
contacts, to get informed about social and political issues. TV use can be seen as a source of 
relatively objective and high-quality information and a potential channel for anti-trafficking 
awareness campaigns. We therefore expect a negative coefficient of the TV dummy. Second, we 
include a regional risk-awareness measure by taking the share of respondents who stated that they 
had heard of the phenomenon of human trafficking before.97 Intuitively, risk awareness is likely 
to reduce the likelihood of trafficking, which again predicts a negative coefficient of this variable. 
Given the heterogeneity across regions and households, it is necessary to control for additional 
factors that might influence trafficking risks.98 We proxy the level of socio-economic 
development with regional infant mortality rates (per 1000 live births) and the number of 
physicians (per 10,000 inhabitants). The remoteness of a region is captured by the share of people 
living in rural localities. On the household level, we use the number of children aged 16 or 
younger99, a dummy for households living in rural areas and another dummy indicating whether 
households live in the district around their respective capital city. We also include age, gender, 
marital status, and educational level of the respondent, but only to control for systematic 
reporting biases along these dimensions. Descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in 
Table A7.1 in the appendix. 
                                                 
96 More precisely, households indicating that they “have to save money for the basic necessities (food, clothing, 
footwear)” are coded as poor. Unfortunately, this information is unavailable for households interviewed in Bulgaria 
and Romania. 
97 We try to most closely resemble a migrant’s knowledge status before departure and reduce potential endogeneity 
by excluding respondents who knew a victim of human trafficking or lived in a migrant household when calculating 
this share. 
98 These variables were coded from the Statistical Yearbooks of each of the five countries. Given that our 
dependent variables are retrospective and in order to minimize potential endogeneity problems, all variables from the 
Statistical Yearbooks were coded for the year 2004.  




7.5.1 Main Results 
Table 7.1 displays our main estimation results for the whole sample.100 First, and most 
importantly, we find migration prevalence to be the key predictor of human trafficking (column 
1). Compared to other explanatory variables, it has a large marginal effect.101 A one percentage 
point increase in the share of migrant households in a region raises the likelihood of having a 
trafficked family member by 0.056 percentage points. This may appear small, but one has to keep 
in mind that trafficking is a rare event. A one percentage point increase in migration prevalence 
effectively translates into a five percent increase in the predicted probability of human trafficking 
on the household level. Or, when increasing the regional share of migrant households by one 
standard deviation (from 0.20 to 0.37), the risk of trafficking more than doubles. This finding is 
confirmed when we use our proxy for low migration pressure, the regional share of people who 
could never imagine working abroad (share of stayers), see column 2. The incidence of trafficking 
appears to be significantly lower in regions where fewer people intend to leave. 
A further main result is on the role of risk perceptions and trafficking. Households in regions 
with higher awareness of the phenomenon of human trafficking are less likely to have a trafficked 
family member. The same is true for households which use the TV as main source of 
information on social and political issues.102 These findings, although not fully robust, underline 
the potential benefits of public awareness campaigns to counter human trafficking. 
To some surprise, we find that many regional control variables seem to play no role. Living in a 
region with a large share of rural population, a high rate of infant mortality, or low density of 
physicians does not increase the likelihood of trafficking. If at all, there is weak evidence that 
households in regions with higher infant mortality are less likely to report a trafficked family 
member. 
The right part of Table 7.1 shows our main results for the subsample of 1560 migrant 
households. The analysis for this subsample is of particular relevance, as it allows testing our 
hypothesis that individual trafficking risks rise with regional migration rates. As can be seen, we 
find that all of our key results hold in this migrant subsample. In particular, columns 3 and 4, 
show that the regional scale of emigration remains a key predictor of trafficking. Migration 
prevalence has a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that trafficking risks increase more 
                                                 
100 All of our main findings hold when standard logit procedures are employed. For reasons of brevity, however, 
these results are available upon request. 
101 With the exception of dummy variables, all marginal effects are evaluated at the mean of the independent 
variables. 
102 Arguably, TV use may also be a proxy for household wealth. Note, however, that this result remains unaffected 
when controlling for a household’s financial status (column 5 of Table 7.2). 
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than proportionally with emigration rates. We also find that our proxy for low migration pressure 
(“share of stayers”) keeps its significantly negative coefficient.  
TABLE 7.1: BASELINE REGRESSIONS 
 coef/se marginal 
effect
 coef/se marginal 
effect
 coef/se marginal 
effect
 coef/se marginal 
effect
4.726*** 0.056 5.108*** 0.158
(1.013) (0.784)
-1.391** -0.006 -1.711* 0.004
(0.686) (0.947)
-1.535* -0.018 -1.857* -0.017 -2.674*** -0.083 -2.932*** -0.055
(0.889) (1.081) (0.921) (1.089)
-0.381** -0.005 -0.372** -0.005 -0.562** -0.020 -0.522* -0.020
(0.157) (0.155) (0.237) (0.285)
0.063 0.001 0.071 0.001 0.161 0.004 0.181* 0.005
(0.071) (0.070) (0.114) (0.108)
0.165 0.002 0.204 0.003 -0.032 -0.001 -0.014 0.000
(0.206) (0.203) (0.264) (0.280)
1.265** 0.024 1.394** 0.029 0.504 0.017 0.699 0.027
(0.616) (0.665) (0.651) (0.713)
0.599 0.007 1.869 0.024 0.813 0.026 2.557** 0.086
(1.189) (1.186) (1.056) (1.067)
-0.071*** -0.001 -0.040 -0.001 -0.113*** -0.004 -0.083** -0.003
(0.021) (0.030) (0.028) (0.035)
-0.010 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.014 0.000
(0.011) (0.011) (0.021) (0.019)
0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.208 -0.003 -1.194*** -0.023 0.937** 0.041 -0.223 -0.097
(0.286) (0.273) (0.435) (0.437)
0.767 0.011 -0.250 -0.011 1.465*** 0.079 0.402 -0.007
(0.467) (0.375) (0.467) (0.431)
-0.768** -0.008 -1.313*** -0.003 -0.050 -0.003 -0.518* 0.014
(0.321) (0.232) (0.377) (0.304)
0.436 0.006 -0.474 -0.012 0.985*** 0.045 0.112 -0.017
(0.424) (0.488) (0.332) (0.455)
-0.009* 0.000 -0.009* 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.008 0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
0.185 0.002 0.192* 0.002 0.153 0.005 0.182 0.006
(0.116) (0.116) (0.243) (0.245)
-0.352* -0.004 -0.334 -0.004 -0.126 -0.004 -0.067 -0.002
(0.212) (0.207) (0.290) (0.283)
-0.079 -0.001 -0.030 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.066 0.002
(0.186) (0.182) (0.310) (0.325)
0.289** 0.003 0.302** 0.004 0.138 0.005 0.186 0.007



























With regional share 
of stayers




All households (n=5,513) Migrant households (n=1,560)
 
Results of rare events logit estimation. The dependent variable is a dummy for human trafficking incidence on the 
household level. ***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively. Country-clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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7.5.2 Results on the Channels at Work 
We have demonstrated that regional migration flows are associated with a higher individual 
likelihood of being trafficked. This section presents evidence on the channels at work. As our 
empirical strategy in this part of the analysis relies on interaction terms, we follow McKenzie and 
Rapoport (forthcoming) and use linear regression models (OLS) for estimation. The main 
purpose is to facilitate interpretation of the interaction term coefficients, which is problematic in 
the non-linear models typically used for binary outcomes, such as logit or probit models (Ai and 
Norton, 2003). 
The left part of Table 7.2 presents results on demand-side effects. The interaction term between 
the share of illegal migration in the region and regional migration prevalence is positive and 
significant (column 1). The same is true for the interaction with illegal migration experience in the 
household (column 2). Both results indicate that illegality has a particular risk-increasing effect in 
high-migration areas. In line with our arguments above, traffickers seem to take advantage of 
larger shadow migration industries and illegal migration patterns. However, we do not find any 
evidence that crime facilitates trafficking in regions with high rates of out-migration. Column 3 
shows that the interaction of reported crimes and migration rates in the region is insignificant and 
negatively signed. This non-finding might be due to measurement error and difficulties in 
comparing crime statistics across the five countries under investigation. Moreover, we lack 
alternative measures, such as the share of people convicted or the number of homicides in a 
region, which might provide a better indicator for relevant criminal activities. 
As to potential supply-side factors, the results are displayed in columns 4 and 5. We find that our 
proxy for negative self-selection in the region (the share of people who would do any kind of job 
abroad), positively depends on migration prevalence. This is consistent with our hypothesis that 
migrant networks may foster the departure of more vulnerable types of migrants, particularly in 
deprived regions. Note, however, that the coefficient of the interaction term is significant only at 
the 10 percent level and not fully robust to specification changes. On the household level, we 
find no evidence for negative self-selection effects. The dummy on poor financial status and the 
interaction is insignificant. It should be kept in mind, however, that the survey does not report 
any pre-migration assessments of living standards. But one should also recall that other proxies 
of regional development, such as remoteness, child mortality or the availability of physicians also 




TABLE 7.2: RESULTS ON THE CHANNELS AT WORK 


































0.099 0.144*** 0.260** 0.137*** 0.259***
(0.066) (0.049) (0.105) (0.040) (0.032)
-0.118** -0.113** -0.142* -0.119** -0.233***
(0.055) (0.058) (0.073) (0.055) (0.047)
-0.024 -0.021 -0.024* -0.024* -0.039***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011)
0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.015*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
-0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001
(0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020)
0.018 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.016
(0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.027)
0.035 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.029
(0.052) (0.050) (0.053) (0.044) (0.024)
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
control for respondent's characteristics yes yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 1,560 1,560 1,560 1,560 987
yescountry dummies
illegal migr. share*migration prevalence
illegal migration (household)






crime rate in region*migration prevalence
poor financial status of household 
crime rate
number of children (0-16)
capital district
share of rural polulation
share of illegal migration in region 










of ordinary least squares estimation. The dependent variable is a dummy for human trafficking incidence on the 
household level. ***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively. Country-clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. 
7.5.3 Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of the results presented above, this section conducts a series of additional 
checks. In a first step, we explicitly account for the fact that human trafficking should only be 
observable for migrant households. To econometrically allow for this we estimate a probit sample 
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selection model with a dummy for migrant households as dependent variable in the selection 
equation and a dummy for households with a trafficked family member in the outcome equation. 
One way to identify this model is to find a variable that is a significant predictor in the selection 
equation, but excludable from the outcome equation. Our dataset offers only a limited choice of 
such instruments. Arguably, the most credible variable is a dummy indicating whether the 
household has an employed member at home. Our identifying assumption is that having a 
domestically employed household member relieves a household’s migration pressure, but does 
not directly affect the risk of being trafficked. Having an employed household member turns out 
to be a highly significant and negative predictor of having a family member abroad.103 The results 
of the probit selection model (columns 1 and 2 of Table 7.3) closely resemble those of the rare 
events logit estimation. In addition, our estimates do not appear to be biased due to sample 
selection. The Likelihood Ratio test of independent equations cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
no correlation between the error terms (p-value 0.56). We are aware that identification may not 
be fully warranted with this approach. We implicitly assume negative self-selection into migration, 
as households with unemployed members are more likely to send a migrant. As discussed above, 
such negative self-selection effects might also affect trafficking risks, especially in high-emigration 
regions, which raises concerns on whether our instrument is strictly excludable. However, we 
show that instrument choice does not affect the results in the Moldova case study (section 6). 
Moreover, an alternative form of identification through functional form, thus relying on the non-
linearity of the model. Re-estimating the regressions without an instrument yields similar results, 
with migration prevalence remaining a significant and substantial determinant of trafficking risks 
(available upon request). We thus conclude that it is sufficient to separate the sample selection 
model and focus on the outcome equation as done in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. 
Another issue of concern is the role of migrant destinations. It is possible that high migration 
flows correlate with migration to destinations with poorer law enforcement or weaker anti-
trafficking laws, e.g. Russia or Turkey. While the survey does not contain information on migrant 
destinations, we take advantage of well-known migration patterns across countries to conduct a 
simple robustness check. Specifically, we divide the sample into sending countries with 
predominantly “Western” destinations (Romania and Bulgaria) and countries with more 
“Eastern”-oriented migration flows (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine). We find that in both groups of 
countries regional migration prevalence remains a highly significant predictor of human 
trafficking risks (columns 3 and 4).  
In a next step, we restrict our sample to rural households. The rationale for this is that networks 
are typically thought to have stronger effects in rural areas. However, as shown in column 5, the 
results remain largely the same. We also find little changes when explicitly controlling for proxies 
                                                 
103 Most evidence on migration in the region indicates that households first try to place a member in the domestic 
labor market and send a migrant only if this is unsuccessful. Generally, migration in the region is overwhelmingly 
motivated by the lack of income or job opportunities (88 percent of respondents in the survey state so). In Moldova, 
for example, only about a third of those migrating were active in the labor market before their departure (Omar 
Mahmoud and Trebesch, 2009).  
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of regional institutions. More specifically, we use the share of respondents answering that 
trafficking in the region mainly occurs (i) because of weak laws and poor law enforcement or (ii) 
because of corruption. As can be seen in column 6, we find these two proxies to be insignificant.  
TABLE 7.3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 














Trafficking Migration Trafficking Trafficking Trafficking Trafficking Trafficking
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
2.744*** 1.847*** 3.870*** 4.842** 5.788*** 5.261*** 5.278***







-1.180*** -0.081 -0.409 -3.302*** -2.566*** -2.533* -2.647***
(0.430) (0.152) (2.279) (1.152) (0.768) (1.302) (0.860)
-0.231 0.055 -0.087 -0.864*** -1.065*** -0.568** -0.632***
(0.170) (0.054) (0.442) (0.175) (0.216) (0.237) (0.185)
0.089 0.061** 0.139*** 0.209* 0.168 0.157 0.136
(0.064) (0.026) (0.023) (0.111) (0.175) (0.117) (0.136)
0.014 0.099** -0.052 -0.086 -0.027 -0.040
(0.133) (0.043) (0.345) (0.368) (0.274) (0.267)
0.193 -0.021 1.040** 0.374 0.931 0.490 0.577
(0.253) (0.077) (0.524) (0.779) (1.041) (0.645) (0.742)
0.375 0.081 4.079* 0.138 -1.754 0.763 0.759
(0.634) (0.199) (2.315) (0.570) (1.448) (1.014) (1.078)
-0.048 0.010 -0.169* -0.069 -0.166*** -0.114*** -0.113***
(0.029) (0.007) (0.096) (0.105) (0.032) (0.031) (0.027)
0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.011 -0.037 0.003 0.000
(0.010) (0.003) (0.045) (0.025) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021)
0.001 -0.001** 0.013*** 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.002





Number of observations 552 1,008 864 1,560 1,550
yes







yes yes yes yes yes









share of rural polulation






number of children         
(0-16)
 
Results of rare events logit and Heckman probit selection estimation. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 3-7 is 
a dummy for human trafficking incidence on the household level. ***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 
percent level respectively. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
Finally, we analyze the differing effects of family networks (strong ties) versus community 
networks (weak ties). Many of the arguments on networks made so far would apply to weak-tie 
networks, but not to family networks, which are likely to be more protective when it comes to 
human trafficking. The family network variable available to us simply captures the number of 
other members in the households that have migrated in the last three years. Family networks 
 
147 
appear to play a protective role. Their effect, however, is far from being statistically significant 
(column 7). The same is true if we include regional fixed effects (available upon request). 
However, a more in-depth analysis with better data on family migration patterns is needed to 
strengthen this conclusion. 
7.6 Moldova Case Study 
To supplement the analysis and address some limitations of the five-country survey, this section 
presents a detailed case study of Moldova, the Eastern European country which is most affected 
by human trafficking. A main difference to the five-country study presented above is the range of 
available data for Moldova, allowing us to conduct the analysis at less aggregated levels. First, we 
have access to a household survey with very detailed information on migrant characteristics and 
their migration patterns including the country of destination. Second, the Ministry of Economy 
and Trade provides a rich database on socio-economic characteristics of every community in 
Moldova. We can therefore investigate the drivers of human trafficking on the individual, not 
household level and include locality-specific migration prevalence rates and control variables. 
Individual data come from a specialized household survey on migration and remittances, 
capturing 3916 households. The survey was commissioned by IOM and executed by the 
CBSAXA opinion research firm in summer 2008 (see Lücke et al. (2009) for further details). The 
impressive scale of emigration from Moldova is reflected by the fact that 1127 households in the 
survey (29 percent) had at least one member abroad. Although the survey instrument does not 
explicitly focus on trafficking and exploitation, we can take advantage of one question on 
problems confronted abroad. This question was answered by almost all respondents and allows 
identifying the worst forms of migrant exploitation analogous to the definition used so far. 
Specifically, we code migrants as trafficked if (i) they were locked by their employer abroad, (ii) 
their passport was taken away and/or (iii) they were subject to sexual exploitation. 31 migrants in 
our sample meet these criteria. This share is notably smaller than in the five-country survey, a fact 
that can be attributed to survey design, in particular to the way trafficking-related questions were 
asked, but also to the degree of retrospectiveness, as the question only referred to the survey year 
and the preceding one (2007 and 2008). 
To assure comparability, the Moldovan case study follows the five-country analysis as closely as 
possible. Some minor differences in the construction of variables are worth mentioning. Above 
all, instead of controlling for the characteristics of the respondent, we include migrants’ personal 
traits directly. Community migration prevalence is proxied by the share of people who are 
temporarily absent from a locality. The Moldovan Labor Force Survey shows that this is a 
meaningful proxy as labor migrants represent more than 80 percent of those temporarily absent. 
A major advantage of this variable is its representativity at the local level, as it is derived from 
administrative statistics and not survey-based. In addition to these changes, availability of doctors 
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is now expressed as the distance to the next doctor and crime rates are replaced by perceived 
levels of personal security. 
Taken together, the baseline results for the Moldovan migrant sample are nearly identical to the 
ones for the five-country study (column 1 of Table 7.4). This strongly supports our argument and 
findings from above. Migration prevalence remains by far the most important determinant of 
trafficking risks. This result holds when using fixed effects for the 35 regions in Moldova, 
restricting the sample to rural areas (available upon request), or including dummies for migrant 
destinations (column 2). Quite remarkably, migrants’ personal characteristics, such as age, sex and 
education, do not appear to matter. The same is true for destinations. Neither is migration to 
Russia or Italy, which together host about 80 percent of Moldovan migrants, associated with 
increased trafficking risks. 
Again, we also investigate the differing role of family and community networks. The Moldovan 
survey data allow for a better measurement of family networks, as it contains information on the 
number of family members that migrated prior to the migrant him- or herself. As can be seen in 
column 3, we now find the family network variable to be significant and negative, indicating that 
previous migration experience of other household members can help lowering the risk of 
trafficking and exploitation. This supports the view that our arguments may only apply to weak-
tie, but not strong-tie networks.  
Robustness of the probit selection model is tested by using an alternative instrument. Specifically, 
we use occupational information on whether surveyed individuals are employed as construction 
workers in Moldova or were so prior to departure. Given the building boom in Moldova’s main 
destination countries until 2008 and the resulting demand for cheap construction labor, 
construction workers have a much higher probability to emigrate (Omar Mahmoud and 
Trebesch, 2009). At the same time, there is no reason to expect construction workers to face a 
higher (or lower) risk of trafficking, an intuition that is confirmed by the data. Using this 
identification approach, we find the key result to hold in the sample selection model (available 
upon request). As before, our estimates do not appear to be biased due to sample selection. 
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TABLE 7.4: RESULTS FOR MOLDOVA CASE STUDY 

















coef/se coef/se coef/se OLS coef/se OLS coef/se OLS coef/se OLS coef/se
7.519*** 7.357*** 7.633*** -0.259** 0.017 0.199 0.662***

























0.011 0.015 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.041 -0.170 -0.148 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.390) (0.394) (0.410) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
-0.016 0.035 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.587) (0.597) (0.593) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
0.263 0.272 0.255 0.006 0.007 -0.003 0.005
(0.716) (0.683) (0.738) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
-0.370 -0.459 -0.387 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005
(0.495) (0.480) (0.474) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
0.027 0.041 0.028 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.000
(0.247) (0.241) (0.247) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
0.143 0.200 0.175 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.001
(0.553) (0.550) (0.563) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
-0.228 -0.353 -0.204 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002
(1.016) (1.078) (1.051) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.019)
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.049 0.046 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.321 -0.293 -0.335 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002
(0.435) (0.440) (0.432) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)




Main results Demand-side effects Supply-side effects
illegal migration (migrant)
infant mortality





share of illegal migration (% in 
region)
illegal migr. share*migration 
prevalence (region)


















Results of rare events logit and OLS estimation in a sample of 1679 migrants. The dependent variable indicates if a 
migrant has been trafficked or not. ***/**/* denote significance at the 1/5/10 percent level respectively. Locality-
clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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The remaining columns of Table 7.4 presents evidence on why trafficking risks increase with 
migration prevalence. To test for demand-side forces, we rely on indicators of illegal migration 
and crime. This time, however, we can use the proportion of migrants who crossed borders 
illegally as proxy for the extent of illegal migration. Illegal border crossing is arguably a more 
exogenous indicator than illegal work abroad and might also capture the size of the regional 
shadow migration industry more accurately. In line with our previous evidence, our results point 
to the existence of agglomeration effects, as the impact of illegality increases with emigration 
rates (columns 4 and 5). Again, the existence of criminal activities does not appear to increase the 
likelihood of trafficking in high-migration areas (available upon request). As regards factors on 
the supply side, the availability of migrants’ educational attainment allows for alternative 
identification of negative self-selection and the possibility to analyze the effect of network 
composition. We do not find that larger networks induce particularly vulnerable migrants to leave 
(column 6). However, network composition, measured as the proportion of migrants with higher 
education, seems to play a role. Migrants from regions with high fractions of low-skilled migrants 
face a particularly high risk when networks are large (column 7). This lends some credence to the 
hypothesis that network quality may decrease with network size and the degree of negative self-
selection. However, more research with better data is needed to validate this point. Overall, our 
findings for Moldova are very similar to the ones of the five-country study and more in favor of 
demand-side channels. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Our results for the Eastern European context have several implications. First, policymakers 
concerned about human trafficking should acknowledge the important role of migration. We find 
strong indication that traffickers and exploitative employers are more prone to recruit victims 
from regions with large-scale emigration flows. For this reason, we propose to target awareness 
campaigns and other anti-trafficking policies to areas where migration flows are high or on the 
rise, not to remote areas with no or little migration. 
Second, our indicative findings on the role of risk awareness and information use may provide 
some orientation for policy initiatives facing cost-benefit trade-offs. In fact, the results give some 
reason for optimism that anti-trafficking campaigns and measures to reduce information 
asymmetries in the migration process can indeed be a promising way to reduce the crime. Besides 
awareness campaigns, the ILO (2005) suggests to set up labor market information systems on 
jobs at home and abroad and the general use of model employment contracts. 
Third, our results document the close link between illegal migration patterns and trafficking. 
Migrants who cross borders illegally and who depart from regions with more illegal emigrants 
face significantly higher risks. One can argue that restrictive immigration policies exacerbate the 
problem, pushing would-be immigrants into illegality and fostering the emergence of shadow 
migration industries. However, a moderate increase of legal migration opportunities is unlikely to 
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solve the problem given the magnitude of global migration pressure (Amin and Mattoo, 2006). In 
addition, traffickers’ incentives would remain unchanged through such measures. 
Finally, we find some indication that large community migration networks increase risks and may 
thus have ambiguous effects. This stands in some contrast to the existing migration literature, 
which generally advocates a risk-reducing role of networks. However, more research is needed to 
better understand the role of social networks for migration and trafficking.  
As a general conclusion, it seems likely that the market of human trafficking and the number of 
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TABLE A7.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR HOUSEHOLDS WITH AND WITHOUT TRAFFICKED 
MEMBERS 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Regional characteristics
rural locality 0.48 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.61 0.49
capital district 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.30
share of rural population 0.38 0.22 0.51 0.26 0.48 0.24 0.58 0.23
infant mortality 10.93 3.75 11.08 2.57 11.87 3.72 11.39 2.56
density of physicians (per 10,000 inh.) 35.40 16.24 28.84 12.51 29.41 15.43 27.09 12.25
crime rate (crimes per 10,000 inh.) 160.92 107.93 115.89 77.72 122.28 80.46 104.41 65.21
migration prevalence 0.28 0.17 0.42 0.19 0.37 0.18 0.46 0.20
share of illegal migrants 0.28 0.17 0.31 0.17 0.30 0.17 0.35 0.17
share of stayers 0.51 0.12 0.48 0.11 0.49 0.12 0.46 0.11
awareness of trafficking 0.79 0.14 0.75 0.18 0.79 0.15 0.70 0.19
share willing to do any job abroad 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.05
rule of law (perception-based) 0.27 0.14 0.24 0.12 0.27 0.15 0.24 0.12
corruption (perception-based) 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.23 0.14 0.21 0.13
Household characteristics
family network (other migrants in hh) 0.25 0.92 0.86 1.85 0.90 1.58 1.30 2.14
illegal migration experience 0.09 0.29 0.40 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.60 0.49
number of children (0-16) 0.46 0.75 0.63 0.84 0.55 0.83 0.76 0.91
TV use 0.83 0.38 0.78 0.42 0.85 0.35 0.79 0.41
poor financial status 0.41 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.50
employed hh member (dummy) 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.50 0.50
Respondent's characteristics
age 43.86 17.71 41.50 16.04 42.32 17.14 39.99 16.38
male 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.50
no or primary education 0.29 0.45 0.27 0.45 0.29 0.46 0.31 0.46
secondary education 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.46 0.50
higher education 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.24 0.43
married 0.60 0.49 0.67 0.47 0.63 0.48 0.67 0.47














Rural life in developing and transition countries is plagued by risks. This dissertation has explored 
how rural households cope with shocks and manage risks. A special focus has been put on the 
welfare implications of household behavior. 
The first part has analyzed the socio-economic consequences of AIDS-related mortality. Chapter 
2 has shown that households in rural Zambia that experience the death of a prime-age member 
are able to stabilize their per-capita incomes in the short to medium run. Adjustments of income-
generating activities as well as household size and composition are likely to explain this finding. 
Yet, risk-sharing arrangements spread the burden beyond directly afflicted households. 
Households that have not lost a member but support afflicted households by fostering orphans 
incur considerable reductions in per-capita incomes. These spillover effects suggest that the 
targeting of AIDS-related interventions should not be limited to households in which the death 
occurred. Overall, however, the impact of AIDS-related mortality on monetary welfare appears 
to be limited. Nevertheless, this finding does not render public support unnecessary if coping 
with the death of a household member adversely affects other dimensions of welfare. Chapter 3 
has demonstrated for North-Western Tanzania that the age at parental bereavement has 
important consequences for children’s long-term capital accumulation in terms of both health 
and education. The effects, however, depend on the gender of the deceased parent. Preferences 
of the surviving parent partly protect same-sex children from the detrimental effects of 
orphanhood, suggesting that risks are not equally shared within households. The results provide 
helpful information for designing policy interventions with an age- and gender-specific approach. 
The second part of this dissertation has been concerned with income diversification patterns of 
farm households in sub-Saharan Africa. For Western Kenya, the analysis in chapter 4 has 
confirmed the dichotomy of the non-agricultural sector. As expected, only rich households are 
able to overcome the entry barriers into high-return activities. Low-return activities, however, are 
not concentrated among the poor. They are pursued by households across the entire income 
distribution, possibly reflecting the high risks associated with high-return activities. The chapter 
also provides evidence that engagement in high-return, but not low-return non-agricultural 
activities is associated with increased agricultural productivity. Apparently, high-return activities 
play an important role in triggering positive interactions between different income strategies and 
may hence contribute to sustainable livelihood success. Chapter 5 has examined the determinants 
of diversification in Burkina Faso between 1994 and 2003. Diversification into non-agricultural 
activities is mainly motivated by insurance motives. During the severe drought in 1997/1998, 
households earned increased incomes from migration and local non-agricultural activities. Many 
households were also forced to sell livestock to ensure survival. Yet, the patterns of 
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diversification also reflect structural change as non-agricultural activities tend to become more 
opportunity-led. 
In the last part, this dissertation has looked at international migration in Eastern Europe. Chapter 
6 has examined the reasons for reduced labor supply of migrant-sending households in Moldova. 
The findings do not support the common view that decreased labor market activity is the result 
of remittances-driven leisure consumption. Instead, the departure of a migrant appears to raise 
remaining members’ productivity in home production. In addition, young adults in migrant 
families are substantially more likely to pursue higher education. This effect may be due to 
remittances relieving credit constraints or migration-induced incentives for additional 
investments in human capital. Chapter 7 has illustrated that the individual risk of falling victim to 
human trafficking increases with the size of regional migration flows. The reasons are lower 
recruitment costs for traffickers and, to a lesser extent, more negative self-selection into 
migration. Accordingly, counter-trafficking efforts should be targeted at areas where emigration 
rates are high or on the rise and not at regions with no or little emigration. Our results also 
indicate that awareness campaigns and other measures designed to reduce information 
asymmetries in the migration process may be a promising way to fight the crime. 
Taken together, the findings of this dissertation illustrate that rural households in developing and 
transition countries have adapted their livelihoods in various ways to cope with shocks or reduce 
their exposure to risks. These strategies help households to smooth income and consumption in 
the presence of dysfunctional insurance and credit markets. In the longer run, however, they are 
likely to perpetuate poverty and reduce economic growth. 
Coping strategies such as the depletion of productive assets or the withdrawal of children from 
school may have detrimental and persistent effects on future welfare and vulnerability to shocks. 
Households might even be trapped in poverty if a shock pushes their asset base below a critical 
level that is needed for entry into profitable activities. Risk-management strategies may come at 
the cost of welfare, too. Diversification into low-risk activities typically not only lowers the 
variance, but also the level of (expected) income. This situation creates efficiency losses, as 
households forego potential gains from specialization or engagement in additional high-return 
activities, hampering the accumulation of productive capital or savings. 
Consequently, strategies that protect households from risks should play a prominent role in 
poverty-reduction and growth policies. Better access to microfinance including index-based 
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Haushalte in ländlichen Regionen von Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern sind vielen 
Risiken ausgesetzt. Unvorhergesehene Ereignisse wie Dürren, Preisfluktuationen oder 
Krankheiten stellen eine erhebliche Belastungsprobe für ländliche Haushalte dar und führen nicht 
selten zu Verarmung. Aufgrund des Versagens formaler Versicherungs- und Kreditmärkte im 
ländlichen Raum haben Haushalte informelle Strategien entwickelt, um Risiken zu streuen und 
Einkommenseinbußen auszugleichen. Diese Dissertation untersucht inwieweit es ländlichen 
Haushalten dadurch gelingt, ihre Risiken zu managen und im Falle des Eintritts von 
unvorhergesehenen Ereignissen ihre Wohlfahrtsverluste zu minimieren. 
Der erste Teil der Arbeit befasst sich mit den sozio-ökonomischen Folgen der durch AIDS 
gestiegenen Erwachsenensterblichkeit in Sub-Sahara-Afrika. In Kapitel 2 wird gezeigt, dass 
Haushalte im ländlichen Sambia in der Lage sind, ihr Pro-Kopf-Einkommen nach dem Tod eines 
erwachsenen Familienmitglieds zu stabilisieren. Dieses Ergebnis lässt sich vermutlich auf die 
Anpassung von Einkommensaktivitäten und der demografischen Zusammensetzung seitens 
betroffener Haushalte zurückführen. Allerdings gehen diese demografischen Anpassungen zu 
Lasten der Wohlfahrt anderer Haushalte. Für Haushalte, die Waisenkinder adoptieren, können 
erhebliche Rückgänge im Pro-Kopf-Einkommen festgestellt werden. Insgesamt halten sich die 
Einkommenseinbußen aber in Grenzen. Allerdings können Todesfälle die Lebensqualität 
verbliebener Familienmitglieder auch in nicht-monetären Dimensionen verringern. Wie in 
Kapitel 3 gezeigt wird, hat das Alter zum Todeszeitpunkt der Eltern langfristige Folgen für die 
Gesundheit und Bildung von Kindern. Diese Effekte hängen jedoch vom Geschlecht des 
verstorbenen Elternteils ab. Kinder, deren gleichgeschlechtliches Elternteil überlebt, sind weniger 
stark von den negativen Folgen für Gesundheit und Bildung betroffen. Dieses Ergebnis deutet 
darauf hin, dass Risiken im Haushalt nicht im gleichen Maße geteilt werden.  
Der zweite Teil der Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit dem Einkommensdiversifizierungs-
verhalten bäuerlicher Kleinbetriebe in Sub-Sahara-Afrika. In Kapitel 4 wird der dichotome 
Charakter des nicht-landwirtschaftlichen Sektors in Westkenia untersucht. Die Analyse legt nahe, 
dass nur reiche Haushalte in der Lage sind, die Eintrittsbarrieren in nicht-landwirtschaftliche 
Beschäftigung mit hohen Erträgen zu überwinden. Allerdings gehen sowohl arme als auch reiche 
Haushalte nicht-landwirtschaftlichen Tätigkeiten mit niedrigen Erträgen nach. Dies deutet darauf 
hin, dass Tätigkeiten, die potentiell höhere Erträge erwirtschaften, möglicherweise auch mit 
höheren Risiken gepaart sind. Darüber hinaus sind derartige Tätigkeiten aber auch mit höherer 
landwirtschaftlicher Produktivität verbunden und spielen somit möglicherweise eine wichtige 
Rolle bei der nachhaltigen Verbesserung der Lebensgrundlagen im ländlichen Raum. In Kapitel 5 
werden die Determinanten der Einkommensdiversifizierung in Burkina Faso über den Zeitraum 
1994-2003 analysiert. Das Versicherungsmotiv scheint bei der Diversifizierungsentscheidung von 
großer Bedeutung zu sein. Während der schweren Dürre 1997/1998 bezogen Haushalte mehr 
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Einkommen aus Rücküberweisungen von Migranten und lokalen nicht-landwirtschaftlichen 
Aktivitäten. Am stärksten betroffen waren die ärmsten Haushalte, die sich oft gezwungen sahen, 
ihren Viehbestand zu verkaufen. Allerdings spiegelt das Diversifikationsverhalten auch 
strukturellen Wandel wider, der vielen Haushalten bessere nicht-landwirtschaftliche 
Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten verschafft hat. 
Der letzte Teil der Dissertation befasst sich mit den Wohlfahrtseffekten internationaler Migration 
auf zurückbleibende Haushaltsmitglieder, aber auch auf die Migranten selbst. Der geografische 
Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf Osteuropa. In Kapitel 6 wird untersucht, warum moldawische 
Haushalte mit einem im Ausland lebenden Migranten ihr Arbeitsangebot auf dem heimischen 
Arbeitsmarkt reduzieren. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die gesunkene 
Arbeitsmarktaktivität nicht auf erhöhten Freizeitkonsum zurückzuführen ist, der durch 
Rücküberweisungen aus dem Ausland finanziert wird. Stattdessen scheint der Weggang des 
Migranten die Produktivität verbliebener Haushaltsmitglieder in häuslicher Produktion zu 
steigern. Außerdem gehen junge Erwachsene aus Migrantenhaushalten verstärkt einer Ausbildung 
oder einem Studium nach. In Kapitel 7 wird berücksichtigt, dass Migration an sich eine mit 
enormen Risiken behaftete Aktivität ist. Hier werden die ökonomischen Mechanismen, die den 
Menschenhandel treiben, herausgearbeitet. Menschenhandel (human trafficking) bezeichnet eine 
Situation, in der ein Migrant unter falschen Versprechen angeworben und dann mit 
Zwangsmitteln genötigt wird, seine Arbeitskraft umsonst oder für wenig Geld zur Verfügung zu 
stellen. Basierend auf einer speziellen Haushaltsbefragung in Bulgarien, Moldawien, Rumänien, 
der Ukraine und Weißrussland stellt sich als grundlegendes Ergebnis heraus, dass das individuelle 
Risiko in die Hände von Menschenhändlern zu geraten mit der Größe regionaler 
Emigrationsströme wächst. Die Gründe dafür liegen in den geringeren Anwerbekosten für 
Menschenhändler und in geringerem Maße in negativer Selbstselektion von Migranten. 
Zusammen betrachtet zeigen die Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation, dass sich ländliche Haushalte in 
Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern in vielfältiger Weise auf ihre risikobehafteten 
Lebensbedingungen einstellen. Zwar helfen die ergriffenen Strategien den Haushalten dabei, ihre 
Einkommens- und Konsumniveaus vorübergehend zu glätten. Auf längere Sicht können sie 
jedoch Armut festigen und das Wirtschaftswachstum mindern. Deswegen sollten 
Politikmaßnahmen, die Haushalte vor Risiken schützen, einen prominenten Stellenwert in 
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